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Moral disgust is thought to be an emotion arising from perceptions of 
immorality as physically contaminating, in part based on experiments showing that 
participants are unwilling to contact immoral objects like a Nazi¶V armband. Here it is   
proposed that apparent contagiousness of immorality is driven by desire to avoid 
reputation harm by visibly associating with immorality.  Hypothetical (Study 1) and 
behavioural (Study 2) evidence supported this account. Participants preferred to wear 
a Nazi armband under rather than over their clothing, even though this meant direct 
skin FRQWDFW7KH³XQGHU´SUHIHUHQFHZDVVWURQJHUZLWKDQDXGLHQFH3DUWLFLSDQW
reports revealed little contamination concern but strong reputation concern. Changing 
perspective, targets who touched but concealed the armband were not seen as 
contaminated or immoral (Study 3). If disgust reported towards immorality is not 
contaminating, it may not reflect activation of the full emotion of disgust. Instead, 
people may express disgust to communicate particular motives. Unlike anger, which 
can be seen as self-interested, disgust communicates a more principled, moral 
motivation. Studies 4 and 5 used scenarios to show that observers infer more moral 
motivation from an expression of disgust and more self-interested motivation from 
anger. Studies 6, 7 and 8 demonstrated that participants are more likely to choose to 
express disgust to show moral concern and anger to protest harm to RQH¶VVHOI-
interest. These findings offer a new perspective for understanding the role of disgust 
in morality: disgust is not expressed because people feel an internal state of disgust 
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1. General Introduction 
The moment there is suspicion about a person's motives, everything he does 
becomes tainted.  
-Mahatma Gandhi 
 
There is no odor so bad as that which arises from goodness tainted.  





But for supporting robbers, shall we now contaminate our fingers with base 
bribes. 
-Shakespeare, Julius Caesar 
 
You, hip and cool with a swastika on your arm at your party, are about as 
disgusting as a mouldy piece of food. I vomit.  
Franz Josef Wagner, Bild, 
 
The language of disease and disgust permeates moral discourse. This thesis aims 
to explain why. Was Prince Harry rendered disgusting because he was contaminated by 
physical contact with an immoral arm band? Was the disgust felt by Franz Josef Wagner 
the same emotion as he would feel towards mouldy food? Predominant perspectives in 
the academic literature on disgust answer yes to questions like these. Research 
participants routinely report feeling disgust towards immoral actions like stealing or 
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cheating and towards immoral individuals like robbers or Nazis. Experimental 
DQDORJXHVRI3ULQFH+DUU\¶VUHDO-life faux pas have shown that people are reluctant to 
contact immoral objects like a murGHUHU¶V MXPSHU RU D 1D]L¶V DUPband. Such 
observations buttress the view that the disgust reported towards immorality is the same 
emotion as that reported towards physically disgusting stimuli. Immoral stimuli, it is 
argued, are perceived as contaminating, so they too elicit disgust, which motivates 
avoidance of the source of contamination (Horberg, Oveis, Keltner & Cohen, 2009; 
Rozin & Haidt, 2013). According to some accounts, this moral contamination is 
perceived to occur via the transfer of either a material substance, or a spiritual essence 
(Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986; Rozin, Haidt & McCauley, 2008). 
Here, the assumption that immoral stimuli are appraised as contaminating is 
questioned; instead the apparent contagiousness of immoral stimuli may primarily be 
motivated by a different concern: people avoid touching immoral stimuli because they 
intuit that touch, by signalling close association, has important consequences for 
REVHUYHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHDFWRU¶VPRUDOLW\7KHDFWRU¶VLQWXLWLRQVDERXWUHSXWDWLRQ
threat, not contamination threat, lead to discomfort touching, or otherwise closely 
associating with, immoral stimuli. This alternative account has important implications: 
if moral disgust does not depend on appraisals of contamination, yet contamination is 
a necessary appraisal for disgust (Horberg et al., 2009)WKHQPRUDO³GLVJXVW´PD\QRW
reflect the activation of the emotion disgust. Further, if people do not intuit that immoral 
essences can be transferred by contagion, then questions are raised for existing 
perspectives on essentialism, magical thinking, moral cleansing effects and for the 
psychological basis of mental contamination associated with some cases of obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD). Studies testing this reputation management hypothesis of 
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apparent moral contagion are presented in the first part of this thesis and also appear in 
a manuscript currently under review (Kupfer & Giner-Sorolla, 2017). 
If reports and expressions of disgust towards immorality do not reflect activation of 
the full emotion disgust, then why do people consistently use this terminology and 
facial behaviour of disgust (e.g., Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009), and 
why, even after controlling for anger (e.g., Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007), do people 
often prefer disgust to anger when condemning immorality? The second main 
hypothesis of this thesis is that people may choose to report and express disgust in 
preference to anger, even if they do not actually experience the emotion disgust, 
because it more effectively signals impartial, moral, condemnation. Studies testing this 
social signalling account of moral disgust form the second part of this thesis and are 
also reported in a published paper (Kupfer & Giner-Sorolla, 2016). The two empirical 
chapters of this thesis (Chapters 2 and 3) are linked in two main ways: firstly, if moral 
disgust is not associated with contamination, then it casts doubt on claims that reports 
and expressions of moral disgust really reflect internal feelings of disgust and the 
signalling account explains why people might choose to express disgust, despite not 
feeling disgust. Secondly, by avoiding association with immorality or by 
communication morally motivated condemnation, apparent moral contagion behaviour 
and expressions of disgust both serve the fundamentally important social task of 
maintaining a good moral reputation. 
 
1.1 Disgust 
1.1.1 Components. Emotions can be thought of as coordinated sets of 
components including physiological responses, facial expressions, subjective feelings 
and action tendencies (Scherer, 2005; Frijda, 1987). Discrete emotions can be 
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distinguished from each other by identifying their components (Roseman, Wiest & 
Swartz, 1994). Components that define disgust include feelings of revulsion, nausea, 
gagging and the urge to vomit, and desire to withdraw from the eliciting stimulus 
(Darwin, 1872; Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2009; Royzman, Leeman & Sabini, 2008; 
Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008). Disgust has a characteristic facial expression 
involving slightly narrowed brows, a curled upper lip, wrinkling of the nose, and 
sometimes visible protrusion of the tongue (Ekman, 1992; Rozin, Lowery, & Ebert, 
1994). It is produced and recognised in a similar way and towards similar cues across 
cultures (Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Sauter & Eimer, 2010; Sauter, Eisner, Ekman & 
Scott, 2010) and is even produced in congenitally blind individuals (Galati, Scherer, 
& Ricci-Bitti, 1997). The disgust expression is often taken to be a reliable index of the 
degree to which the emotion is experienced (e.g., Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & 
Anderson, 2009).  
Disgust may also have specific autonomic responses, such as reduced blood 
pressure, heart rate deceleration, decreased skin conductance (Ekman, Levenson, & 
Friesen, 1983; Stark, Walter, Schienle, & Vaitl, 2005), and decreased gastric activity 
(Harrison, Gray, Gianaros & Critchley, 2010; Shenav & Mendes, 2014). Disgust with 
these characteristic properties, especially feelings of revulsion, nausea, and the desire 
to withdraw, is referred to as core disgust (e.g., Rozin et al., 2008), pathogen disgust 
(e.g., Tybur, Lieberman & Griskevicius, 2009), prototypical disgust Rozin et al., 
1994), or bodily disgust (Russell & Giner-Sorrolla, 2013). Emotions are responses to 
the evaluation of external or internal stimuli that are of importance to the functions of 
an organism (Scherer, 2005; Frijda, 1987). As such, a key cognitive component of 
emotions is the evaluation of specific environmental inputs; a process known as 
appraisal (Scherer, 2005). Different emotions appraise different environmental inputs 
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and the key appraisal of disgust is often said to be contamination (Oaten et al., 2009; 
Rozin et al., 2008).  
1.1.2 Function. Disgust has several properties that identify it as an adaptation 
serving the function of pathogen avoidance. Pathogens are typically microscopic and 
cannot be detected directly, so instead disgust is elicited by cues that are reliably 
associated with pathogens (Curtis & Biran, 2001). These cues include body products 
(faeces, urine, vomit, blood and mucus), lesions or rashes on the skin, decay and some 
odours such as putrescine. These cues are often produced by pathogenic 
microorganisms and are, therefore, reliable cues to their presence. Small animals like 
tics or insects are often ectoparasites (or resemble ectoparasites); they and other 
animals like rats can be vectors of disease (Davey, 2011; Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 
2009). Injuries, gore or body-envelope violations have also been argued to reliably 
elicit disgust because they have the potential to transfer pathogens (Curtis & Biran, 
2001; Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2009; Tybur et al., 2009) but a recent account 
suggests that disgust towards injuries may primarily be an empathic response, rather 
than a pathogen avoidance response (Kupfer, 2018; Shenhav & Mendes, 2014).   
Research has confirmed that, across cultures, these stimuli reliably elicit disgust 
(Curtis, Aunger, & Rabie, 2004). Therefore, the inputs to disgust are consistent with 
an emotion that is adapted to disease avoidance function (Curtis & Biran, 2001). 
These cues are not invariably reliable indicators of the presence of pathogens ± not all 
rotting meat is infectious and not all rashes are produced by infection. But the costs of 
failing to detect an infectious agent are generally higher (infection and possible death) 
than the costs of mistakenly avoiding an uninfected person, food or animal, so 
evolution has favoured a hypervigilant detection system that is prone to false alarms 
(Haselton & Nettle, 2006; Nesse, 2005). In the modern day this adaptive feature can 
12 
 
have some unfortunate consequences. For example, people are biased toward 
inferring that healthy people are diseased based only on superficial cues, or even any 
deviation from species-typical morphology (Kurzban & Leary, 2001, Schaller & 
Duncan, 2007). This may be why groups like obese people (Park, Schaller & 
Crandall, 2007), physically disabled people (Park, Faulkner & Schaller, 2003), and 
ugly people (Krendl, Macrae, Kelley, Fugelsang & Heatherton, 2006; Park, van 
Leeuwen, Stephen, 2012) might elicit the pathogen avoidance emotion which 
contributes to prejudice (Neuberg, Kenrick & Schaller, 2008). The components of 
disgust also appear well designed (by evolution) to perform a specific function, which 
is important because the fit between form and function is regarded as the key criterion 
for identifying adaptations, behavioural or otherwise (Mayr, 1983; Williams, 1966). 
The contamination appraisal identifies sources of pathogens; the withdrawal action 
tendency reduces the chance of contact with pathogens; feelings of nausea reduces the 
chance of ingesting pathogens; and vomiting and hygiene behaviour such as grooming 
remove pathogens that have not been successfully avoided (Curtis et al., 2011; Oaten 
et al., 2009; Royzman et al., 2008). 
1.1.3 Acquisition. Many authors have suggested SHRSOHDUH³SUHSDUHG´E\
evolution to respond to cues that most reliably correlated with pathogen presence over 
evolutionary time (Curtis, de Barra, & Aunger, 2011; Oaten et al., 2009; Tybur et al., 
2013), in the sense that disgust towards them is either easily learned (Seligman, 1971) 
or does not require any learning (Menzies & Clarke, 1995). Evidence for such 
preparedness is limited however. Some suggest that features like moisture, 
temperature and soft consistency might be prepared for disgust because they are 
associated with the conditions in which microbes grow best (Oaten et al.; Oum & 
Lieberman, 2012). Odours like putrescine and cadaverine are good candidates for 
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preparedness because they are reliably associated with rotting flesh and other sources 
of potential infection and there is evidence that some non-human animals respond 
innately to these chemicals (Hussain et al., 2013). However, direct evidence for 
disgust cue preparedness in humans is limited, if not absent.  
There is also evidence that disgust reactions to certain cues might be learned. 
Unlike distaste reactions to bitter and sour chemicals, disgust reactions do not seem to 
be present at birth, but develop gradually from around two years of age (Rozin et al. 
2008). Based on parent report, self-report and behaviour, Stevenson, Oaten, Case, 
Repacholi and Wagland (2010) found WKDWFKLOGUHQ¶VGLVJXVWWRZDUGVFRUHHOLcitors 
manifest from around two years of age, whereas socio-moral disgust emerges from 
around seven years of age. Disgust towards body odours does not strongly appear 
until adolescence (Stevenson & Repacholi, 2003); leading Soo and Stevenson (2003) 
to suggest that body odours are a learned cue resulting from the development of 
modern hygiene standards in the twentieth century. Repacholi (1998) found that 14-
month olds demonstrate aversion to objects if a disgust face was made towards them. 
1.1.4 Contamination. Paul Rozin and colleagues conducted early investigations 
into the contaminating properties of disgusting stimuli and described their findings 
under the rubric of the three laws of sympathetic magic (Rozin et al., 1986). The laws 
were originally described by anthropologists, most notably Frazer (1890), who noted 
that many primitive people believe that essences can be magically transferred between 
objects, for example the Kai from New Guinea believed that everything a person 
FRQWDFWVUHWDLQVVRPHRIKLVµVRXOVWXII¶. Rozin et al. elaborated on )UD]HU¶V laws and 
argued that they are intuitive beliefs of all people, including educated Western adults. 
The first law³you are what you eat´VWDWHV that the qualities of a food (e.g., a fierce 
animal) transfer to the consumer. The second LVWKH³law of similarity´: people 
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perceive that objects that look similar possesses similar essences, which was 
GHPRQVWUDWHGE\$PHULFDQVWXGHQWV¶ reluctance to consume chocolate fudge shaped 
like dog faeces (Rozin et al.7KHWKLUGODZRIV\PSDWKHWLFPDJLF³RQFHLQFRQWDFW
DOZD\VLQFRQWDFW´ RUWKH³ODZRIFRQWDJLRQ´refers to the transmission of an 
invisible essence from one object to another resulting in a permanent link between the 
two. This was demonstrated by participanWV¶UHOXFWDQFH to drink juice that has been in 
contact with a sterile cockroach (Rozin et al.) and by findings showing that 
participants are reluctant to touch morally disgusting objects (described in detail 
below). These laws are irrational in the sense that consuming a fierce animal does not 
really change one¶s personality, eating faeces shaped chocolate is not harmful, and a 
sterile cockroach is not in fact contagious. However, Rozin and colleagues argue that 
the laws are intuitive beliefs that operate even among Western, educated student 
populations ± their participants responded with aversion despite knowing that the 
cockroach and chocolate were harmless. These findings fit with the pathogen 
avoidance model of disgust: pathogens are easily transferred by touch, so an 
important adaptive feature of disgust is that it motivates people to avoid contact with 
contaminating stimuli and with objects that have been contaminated by touching those 
stimuli (Curtis et al., 2004; Oaten et al., 2009).   
The perception of contamination does not require conscious assessment of 
infection likelihood, or knowledge of germ theory, because people respond to certain 
cues implicitly (Curtis et al., 2004; Rozin et al., 2008): people avoid contaminated 
objects, even if they consciously know there is no infection risk (Rozin et al., 1986). 
Furthermore, research suggests that children respond to food as if it could be 
contaminated as early as 4 years old (Rozin, Hammer, Oster, Horowitz & Marmora, 
1986; Siegal & Share, 1990; Springer & Belk, 1994) without necessarily 
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understanding that it is contaminated because of germs. For example, when 
interrogated, children reported that poisons, chemicals like pepper (Kalish, 1997), 
³GRJJ\VOLPH´GLUWRUOLWWOHDQLPDOV/HJDUH:HOOPDQ	*HOPDQ might be the 
reason that touching contaminated objects causes harm.  Poisons may be an adequate 
model for understanding infection by contamination, even if objectively inaccurate, 
because poisons are harmful, can easily transfer to other objects, and can make those 
objects harmful (Kalish; Keil, Levin, Richman, & Gutheil, 1999; Siegal, Fadda & 
Overton, 2011). Explicit explanations like the transfer of poisons, invisible particles, 
germs, or even evil essences, may constitute post-hoc reflective elaborations on 
intuitions deriving from an intuitive germ theory motivated largely by disgust. The 
intuitive germ theory can be summarised as the rule ³LIDQREMHFWKDVcontacted a 
substance that makes me feel disgust, then that object is now harmful and disgusting 
to conWDFW´  Such reflective elaborations on intuitions are argued to be the source of 
many common beliefs (Boyer & Baumard, 2012). 
Contamination is a very useful property empirically because only disgusting 
stimuli are contaminating. More specifically, only stimuli that induce pathogen 
disgust are contaminating. Other emotions, like fear or anger, are not contaminating ± 
if RQH¶V toothbrush touched a lion, the toothbrush would not become frightening. But 
if the toothbrush touched a cockroach, it would become disgusting. In other words, 
contamination may be specific to disgust (Kupfer, 2017; Oaten et al., 2009). Although 
discrete emotions have a unique set of coordinated components, the individual 
components or properties of emotions are seldom specific to that emotion (Levenson, 
2014; Mauss & Robinson, 2009). Arousal, increased heart rate and increased skin 
conductance are physiological properties that can be measured, but they are not 
specific to one emotion, occurring with anger, fear and excitement (Kreibig, 2010). 
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Similarly, aversion and avoidance are not specific to one emotion but can be an output 
of disgust, fear or contempt (Watson, Wiese, Vaidya & Tellegen, 1999). Patterns of 
gastric reactivity (Harrison, et al., 2010; Shenhav & Mendes, 2014), nausea and 
diminished appetite (Royzman, Leeman & Sabini, 2008) might seem like plausible 
candidates for components that are specific to disgust, given that they could index its 
prototypical properties (Chapman & Anderson, 2013; Oaten et al., 2009). But even 
these components are not specific to disgust because other emotions like fear, 
excitement and pain can also involve reduced gastric reactivity and nausea (Andersen 
& Krohg, 1976; Vianna & Tranel, 2006).  
Unlike most other emotion properties contamination appears to be specific to one 
emotion, disgust. It could, therefore, be used to diagnose disgust and distinguish it 
from other affective responses. For example, Kupfer (2017) used a binary-choice 
behavioural avoidance task to demonstrate that injuries are perceived as less 
contaminating than equally disgusting infections. Based partly on this evidence, he 
argued that the disgust reported towards injuries is not pathogen disgust but an 
empathic affective response involving vicarious pain and harm which feels 
subjectively similar to pathogen disgust. Similarly, if moral disgust is the same 
emotion as disgust towards pathogen cues, then morally disgusting stimuli should be 
perceived as contaminating. Thus, the property of contamination affords the 
opportunity to investigate whether or not reported moral disgust reflects the full 
activation of the emotion disgust. 
1.1.5 Variation in disgust. As for most complex biological traits, there is 
variation in the degree to which disgust is present in each individual, as revealed by 
measures of disgust sensitivity such as the Disgust Scale-Revised (DS-R; Haidt et al., 
1994, modified by Olatunji et al., 2007) and the Three Domain Disgust Scale (TDDS; 
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Tybur et al., 2009). One reason for these individual differences might be that people 
have chronic variation in (perceived) susceptibility to disease (Duncan, Schaller & 
Park, 2009). Some of this variation might be functional. High disgust sensitivity 
might be more adaptive for women, for example, because childbearing results in 
greater fitness costs associated with contracting infection (Fleischman, 2014; Oaten, 
Stevenson, & Case, 2009).  
Other variation in disgust may be due to trade-offs with competing motives like 
the motive to eat or to have sexual intercourse. The level of experienced disgust may 
be a result of a trade-off between these costs and benefits of physical contact with the 
stimulus ± a motivational state that has been described as the expected value of 
contact (Tybur et al., 2013). The expected value of contact of a food, for example, 
would depend on its perceived infectiousness (e.g., via odours or colours cuing 
decay), a person's nutritional state, and the food's perceived nutritional value. To an 
especially hungry person, even mouldy corn could become palatable (Hoefling et al., 
2009). This logic also applies to interpersonal disgust, including parent-offspring 
interactions. The smell and appearance of faces are typically treated as pathogen cues, 
but parents feel little disgust towards their own baby's diaper in comparison to an 
XQNQRZQEDE\¶VGLDSHU, presumably because the benefits of contact with RQH¶VRZQ 
offspring outweigh the costs of contact with pathogens (Case, Repacholi, & 
Stevenson, 2006).  
Case and colleagues offered a somewhat different explanation for these effects, 
referring to the observation that disease-related cues from strangers are more 
disgusting as the µsource effect¶. Stevenson & Repacholi, (2005) found that negative 
affect increased when the source of a body odour (e.g., faecal matter, feet, flatulence 
and sweat) derived from a stranger rather than from the self. They suggested that this 
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source effect might be due to the level of exposure and habituation to cues, or because 
strangers and outgroups might carry less familiar pathogens to which people are more 
vulnerable (Navarrete & Fessler, 2006). Remarkably, these source effects seem to 
have been demonstrated in children: Raman and Gelman (2008) found that children 
reported family members or liked people as less likely to be contagious than strangers 
or disliked people. In contrast, the expected value of contact explanation explains 
source effects as disgust resulting from a trade-off between the costs and benefits of 
contact with other people. The benefits of contact might be higher, for example, with 
an in-group member, because of potentially cooperative engagement, than with a 
stranger, so the disgust might be reduced to facilitate harmonious contact (Reicher, 
Templeton, Neville, Ferrari & Drury, 2016; Sacco, Young & Hugenberg, 2014).  
Similarly, the benefits of contact with a high quality mate may outweigh costs 
from the transfer of potentially pathogenic body fluids, resulting in low or even absent 
disgust towards intimacy and intercourse (Borg & de Jong, 2012), though not all 
studies have found this effect (Zsok, Fleischman, Borg & Morrison, 2017). Equally, 
disgust cues can reduce sexual motives (Fleischman, Hamilton, Fessler & Meston, 
2015). Similarly, interactions with people in general facilitate beneficial cooperative 
activities but also risk pathogen transmission due to proximity and contact. Disgust 
motivates avoidance of people, especially those with pathogen cues, and expressing 
disgust can be harmful to interpersonal relations (Giner-Sorolla & Espinosa, 2011; 
Harris & Fiske, 2006). Consistent with this, the level of disgust reported towards 
humans displaying pathogen cues (but not non-human pathogen cues) is lower for 
people high in agreeableness ± a trait that indexes motives for maintaining 
harmonious relationships (Kupfer & Tybur, 2017). In summary, when explaining the 
level of disgust a person experiences, expresses or reports, it is important to consider 
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not just the perceived infection or contamination risk, but the overall costs and 
benefits of experiencing, expressing or reporting disgust; a principle that might also 
apply to moral disgust. 
1.1.6 Evolution and phylogeny. Infectious disease and parasitism exerted strong 
selection pressures during animal and human evolution (Hamilton, Axelrod, & 
Tanese, 1990; Wolfe, Dunavan & Diamond, 2007), which led to the evolution of 
behavioural adaptations for disease avoidance in animals as well as humans (Hart, 
2011). Comparison between animal and human behaviours can be informative 
(Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990; Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch, 2002), enabling inferences 
about the phylogeny and functions of existing traits, such as pathogen avoidance 
behaviour in humans (Darwin, 1859; Tinbergen, 1953).  
Animal pathogen avoidance behaviours include selective defecation and faecal 
avoidance; grooming, preening, and behaviours like tail swishing, which mainly deter 
biting parasites; exclusion or avoidance of conspecifics that carry pathogens; selective 
sexual interaction to avoid infected mates; wound licking; nest fumigation with 
natural insecticides and self-medication with natural medicines; and avoidance of 
certain foods (Hart, 1990; 2011).  Such behaviours are often present in 
phylogenetically distant species. For example, dHVHUW,JXDQDVJHQHUDWH³EHKDYLRXUDO
IHYHU´E\PRYLQJWRZDUPPLFURFOLPDWHVto kill parasites (Kluger, Ringler, Anver, 
1975). Birds have a wide array of parasite avoidance behaviours, including sunning, 
anting, dusting, preening (Clayton, Koop, Harbison, Moyer & Bush, 2010).  
Many social species have been found to have behavioural mechanisms that enable 
them to detect and avoid specific individuals that are infected. For example, Sage 
Grouse are parasitized by lice which create hematomas on the air sacs of males and 
females can detect these and then avoid lousy males (Boyce, 1990). The Caribbean 
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spiny lobster is able to detect chemical signatures of the PaV1 virus in the urine of 
infected conspecifics and uses this cue to avoid sharing shelters with infected 
conspecifics (Behringer, Butler & Shields, 2006). Like many primates, Mandrills 
engage in allogrooming, in part for social benefits. Ingestion of skin fragments and 
ectoparasites during allogroooming can lead to transmission of protozoa but 
individuals avoid these costs by selectively avoiding grooming parasitized 
individuals. Avoidance was found to be mediated by the detection of odours found in 
higher levels in protozoan rich faecal matter (Poirotte et al., 2017). Evidence like this 
gives more plausibility to the claim that humans are evolutionarily prepared to detect 
and avoid cues of contamination by pathogens (Kavaliers & Choleris, 2011). Hart 
(2011) suggested that all of the disease avoidance strategies that are present in 
animals are also present in humans in some form, including medication and hygiene 
behaviour.   
1.1.7 Pathogen-avoidance is not only disgust. Research on human disease-
avoidance behaviour has focused predominantly on disgust and on clarifying the 
functions of the emotion (Lieberman & Patrick, 2014; Tybur et al., 2009; Rozin & 
Haidt, 2013). Less attention has been given to the possible existence of other 
behaviours in humans, despite the variety of pathogen avoidance behaviours in 
nonhuman animals. However, some researchers have suggested that disgust is only 
RQHSDUWRIDZLGHU³EHKDYLRXUDOLPPXQHV\VWHP´6FKDOOHU	3DUN6FKaller, 
2014) and there is some evidence that perception of disease cues leads to upregulation 
of the immune system (Miller & Maner, 2011; Schaller, Miller, Gervais, Yager & 
Chen, 2010), which presumably does not require the activation of the emotion disgust.  
As another example, recent research suggests that humans may have an 
ectoparasite avoidance system, at least partly distinct from prototypical disgust, that 
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involves skin sensations such as itching and crawling (Blake et al., 2016), 
upregulation of skin sensitivity to touch in response to ectoparasite cues (Hunt et al., 
2016) and scratching and self-grooming behaviour (3URNRS)DQþRYLþRYi	)HGRU
2014). This ectoparasite avoidance system may be homologous with the adaptation 
underlying grooming and ectoparasite avoidance behaviour in primates and mammals 
(Kupfer & Fessler, 2017) and may be implicated in particular disorders, including 
delusory parasitosis, the belief that one is infested by ectoparasites (Hinkle, 2000); 
trypophobia, an aversion towards clusters of roughly circular objects that includes 
itching sensations and scratching behaviour (Kupfer & Le, 2017); trichotillomania, 
compulsive hair pulling (Fleischman & Fessler, 2011); and excoriation, compulsive 
skin-picking (Grant et al., 2012).  Nevertheless, the study of moral disgust has 
focused on its relation to core or pathogen disgust its prototypical components, 
including nausea and contamination appraisal and avoidance. 
 
1.3 From pathogen disgust to moral disgust 
Although most researchers agree WKDWGLVJXVW¶VRULJLQDOIXQFWLRQZDVSDWKRJHQ
avoidance, there is no consensus about how it came to be involved in moral 
condemnation. However, accounts can be roughly divided into three groups: one 
argues that disgust evolved to take on a general role in morality, another that it 
evolved to respond to a specific class of moral violations, and a third argues that it 
only responds to the pathogen content of moral violations. A fourth type of account 
argues that moral disgust is used as a metaphor, but that it is tightly linked to the 
concept of physical disgust to the extent that a full disgust response is activated 
including the urge to clean and remove contamination (Lee & Schwarz, 2016; Zhong 
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& House, 2014); this account is evaluated in section 4.1 of the general discussion, 
along with a more general consideration metaphor. 
 
1.2.1 General role. One type of perspective on moral disgust argues that pathogen 
disgust was co-opted and modified during evolution to take on a new general-purpose 
function in morality, responding to moral violations in general, such as cheating or 
stealing, that have no relevance to pathogens (e.g., Cannon et al., 2011; Chapman et 
al., 2009; Chapman & Anderson, 2013; 2014; Danovich & Bloom, 2009; Hutcherson 
& Gross, 2011; Tybur et al., 2009). Tybur et al. suggested that disgust was co-opted 
during evolution to perform the novel function of motivating avoidance of individuals 
ZKRFRXOGLQIOLFWFRVWVRQRQH¶VVHOINLQRUDOOLHVYLDQRUP-violations like lying, 
cheating or stealing.  
The reuse of existing systems for new functions is thought to have been common 
in the evolution of the human brain (Anderson, 2010). For example, the physical pain 
system may have been co-opted to guard against social rejection with social pain 
(MacDonald & Leary, 2005). Later, Tybur, Lieberman, Kurzban and DeScioli (2013) 
also suggested that disgust was co-opted to perform a new role in morality but that its 
role was primarily as a signal to recruit and coordinate condemnation of people who 
YLRODWHQRUPVWKDWHQKDQFHWKHHQGRUVHU¶s fitness. This account is similar to the 
signalling hypothesis given in the current thesis, except that they do not explain why 
disgust, rather than another emotion like anger, should perform this function, or why 
it would be necessary to feel the emotion, rather than just express it. Chapman and 
Anderson (2013) suggest that the co-option of disgust may have been selected for 
EHFDXVHLWSURYLGHVZLWKGUDZDOPRWLYDWLRQ³ZKLFKFRXOGKDYHEHHQDYDOXDEOH
addition to the behavioural repertoire of our highly socLDOVSHFLHV´S
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However, nonhumans already appear to have adaptations to motivating discriminate 
sociality (Kurzban & Leary, 2001), for example chimps have often been observed 
socially excluding particular individuals (Harcourt & de Waal, 1992; Wrangham, 
1987). The evolution of moral disgust, therefore, may have been superfluous. 
Based on findings showing that incidental disgust increased condemnation of 
purity and nonpurity violations, Schnall et al. (2008, p. 1097) gave a general 
GHILQLWLRQRIGLVJXVWDV³DQHPRWLRQRIVRFLDOUHMHFWLRQ´6LPLODUO\&DQQRQSchnall & 
White (2010 p. DUJXHGWKDW³GLVJXVWLVDUHDFWLRQWRRIIHQVLYHREMHFWVDVZHOOas 
RIIHQVLYHDFWLRQV´&KDSPDQet al. (IRXQGWKDWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶VHOI-reports and 
their facial expressions showed that they felt disgusted by very unfair offers during 
ultimatum games and Cannon et al. found that participants showed facial 
electromyographic (EMG) activation specific to disgust but not anger when 
participants read about unfairness (e.g., someone cheating at cards). Danovitch and 
Bloom (2009) found that young children ZLOOGHVFULEHPRUDOYLRODWLRQVVXFKDV³EHLQJ
YHU\PHDQWRVRPHRQH´DVGLVJXVWLQJDQGDJUHHWKDWDGLVJXVWIDFHFDQJRZLWKVXFK
violations. Findings like these are often taken to show that disgust may be a reaction 
to immoral acts in general because sociDOUXOHYLRODWRUVDUHVHHQDV³VRFLDO
FRQWDPLQDQWV´*UDKDP+DLGW	1RVHN&KDSPDQ	$QGHUVRQ=KRQJ
& House, 2014).  However, these findings do not provide evidence that participants 
do perceive violators as contaminating, nor do they show that the expression of 
disgust is accompanied by an emotional experience of disgust. As others have argued, 
facial expressions can be produced for communicative effect, in the absence of 
specific internal feelings (Fridlund & Russell, 2006; Royzman & Kurzban, 2011).  
1.2.2 Pathogens as a specific cue. This account argues that disgust is involved in 
moral violations only to the extent that those violations contain cues to pathogens, or 
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behaviours that could increase the risk of pathogen transmission, such as certain 
sexual and food consumption behaviours (Inbar & Pizzaro, 2014; Oaten et al., 2009; 
Schaller & Park, 2011). According to Oaten et al., (2009) violations of some social 
norms bring to mind physical disgust elicitors that have become associated, via 
socialization, with these norms. For example, in some cultures preparing food with 
the left hand would be disgusting because of the idea that other disgusting objects are 
likely to have been touched by the left hand. Royzman et al. (2014) make the same 
argument and found that the nausea, gagging and reduced appetite components of 
disgust are only elicited when moral violations that contain cues to pathogens; 
otherwise anger is the dominant emotion. Similarly, based on two studies finding that 
disgust was only reported towards immoral items that contained cues like urine or 
other body products, Kayyal, Pochedly, McCarthy and Russell (2015) also argued that 
the emotion disgust is only involved in morality when violations include pathogen 
cues. Accounts like these see disgust towards moral violations as arising from its 
pathogen content, not from its moral content, so they do not view moral disgust as a 
specific and discrete emotion. When disgust is reported towards pathogen-free 
violations, it is interpreted as a metaphor for another feeling such as anger (Nabi, 
2002; Royzman & Kurzban, 2011). 
1.2.3 Impurity as a specific cue. According to Rozin and colleagues, disgust 
originated as a bitter taste rejection system and through the evolutionary process of 
preadaptation, it later adopted the new role of avoiding pathogenic, or contaminated, 
foods like cockroaches (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008). Still later, other elicitors 
were added, including animal-reminders, certain people and social groups, and moral 
offenses involving purity, divinity or sanctity violations (Rozin, Lowery, Imada & 




H[SHOWKHFRQWDPLQDQW´ZHUHFRQVHUYHGAs noted by other authors (e.g., Russell & 
Giner-Sorolla, 2013), the cues included in the purity domain are not clearly defined, 
sometimes focusing on sexual purity cues but at other times on more general and 
metaphorical purity cues. For example, Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto & Haidt (2012, p 
185) argued that moral disgust UHVSRQGVWR³YDULRXVVRFLDOFRQWDPLQDQWVOLNHVSLULWXDO
FRUUXSWLRQRUWKHLQDELOLW\WRFRQWURORQH¶VEDVHLPSXOVHV´ and claimed that its 
evolutionary function was to improve group cohesion by binding people together 
(Haidt, 2012). Horberg et al. (2009, p 964) also give a vague and general definition of 
SXULW\DV³DQ\WKLQJSHUFHLYHGDVOLNHO\WRFRQWDPLQDWHWKHVHOISK\VLFDOO\RUVSLULWXDOO\
RUWRWKUHDWHQWKHLUVWDWXVDVFLYLOL]HGKXPDQEHLQJV´ Whereas Rottman, Kelemen and 
Young (2014 p 218) used a more specific religious definition of impurity as 
³WUDQVJUHVVLRQVWKDWDUHFRQVLGHUHGZURQJEHFDXVHWKH\FRQWDPLQDWHRUGHJUDGHD
VDFUHGHQWLW\´+DLGWDQG*UDKDPSLGHQWLI\SXULW\DVWKH³YLUWXHVDQG
vices linked to bodily activities in geQHUDODQGUHOLJLRXVDFWLYLWLHVLQSDUWLFXODU´DQG
JLYHWKHH[DPSOHVRI³FDUQDOSDVVLRQVOXVWJOXWWRQ\JUHHGDQGDQJHU´
Furthermore, as will be described below, when these researchers set out to measure 
disgust towards purity, it is not clear how their violation items fit with these various 
vague definitions. 
Russell & Giner-Sorolla (2013) make a similar argument, claiming that disgust is 
elicited by violations that include cues to the body, or cues related to the body by 
association, including taboo food practices and sexual behaviours. They suggested 
that non-bodily moral disgust requires a different explanation from bodily moral 
disgust, perhaps based on cues to bad character (Giner-Sorolla & Chapman, 2017).  
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Purity accounts sometimes reject evidence showing that disgust is reported and 
expressed towards general moral violations which have no pathogen, impure, or 
bodily content (e.g., Chapman et al., 2009) by arguing that the disgust is 
metaphorical. For example, Rozin, Haidt and Fincher (2009, p 1180) suggest that 
³RQO\LIHYLGHQFHLVIRXQGIRUDURXWHIURPXQIDLUQHVVWRWKHGLVJXVWHYDOXDWLRQV\VWHP
can it be concluded that disgust at unfairness is "the same" as disgust that is elicited 
WKURXJKWKHFRUHURXWHVXFKDVLQUHVSRQVHWRFRFNURDFKHV´7KH\FODLPWKDWLQ
contrast to general disgust elicitors, evidence from behavioural avoidance tasks 
(described belowVKRZVWKDWSXULW\YLRODWLRQVHQJDJH³IXOOGLVJXVW´E\GHPRQVWUDWLQJ
that they are appraised as contaminating. However, their assertion does not seem to be 
supported by the evidence they cite, given that (as described below) many of these 
³ODZ RIFRQWDJLRQ´H[SHULPHQWVSXUSRUW to demonstrate that general elicitors like a 
liar, a murderer, or a thief, are contaminating. Royzman and Sabini (2001) also argue 
that evidence that people report or express disgust towards moral violations is 
insufficieQWWRVKRZWKDWWKH\HOLFLWIXOOGLVJXVW7KH\UHIHUWRWKLVFODLPDVWKH³PRUDO
G\VSHSVLDK\SRWKHVLV´DQGDUJXHWKDWSURWRW\SLFDOGLVJXVWFRPSRQHQWVOLNHnausea, 
gagging and diminished appetite could show that disgust reported towards moral 
violations is full disgust (Royzman et al., 2008; Royzman & Kurzban, 2011). 
The argument presented in this thesis agrees that for moral disgust to qualify as 
³IXOOdisgust´, the response to moral violations needs to be shown to consist of more 
than just words and expressions and should, in particular, include contamination 
appraisals. To DVVHVVWKHFUHGLELOLW\RIWKHFODLPWKDW³IXOOGLVJXVW´LVHOLFLWHGE\SXULW\
or general moral violations, the next section will review evidence that goes beyond 




1.3 Evidence for moral disgust.  
1.3.1 Neuroimaging. There is strong evidence that the insula is involved in 
pathogen RUµFRUH¶disgust. Lesions of human insula cortex impair both the experience 
of disgust and the recognition of disgust in others (Calder, Keane, Manes, Antoun, & 
Young, 2000; Hayes, Stevenson, & Coltheart, 2007) and recordings with depth 
electrodes in the anterior insula show responses to pictures of facial expressions of 
disgust but not to other emotional expressions (Krolak-Salmon et al., 2003).  
Neuroimaging has also shown that the recognition of facial expressions of disgust, 
and disgust towards olfactory or visual cues, involve the insula (Hennenlotter et al., 
2004; Phillips et al., 1997; Schienle et al., 2002; Wicker et al., 2003).  
Findings like these have motivated two investigations into insula responsiveness 
towards moral violations. Moll et al. (2005) had participants read physically 
GLVJXVWLQJVHQWHQFHVHJ³DFDWHDWLQJIDHFHV´DQG³\RXVDZUDWVLQWKHSDQV´DQG
PRUDO³LQGLJQDWLRQ´ VWDWHPHQWVHJ³WKHQXUVHKDGSXWDVSLGHURQWKHEDE\¶VIDFH´
DQG³DGHDGFRFNURDFKIORDWLQJRQWKHVRDSSDQ´. They found that both types of 
statement resulted in similar patterns of neural activation, but in regions other than the 
insula. Furthermore, the inclusion of physically disgusting content in their moral 
statements limits any conclusions that can be made about where the brain processes 
moral disgust. Borg, Lieberman and Kiehl (2008) compared disgust eliciting 
VHQWHQFHVHJ³<RXVLSSLQJ\RXUVLVWHU¶VXULQH´ZLWKPRUDOYLRODWLRQVZLWKout 
pathogen content (³<RXEXUJODUL]LQJ\RXUVLVWHU¶VKRPH´) and found that core disgust 
and moral disgust elicited activation in overlapping brain areas. However, again these 
areas did not include the insula, so it is not clear that the areas of overlap represent 
common feelings of disgust, or just processing of other information, such as the social 
situation described in the items. 
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Even if future studies did demonstrate insula activation during moral disgust, the 
insula has been implicated in many processes (Critchley et al., 2004), including 
empathy (Singer, Critchley & Preuschoff, 2009) and social exclusion (Eisenberger, 
Lieberman & Williams, 2003) and some have argued that it has a more general role in 
interoception (Craig, 2011). Therefore, evidence of insula activation during moral 
disgust would not warrant the reverse inference that the brain circuits of physical 
disgust are involved because insula activation could represent another process 
(Poldrack, 2006). In summary, the available neuroimaging evidence does not support 
the conclusion that the emotional response to moral violations is the same as that 
towards physically disgusting cues. 
1.3.2 Disgust sensitivity and moral condemnation. A number of findings have 
investigated the association between individual differences in disgust sensitivity and 
moral judgments. For example, Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, and Ditto (2011) 
found that disgust sensitivity measured using the Disgust Scale-Revised (DS-R; 
Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994, modified by Olatunji et al., 2007) more strongly 
correlated with the purity domain of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire than with 
the other four domains. The DS-R measures disgust towards a variety of physically 
GLVJXVWLQJFXHVHJ³<RXVHHPDJJRWVRQDSLHFHRIPHDWLQDQRXWGRRUJDUEDJH
SDLO´DQG³$IULHQGRIIHUV\RXDSLHFHRIFKRFRODWHshaped like dog-GRR´VRWKH
authors argued that the tendency to experience physical disgust towards cues like 
these also influences moral judgement. 
 People who score higher on disgust sensitivity have also been found to show 
more negative attitudes towards homosexuality and other deviant or threatening 
VH[XDOSUDFWLFHVEXWQRWWRZDUGV³SXUH´LVVXHVOLNHZHOIDUHDQGJXQFRQWURO(Crawford 
et al., 2014; Inbar, Pizarro et al., 2009; Jarudi, 2009) and disgust sensitivity predicts 
29 
 
opposition to gay marriage, premarital sex and abortion (Inbar et al., 2009; Smith, 
Oxley, Hibbing, Alford, & Hibbing, 2011). Horberg et al. (Study 3, 2009) found that 
highly disgust sensitive individuals endorsed stronger punishment of purity violations 
like ³EHLQJVH[XDOO\SURPLVFXRXV´DQG³NHHSLQJDQXQWLG\DQGGLUW\OLYLQJVSDFH´ but 
not harm or justice transgressions VXFKDV³NLFNLQJDGRJWKDWLVEORFNLQJDGRRUZD\´
RU³OHDYLQJVPDOOWLSV´Recent research by Wagemans, Brandt and Zeelenberg (2017) 
used the standardised set of Moral Foundations Vignettes developed by Clifford, 
Iyengar, Cabeza and Sinnott-Armstronget (2015) to investigate the relationship 
between disgust sensitivity measured using the DS-R and moral judgement. They 
found that disgust sensitivity more strongly predicted purity moral judgments than 
moral judgments in the authority, care, and fairness domains. Overall, findings like 
WKHVHDSSHDUWRVKRZWKDW³GLVJXVWLVXQLTXHO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKPRUDOL]DWLRQRIWKH
SXULW\GRPDLQ´+RUEHUJHWDOS 
However, the relationship between disgust sensitivity and moral judgement could 
be due to non-moral content of the items and scenarios judged by participants. As 
discussed further, below, many of the purity or divinity items contain physically 
disgusting cues such as dog meat or touching a corpse, and disgust sensitivity 
questionnaires tend to measure sensitivity to similar content (especially core or 
pathogen disgust items). Therefore, findings like those described above do not 
distinguish the impurity account from the pathogen cue account (Inbar & Pizzaro, 
2014; Oaten et al., 2009; Schaller & Park, 2011). For example, the Moral Foundations 






homosexual in a gay bar offering sex to DQ\RQHZKREX\VKLPDGULQN´DQG ³<RXVHH
DZRPDQKDYLQJLQWLPDWHUHODWLRQVZLWKDUHFHQWO\GHFHDVHGORYHGRQH´$WWKHVDPH
time, the DS-5FRQWDLQVLWHPVVXFKDV³<RXDFFLGHQWDOO\WRXFKWKHDshes of a person 
ZKRKDVEHHQFUHPDWHG´DQG³,WZRXOGERWKHUPHWUHPHQGRXVO\WRWRXFKDGHDG
ERG\´Thus, people who are highly sensitive to the latter items might rate the 
vignette items as more morally wrong because they are more affected by the 
physically disgusting content, rather than because they are more prone to experience 
moral disgust. Although disgust sensitive people may judge certain moral 
transgressions more harshly, this is not evidence that their condemnation is driven by 
their experiences of a moral disgust emotion, or that they perceive moral 
contamination. Rather, stronger experiences of pathogen disgust may make 
individuals more motivated to prohibit behaviours that lead to these feelings.  
Even disgust towards sexual practices like homosexuality or incest might derive 
from non-moral forms of disgust. Any sexual interaction involves close physical 
contact and exchange of bodily fluids, which pose risk of infection by pathogens 
(Fleichman, 2017). Sexual acts with people that do not provide any benefits to the 
perceiver (such as homosexuals to heterosexuals) could arouse disease-avoidance 
motives without being tempered by competing mating motives (Tybur et al., 2013; 
Tybur & Gangestad, 2011). Even if people are only evaluating vignettes or items in a 
questionnaire, the contemplation of behaviours like homosexuality or bestiality may 
evoke disgusting mental images (Fessler & Navarette, 2003). These disgusting mental 
images might then lead to a desire to proscribe and condemn the evoking behaviours.  
This mental imagery process might underlie moral condemnation of a wide variety of 
behaviours. For example, imagining another person eating meat might be disgusting 
for a vegetarian, which might contribute to their opposition to the behaviour (Fessler, 
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Arguello, Mekdara, & Macias, 2003; Rozin, Markwith & Stoess, 1997). A similar 
moralisation process might underlie opposition to behaviours like smoking ± the more 
disgusting an individual finds cigarette smoke, the more they will support proscription 
of smoking. Rozin (1999) described this process as the conversion of preferences into 
values. 
Contact with potential mates might also be undesirable if they have low genetic 
quality, revealed by cues to physical attraction (Little, 2014; Willis and Todorov, 
2006), infertility (e.g., old age or pre-pubescence; Tybur et al., 2009), or cues to 
genetically incompatibility due to being the wrong gender in homosexuality, the 
wrong species in bestiality, or too closely related in incest (Tybur et al., 2009). These 
cues to low mate quality or compatibility might serve as inputs to computations which 
output avoidance motives along with disgust-like feelings; this output has been 
referred to as sexual disgust (Tybur et al., 2013). Thus, a combination of pathogen cue 
avoidance and µJHQHWLF¶avoidance might be the cause of disgust reported to supposed 
moral violations like incest, homosexuality, necrophilia and bestiality. Although there 
could also be moral motives for objecting to these behaviours if they violate societal 
norms, findings that show a relationship between disgust sensitivity and 
condemnation of purity violations may be due to non-moral content relating to 
pathogen cues or low mate quality cues shared by both disgust sensitivity 
questionnaire items and impurity (or sanctity or divinity) items. If true, this 
explanation renders superfluous the argument that disgust sensitivity increases purity 
condemnation because purity condemnation is driven intuitively by feelings of moral 
disgust and the appraisal of social or moral contaminants (Horberg et al., 2009; 
Wagemans et al., 2017). 
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Other research suggests that disgust sensitivity might be related to moral 
judgement more generally. For example, more disgust sensitive participants judged a 
target who had committed theft or fraud as guiltier and supported harsher sentences 
(Jones & Fitness, 2008) and Chapman and Anderson (2014) found that disgust 
sensitivity positively related to condemnation of violations outside of the purity 
IRXQGDWLRQVXFKDV³DVWXGHQWVWHDOVDOLEUDU\ERRN´RU³DVWXGHQWDVNVWKHWHDFKHUD
TXHVWLRQLQFODVVZLWKRXWUDLVLQJKHUKDQGILUVW´These findings are taken to show that 
increased disgust sensitivity leads to more disgust experienced in response to 
immorality, leading to harsher judgements; Chapman and Anderson conclude ³GLVJXVW
XQGHUZHQWDGUDPDWLFVKLIWLQIXQFWLRQXSRQHQWHULQJWKHPRUDOGRPDLQ´ 
However, such relationships could be accounted for by third variables, for 
example Chapman and Anderson (2014, Study 1) found that their effect was 
attenuated when controlling for anxiety. Other research has shown that disgust 
sensitivity is negatively related to openness to experience (Tybur & deVries, 2013), 
which could explain the relationship between disgust sensitivity and opposition to 
breaking norms. Furthermore, some research suggests that disgust sensitivity may not 
be specific to moral attitudes: it has been linked to negative attitudes towards 
threatening groups in general, including immigrants and socially deviant groups 
(Brenner & Inbar, 2014; Hodson & Costello, 2007) and with conservative ideologies 
in general (Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt, 2012; Terrizzi, Shook, & Ventis, 2010; 
Tybur et al., 2016). Van Leeuwen, Dukes, Tybur and Park (2017) found that the 
pathogen domain of the Three Domain Disgust Scale (TDDS, Tybur et al., 2009) had 
weak relationships with the ingroup, authority, and purity foundations of the Moral 
Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham et al., 2011). However, sexual disgust also 
related to the MFQ domains and had a stronger relationship than pathogen disgust 
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with the purity domain. Tybur, Inbar, Güler and Molho (2015) found that pathogen 
disgust had no relationship with conservative attitudes after controlling for sexual 
disgust. These findings also indicate that the relationship between pathogen disgust 
and moral condemnation might be explained by other shared variables. Overall, it is at 
best premature to argue that the reviewed correlational evidence demonstrates shows 
that moral condemnation is caused by experiences of moral disgust. 
1.3.3 Incidental disgust and moral condemnation. Another line of research that 
has been argued to show that disgust leads to moral condemnation shows that 
inducing participants to feel disgust makes them subsequently condemn immoral 
actions more strongly. 7KLVUHVHDUFKZDVODUJHO\LQVSLUHGE\+DLGW¶VVRFLDO
intuitionist model, in which he argued that moral judgements are not the product of 
reason but of social intuitions that are then followed by post-hoc rationalisations. He 
argued that emotions, including disgust, are an important source of these rapid 
intuitions. For example, WKHWKRXJKWRILQFHVWPLJKWUHVXOWLQ³DTXLFNIODVKRI
UHYXOVLRQ´ZKLFKHQDEOHVWKHSHUVRQWR³know LQWXLWLYHO\WKDWVRPHWKLQJLVZURQJ´
(Haidt, 2001, p. 814). Disgust facilitates tests of the social intuitionist theory because 
it can be induced using pathogen cues that are unrelated, or incidental, to a moral 
violation and then WKHHPRWLRQ¶VHIIHFWRQVXEVHTXHQWPRUDOMXGJHPHQWVFDQEH
measured. This approach has been called the moral amplification hypothesis (Landy 
& Goodwin, 2015; Pizarro, Inbar &Helion, 2011).  
The first amplification studies were conducted by Wheatley and Haidt (2005) who 
used hypnosis to make participants feel disgust when they read sentences containing 
KDUPOHVVZRUGVOLNH³RIWHQ´3DUWLFLSDQWVVXEVHTXHQWO\UDWHGEHKDYLRXUV (e.g., a 
student who stole library books) described in vignettes that included the trigger word 
as more immoral than the same behaviours not including the trigger word. The 
34 
 
findings indicate that participants misattributed the source of the emotion to 
something that the target had done wrong (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). This suggests 
that behaviours with physically disgusting content could be judged immoral because 
physical disgust is taken as information that something wrong was done. In other 
widely cited research, Schnall, Haidt, Clore and Jordan (2008) found that participants 
exposed to flatulence spray rated violations as more immoral than participants not 
exposed to any odour. They also induced incidental disgust using a dirty work area, 
recollections of a disgusting experience, and a disgusting film scene. These 
manipulations also led participants to make harsher moral judgements, but only for 
individuals high in private body consciousness (Miller, Murphy, & Buss, 1981), the 
WHQGHQF\WRDWWHQGWRRQH¶VLQWHUQDOERGLO\VWDWHVHorberg et al. (2009) used the same 
film as Schnall et al. (2008) to induce incidental disgust but unlike them, found that it 
only amplified judgements of purity violations, not harm or justice violations. Seidel 
and Prinz (2013) induced physical disgust using vomiting sounds and also found that 
only judgements of purity violations were amplified. 
Although these studies appear to support some version of the amplification 
hypothesis, which is argued to demonstrate the causal role of disgust on moral 
judgement (hapman & Anderson, 2013; Horberg et al., 2009), other studies have 
shown that the effects may not be reliable. For example, Ugazio, Lamm and Singer 
(2012) reported a failure to replicate the effect of flatulence spray on moral judgement 
(Schnall et al., 2008) and in a similar design WR:KHDWOH\DQG+DLGW¶VK\SQRVLV
research, David and Olatunji (2011) used evaluative conditioning to condition 
participants to feel disgust towards an innocuous word (³part´) but found no effect on 
subsequent moral judgements. These studies included manipulation checks showing 
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that they did successful elicit feelings of disgust, but the experience disgust did not 
influence moral judgment.  
A recent meta-analysis sought to formally assess the reliability of amplification 
effects based on 31 published and 19 unpublished studies (Landy & Goodwin, 2015). 
They found that published studies had a small but significant effect size (d = 0.11, p = 
.002) and unpublished studies had a mean effect size very close to zero (d = 0.03, p = 
.59). Furthermore, a funnel plot showed evidence of publication bias and correcting 
for this suggested that overall there is no significant effect of incidental disgust on 
moral judgment. Analysed separately, they found that effects were stronger for 
gustatory or olfactory disgust inductions. However, in some of these procedures, 
disgust inductions could have evoked moral disapproval and not just disgust (Baron, 
Royzman, & Goodwin, 2013; Landy & Goodwin, 2015), because experimenters had 
forced them to, for example, consume a bitter substance (Eskine, Kacinik & Prinz, 
2011), or sit at a dirty desk (Schnall et al., 2008). In a reply to Landy & Goodwin, 
Schnall, Haidt, Clore and Jordan (2015) suggested that certain personality variables, 
HVSHFLDOO\3ULYDWH%RG\&RQVFLRXVQHVVPLJKWEH³FUXFLDOIRUWKHHIIHFW´, otherwise 
the disgust induction might not be felt sufficiently. However, in a highly powered 
study (N = 1412), Johnson et al. (2016) found no effect of induced disgust on moral 
condemnation, nor any moderation by sensitivity to internal bodily state, or 
accessibility of mood state.  
Although it can still be true that moral judgements are caused by rapid affective 
intuitions (Haidt, 2001), the incidental disgust literature does not provide strong 
evidence that disgust amplifies moral judgement. For this reason, it does not support 
the claim that reported or expressed disgust towards immorality requires an internal 




1.4 Moral contagion 
Researchers generally agree that the primary function of disgust is to motivate 
avoidance of stimuli that are sources of pathogens (Curtis & Biran 2001; Oaten et al., 
2009; Tybur et al., 2009), so the potential to contaminate is regarded as a key 
appraisal for the elicitation of disgust (Horberg et al., 2009; Rozin et al., 2008; Oaten 
et al., 2009). This is thought to extend to moral disgust: immoral people or objects are 
appraised as socially contaminating or impure, so they elicit disgust (Horberg et al., 
2009; Rozin et al., 1999; Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009; Chapman & Anderson, 
2013; Inbar & Pizarro, 2014; Zhong & House, 2014). This section evaluates the 
evidence usually taken to support the claim that immoral stimuli are contaminating, 
including anthropological observations, questionnaire data, and behavioural 
avoidance studies. Moral cleansing experiments are also taken to support the idea that 
immorality is contaminating, and these are evaluated in the general discussion. 
1.4.1 Disgust towards purity violations. Ideas about purity or divinity were 
partly inspired by anthropological observations made by Richard Shweder and 
colleagues (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997) in India that practices relating 
to contact with food, the opposite gender and clothing were judged to be moral issues 
and not just physical or conventional issues. This led to the suggestion that the moral 
mind comprises three independent modes of ethical discourse, tKH³%LJThree´, 
comprising the ethics of autonomy, community, and divinity (Shweder et al.). Similar 
observations had been made by other anthropologists and sociologists. For example, 
Durkheim (1912) QRWHGWKDWQXPHURXVFXOWXUHVEHOLHYHLQ³VDFUHGFRQWDJLRQ´ whereby 
animals, women during menstruation, and men after a nocturnal emission, are 
considered not just physically unclean, but spiritually unclean. Mary Douglas also 
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surveyed the anthropological literature DQGFRQFOXGHGWKDW³moral values are 
XSKHOG«by beliefs in dangerous contagion, as when a glance or touch of an adulterer 
LVKHOGWREULQJLOOQHVVWRKLVQHLJKERXUV´1966, p 3) DQGWKDW³SULPLWLYHVPDNH little 
GLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQVDFUHGQHVVDQGXQFOHDQQHVV´SMeigs (1988) documented that 
a central idea regulating life for the Hua people of New Guinea is that a potentially 
polluting VXEVWDQFHFDOOHG³1X´LVWUDQVIHUUHGGXULQJDOOIRRGDQGVRFLDOWUDQVDctions.  
Later Haidt and colleagues expanded on these anthropological ideas by arguing 
that they applied to all people including Westerners (Haidt, Koller & Dias, 1993; 
Haidt, Rozin, McCauley & Imada, 1997). More formally, Rozin, Lowery, Imada and 
Haidt (1999) K\SRWKHVLVHGVSHFLILFWLHVEHWZHHQ6KZHGHUHWDO¶VWKUHHHWKLFV
and three other-FRQGHPQLQJHPRWLRQV³&´IRUFRQtempt towards community 
YLRODWLRQV³$´IRUDQJHUWRZDUGVautonomy YLRODWLRQVDQG³'´IRUGLVJXVWWRZDUGV
divinity violations). The CAD triad ethics were later expanded and rebranded as 
Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) in which WKHGLYLQLW\HWKLFEHFDPHWKH³SXULW\´
foundation (Haidt & Joseph 2004). The hypothesised inputs to the divinity and purity 
modules are similar: sacred or religious objects (e.g., flags or crosses), places (e.g., 
Mecca or Jerusalem), sacred individuals (e.g., martyrs or saints), and some secular but 
cherished ideals, such as freedom and democracy (Haidt, 2012), though, as noted 
previously, there is inconsistency in the literature about what constitutes a purity 
violation (e.g., Rottman et al., 2014). Objects, ideas and people who violate purity 
ideals would be perceived as impure, would specifically activate the purity mental 
module and would therefore elicit disgust and its concomitants like contamination 
avoidance. These authors claim that specific correspondences between divinity or 
purity violations and disgust show that people perceive moral or social contamination. 
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Although the CAD hypothesis was aestheticaOO\FRQYHQLHQW³ZHFDQQRWUHVLVW
noting the coincidence that in the English language, the first letter of each of the 
Shweder ethics matches the first letter in the emotion word that we link to it´5R]LQ
et al., 1999 p 567) the idea that divinity or purity is specifically linked to disgust is 
questionable. As noted previously, disgust reported towards divinity or purity 
violations may arise from appraisals of physical impurity, rather than moral impurity, 
due to non-moral content such as dog meat or a corpse in their items (Hutcherson & 
Gross, 2011; Giner-Sorolla, Bosson, Caswell, & Hettinger, 2012; Royzman et al., 
2014). In addition to GRJPHDWDQGFRUSVHLWHPV5R]LQHWDOLQFOXGHG³D
SHUVRQELWHVLQWRDQDSSOHZLWKDZRUPLQLW´³DSHUVRQLVVKDking hands with 
VRPHRQHZKRKDVDQLQFHVWXRXVUHODWLRQVKLS´DQG³DSHUVRQLVKHDULQJDERXWD-
year-old male who has sex with a 17-year-ROGIHPDOH´ as divinity items. These items 
do not appear to have content relevant to divinity or sanctity, or, in the case of biting 
an apple, even of morality. Indeed, according to their own data, participants only 
chose the rotten meat, apple and incest items as divinity (rather than community or 
autonomy) violations and, even for these items still under 30% of participants agreed 
ZLWKWKHDXWKRUV¶FODVVLILFDWLRQDVGLYLQLW\YLRODWLRQVThus, responses to these items 
cannot be taken as evidence that a specific emotion (disgust) responds to divinity 
violations due to an appraisal of moral contamination.  
Royzman et al. (2014) had participants imagining themselves in pathogen-free 
GLYLQLW\YLRODWLRQVHJ³XVLQJDODUJHVLOYHUFUXFLIL[KHLQKHULWHGIURPKLVGHYRXW
3URWHVWDQWIDWKHUDVDGRRUVWRS´LQFRPSDULVRQWRWKHRULJLQDOGLYLQLW\LWHPVDQG
found that only 1.7% of participants chose disgust as their predominant response, 
compared to 94.3% who chose anger. In contrast, 92% chose disgust towards the 
original divinity items and 3.9% chose anger. The authors also used their Oral 
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Inhibition Index (Royzman et al., 2008) to measure prototypical disgust feelings (feel 
like gagging, loss of appetite, feel nauseated) and found that their pathogen-free 
divinity items received a mean rating of only 0.12 on a 0-3 scale. In summary, the 
literature on divinity and purity violations does not provide strong evidence that 
disgust arises from the appraisal of moral impurity or contamination; when disgust is 
reported in these cases, it may be due to the appraisal of physical, pathogen-related 
contamination.  
1.4.2 Moral contagion. The most direct evidence for moral contagion comes 
from experiments showing that many participants are unwilling to make contact with 
immoral objects. This line of research was also inspired by anthropology. For 
example, Marcel Mauss (1902 p 82) wrote about coQWDJLRQ³SHUVRQDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFV
illness, life, luck, every type of magical influx are all conceived as being transmitted 
DORQJDV\PSDWKHWLFFKDLQ´James Frazer (1890) also surveyed anthropological 
HYLGHQFHDQGFRQFOXGHGWKDW³WRWKHFUXGHLQWHOOLJHQFH not only of the savage, but of 
ignorant and dull-ZLWWHGSHRSOHHYHU\ZKHUH´WKHODZRIFRQWDJLRQLVDSSOLHG³WKLQJV
ZKLFKKDYHRQFHEHHQLQFRQWDFWZLWKHDFKRWKHUDUHDOZD\VLQFRQWDFW´S Rozin 
and Nemeroff, (1986) built on these ideas but argued that they were not merely 
primitive ideas, but intuitive beliefs shared by all people, including American 
students. They also noted that the law of contagion appeared to apply particularly 
strongly to disgusting substances. In experimental tests of the law, subjects were sat at 
a table at a 90-degree angle to the experimenter and were asked to rate on a scale how 
much they would like to perform various actions such as drinking juice contacted by a 
dead sterilised cockroach, compared to uncontacted juice. Participants also rated how 
much they would like to perform hypothetical actions such as wearing a shirt of a 
disliked person in comparison to a shirt of a liked person. Participants preferred to 
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touch the contUROLWHPVFRPSDUHGWRWKHµFRQWDPLQDWHG¶LWHPVDQGLQWHUSUHWHd this as 
HYLGHQFHWKDWERWKSHRSOHDQGREMHFWVFDQWUDQVPLW³QHJDWLYLW\E\VRPHVRUWRIFRQWDFW
ZLWKGLVJXVW´S 
A number of similar hypothetical and behavioural experiments have subsequently 
shown that people are reluctant to ZHDUD1D]L¶VKDWRUDUPEDQGRozin, Haidt, 
McCauley, Dunlop & Ashmore, 1999XVHDPXUGHUHU¶VVZHDWHUEHGRUFDU5R]LQ
0DUNZLWK	0F&DXOH\XVHDQµXQVDYRU\¶SHUVRQ¶VVZHDWHURUKDLUEUXVK
(Rozin, Nemeroff, Wane, Sherrod, 1989), accept money from an immoral company 
(Stellar & Willer, 2014), or from a thief (Tasimi & Gelman, 2017), or eat with a 
WKLHI¶VIRUN7DSS	2FFKLSLQWLIn addition, negative emotions have been 
shown to follow contact with immoUDOVWLPXOLVXFKDVDOLDU¶VKDQGRUDWKLHI¶VFKDLU
(Eskine, Novreske & Richards, 2013). 3HRSOH¶s reluctance to touch these objects has 
been taken to show that immoral objects are appraised as contaminating. Researchers 
claim that people intuitively believe that contamination can come about via the 
tUDQVIHURID³PDWHULDOHVVHQFH´ or D³QRQ-PDWHULDOVSLULWXDOHVVHQFH´(Nemeroff & 
Rozin, 1994; Rozin et al., 2008). Previously thought to be characteristic of primitive 
beliefs in systems of magic (Frazer, 1890WKLV³ODZRIFRQWDJLRQ´KDVEHHQDUJXHGWR
be a pan-FXOWXUDOSV\FKRORJLFDOIHDWXUHWKDWRSHUDWHVLQ³DVDOLHQWDQGIUHTXHQWZD\LQ
WKHWKLQNLQJRIHGXFDWHG:HVWHUQDGXOWV´1HPHURII	5R]LQS 
However, none of these behavioural avoidance studies have excluded reputation 
concerns as an alternative explanation. Some features of these studies point to this 
possibility. Most studies were conducted in audience conditions in front of an 
experimenter (e.g., Rozin & Nemeroff, 1986; Eskine et al., 2013), or even in front of 
a conspicuously positioned video camera (Rozin et al., 1999). Also, some results 
suggest that discomfort with visible association with immoral objects may drive the 
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effects. For example, one study found that most participants were willing to hold a 
Nazi hat (84%) or armband (82%) but only a minority were willing to wear the hat 
(44%) or armband (44%), even though both acts entailed skin contact (Rozin et al., 
1999). This may be because wearing the object would create more reputation threat 
than touching it by increasing visibility and by implying greater endorsement of the 
object. Even wearing an otherwise innocuous object might invoke reputation concerns 
if a participant knows that it is known by the experimenter to have belonged to a 
wrongdoer. 
 
1.5 An alternative account  
The main proposal in this thesis is that verbal and facial expressions of moral 
disgust, as well as its behavioural manifestation in the form of the apparent 
contagiousness of morally disgusting stimuli, are not products of disease-avoidance 
motivation, but instead serve the fundamentally important social goal of maintaining a 
good reputation. One important way to maintain a good reputation is by avoiding 
association with immoral people or immoral behaviours, especially if there is a risk of 
being observed by third parties. Behaviours that are usually assumed to be outputs 
motivated by the experience of disgust, including avoidance of immoral objects and 
apparent contamination concern towards them, may in fact be motivated by reputation 
management concerns ± people do not want to be visibly associated with immorality. 
Another important way to secure a good reputation is to condemn third 
SDUWLHV¶LPPRUDOEHKDYLRXUHVSHFLDOO\when being observed, in order to communicate 
opposition to the immoral behaviour. Emotions can be particularly valuable for 
communicating condemnation because they are often perceived to reflect authentic 
and intuitive motives (Frank, 1988) but not all emotions communicate the same 
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information about our motives (Barasch, Levine, Berman and Small, 2014). The other 
main proposal of this dissertation is that disgust is expressed towards moral violations 
because it effectively communicates morally motivated condemnation. Although 
anger can also communicate condemnation, it conveys a more selfishly motivated 
condemnation, so it is not as useful for conveying moral motives. Importantly, this 
account explains why disgust would be expressed in preference to anger even towards 
moral violations without pathogen content. 
1.8 Reputation management 
1.6.1 Cooperative reputation. Cooperation is essential to many activities that are 
key to human survival and reproduction, from large group endeavours like hunting 
and warfare, to small group or dyadic exchanges like trading food or cooperative 
breeding (Gurven & Winking, 2008; Hill & Hurtado, 2009). However, for human 
cooperation to have evolved individuals had to solve the problem of free-riding 
(Trivers, 1971). For example, a person in a raiding group might take his share of 
cattle but free-ride by advancing later, or retreating earlier, than his tribe mates 
(Mathew & Boyd, 2014), or he might even desert or malinger altogether (Chagnon, 
1988). On more quotidian scale, a person might free-ride by accepting a favour of a 
food donation, or help building a shelter, but avoid returning the favour at a later date 
(Gurven, 2004). By taking benefits without paying costs these cheaters would have 
higher fitness than co-operators which undermines the evolutionary stability of 
cooperation. Evolutionary scientists have long sought to answer the question of how 
this problem was solved during human evolution (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). There 
is broad consensus that two of the most important solutions were punishment (Fehr & 
Gächter, 2002; Price, Cosmides & Tooby, 2002) and reputation (Milinski, Semmann 
& Krambeck, 2002; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). The evolution of punitive sentiment 
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promotes cooperation by increasing the costs of cheating or freeriding, and decreasing 
the risk of losses through defection for those who initiate cooperation. However, 
punishment is costly to the individual who chooses to punish due to the risk of costs 
of retaliation from cheaters or free-riders, so people often avoid punishing and it does 
not provide a complete solution to the problems of cooperation (Dreber, Rand, 
Fudenberg & Nowak, 2008; Sigmund, 2007).  
The benefits of cooperating can be gained without the costs of punishment if a 
person can choose their partner discriminatingly prior to investment in cooperation 
(Barclay, 2013; Noë & Hammerstein, 1994; Sylwester & Roberts, 2013). If people are 
choosy with regards to whom they cooperate based on SHRSOH¶V reputation for 
cooperation, this creates a selective pressure for behaving so as to be chosen ± what is 
VRPHWLPHVUHIHUUHGWRDV³WKHHYROXWLRQRIFRRSHUDWLRQE\SDUWQHUFKRLFH´'XJDWNLQ
1995; Nesse, 2007).  Even if people do not find themselves in a situation in which 
they can choose between partners, as may often have been the case in small, ancestral, 
populations, they can still condition their level of cooperation on the potential 
SDUWQHU¶VUHSXWDWLRQ, by for example, withholding favours or making smaller 
donations (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). This means that even without partner choice, 
there will be selection for those who encourage others to offer benefits by building 
and maintaining a reputation for being a good cooperative partner. 
People assess the reputation of others not only by remembering the outcomes 
of their own past interactions with them but also by paying attention to information 
from third parties in the form of reported reputation, or gossip - the exchange of 
positive or negative social information about absent others (Dunbar, 2004). The 
content of gossip frequently relates to norm violation and free-riding, and this gossip 
facilitates reputation spreading (Feinberg, Willer, Stellar & Keltner, 2012). 
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Simulation models (Giardini & Conte, 2012) and empirical studies (Wedekind & 
Milinski, 2000; Wedekind & Braithwaite, 2002) have shown that individuals who 
have a cooperative reputation RU³LPDJHVFRUH´ are more likely to receive benefits 
IURPWKLUGSDUWLHVZKRKDYHNQRZOHGJHRIWKHLQGLYLGXDOV¶UHSXWDWLRQ, because third 
parties choose who to cooperate with based on reputation. This mechanism, known as 
indirect reciprocity has been shown to be an effective and low-cost solution enabling 
the stable evolution of cooperation (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998).  
The selective pressures created by people attending to reputations and 
conditioning partner choice on reputation are believed to have led to the evolution of 
psychological mechanisms for managing reputation (Baumard & Sperber, 2012; 
Haley & Fessler, 2005; Trivers, 1971). Accordingly, many studies have shown that 
people tend to be more cooperative when their reputation is at stake (Wu, Balliet & 
Van Lange, 2016; Feinberg, Willer,Stellar & Keltner, 2012; Filiz-Ozbay & Ozbay, 
2014). For example, Piazza & Bering (2008) found that participants were much more 
generous in a dictator game when they were told that a third party would find out 
about the amount of money they had allocated to an anonymous receiver, even though 
the third party was given no power to punish the dictator. Milinski, Semmann, 
Krambeck and Marotzke (2006) found that when investment in a pool for climate 
protection had reputational consequences because donations were being observed by 
other participants, donations were much higher than in anonymous rounds. Ariely, 
Bracha and Meier (2007) found that participants made more effort to earn money for 
charity, by tapping on two keyboard keys for 5 minutes, if they did so knowing that 
they would subsequently tell the other participants in the lab how much money they 
had earned for the charity. In another study they found that participants who earned 
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$1 per mile cycling on stationary bikes for up to 10 minutes, cycled further in a public 
area of the gym than in a private room of the gym. 
Notably, generosity is enhanced in dictator games even if it is only the 
experimenter who could gain knowledge of the SDUWLFLSDQW¶V level of generosity 
(Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1996). It was only in a double-blind condition, in 
which participants were guaranteed that no one, even the experimenter, could find out 
how much money the participants had givenWKDWWKHPDMRULW\RISDUWLFLSDQWV¶
generosity dropped to zero (Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat & Smith, 1994). Kurzban, 
'H6FLROLDQG2¶%ULDQIRXQGWKDWSDUWLFLSDQWVZKRREVHUYHGDWDUJHWFKHDW
someone during an economic game would pay more money to punish the target under 
audience than anonymous conditions, even if the audience was only the experimenter. 
Studies like these confirm that people are highly sensitive to threats to their 
reputation and they are strongly motivated to behave in ways to enhance or maintain a 
reputation as a good co-operator. In line with evolutionary models of cooperation by 
reputation, it has been suggested that the psychology underpinning reputation 
monitoring and management is a largely intuitive and innate adaptation (Haley & 
Fessler, 2005; Kurzban et al., 2007; Sparks & Barclay, 2013). For example, Haley and 
Fessler found that schematic pictures of eyespots placed in a lab were sufficient to 
LQFUHDVHSDUWLFLSDQWVGRQDWLRQVLQDQHFRQRPLFJDPHFRPSDUHGWRSLFWXUHVRIWKHODE¶V
logo. Although not all studies have replicated the effect of subtle eye spots (Sparks & 
Barclay), some other lines of evidence support the possibility that people have 
implicitly operating reputation management mechanisms, including the apparent 
presence of reputational concerns in other species and in pre-verbal infants, who are 
presumably not capable of deliberate, calculated cooperation for reputational gain.  
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Client fish visit cleaner stations on tropical reefs where cleaner fish eat their 
ectoparasites, EXWFOHDQHUILVKSUHIHUWRHDWWKHLUFOLHQW¶V more nutritious mucus and 
KDYHRIWHQEHHQREVHUYHGµFKHDWLQJ¶ by taking bites of mucus (Grutter & Bshary, 
&OLHQWVZLOORIWHQµHDYHVGURS¶RQRWKHUFOLHQW-cleaner interactions, gaining 
information on the cooperativeness of the cleaner fish. When cleaner fish can detect 
that they are being observed, they increase their apparent cooperativeness by eating 
ectoparasites rather than mucus (Bshary & Grutter, 2006). It is not known whether 
this is achieved due to an innate mechanism for reputation management, or by 
learning through associating eating ectoparasites in the presence of an observer with 
the reward of additional client visits. Nevertheless, the existence of an audience effect 
in fish suggests that reputation management mechanisms can operate implicitly (in 
humans and animals) and do not depend (only) on deliberate or explicit cost benefit 
calculation (Bshary & Grutter). 
Reputations are also formed by nonhuman primates. Russell, Call and Dunbar 
(2008) allowed apes to observe a nice person giving food to a recipient and then a 
stingy person refusing to share food. They found that chimpanzees subsequently spent 
significantly more time in proximity to the nice compared with the stingy person. 
Similar research has shown that Orangutans, chimpanzees, and 2.5-year-old human 
children prefer to interact with a nice experimenter who they had observed giving 
food to a third party, compared to a mean experimenter who interrupted the food 
giving (Herrmann, Keupp, Hare, Vaish & Tomasello, 2013). Another study found that 
5-year-old pre-school humans share more and steal less when they are being watched 
by a peer than when they are alone. In contrast, chimpanzees behave the same 
whether they are being watched by a groupmate or not (Engelmann, Herrmann & 
Tomasello, 2012).  
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Studies like these suggest that although reputation psychology is present at least in 
rudimentary form in primates, it is much more advanced in humans, to the extent that 
they know when they are being judged by others, and they adjust their behaviour to 
manage the impressions formed by observers. There is also evidence from 
developmental psychology showing that a concern for reputation develops at around 5 
years of age: children of this age will act more generously by giving away toys or 
prizes if they know they are being observed (Fujii, Takagishi, Koizumi, & Okada, 
2015; Leimgruber, Shaw, Santos & Olson, 2012). Children will also judge a target 
negatively for taking FUHGLWIRUDQRWKHU¶VZRUk if taking credit leads to reputational 
gains (Shaw, Montinari, Piovesan, Olson, Gino & Norton, 2014). Eight to ten-year 
olds judge someone who behaves prosocially in private more favourably than 
someone who does so publically, suggesting that they are aware that other people act 
out of concern for reputation and adjust inferences about cooperativeness accordingly 
(Heyman, Barner, Heumann & Schenk, 2014; Heyman, Fu, Barner, Zhishan, Zhou & 
Lee, 2016). Furthermore, thHUHLVHYLGHQFHWKDWFKLOGUHQ¶V reputation management is 
strategically designed to promote behaviour for self-interest: 6 year olds will be less 
fair to others if they can do so without appearing to be unfair (Shaw, Montinari, 
Piovesan, Olson, Gino & Norton, 2014) and they will behave more generously, not 
only if they are being observed, but also if they know that the recipient will later be in 
a position to reciprocate (Engelmann, Over, Herrmann & Tomasello, 2013). 
Although reputation management does not seem to develop before 5 years of age, 
the preference for interacting with good co-operators over non-cooperators, cheaters 
or free riders is present in infants (Warneken & Tomasello, 2009). Even 3 and 6-
month-old infants have been shown to prefer an agent who acted prosocially over one 
who acted antisocially, shown by approaching or looking more toward the former 
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(Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; 2010). Eight-month-old infants preferred a puppet 
that pushed an unhelpful puppet down a hill (Hamlin, Wynn, Bloom, & Mahajan, 
2011). These findings indiFDWHWKDWDWWHQWLRQWRRWKHUV¶PRUDOUHSXWDWLRQGHYHORSV
early and pre-verbally and affects behaviour towards those others, but according to 
WKHDERYHHYLGHQFHDVRSKLVWLFDWHGDQGVWUDWHJLFFRQFHUQIRURQH¶VRZQUHSXWDWLRQ
develops later. This suggests that children learn over time that they are being judged 
by others. Nevertheless, chimps do not learn this, so humans might at least have 
preparedness for reputation management (Engelmann et al., 2013). 
1.6.2 Moral reputation. The evidence reviewed above focused on cooperative 
reputation, however most evolutionary approaches to morality hold that the biological 
function of moral behaviour to help individuals gain a reputation as good co-operators 
(Alexander, 1987; Krebs, 2008; Sperber & Baumard, 2012; Trivers, 1971), in which 
case the evidence described above on the importance of cooperative reputation is 
directly relevant to the importance of moral reputation ± people who are 
uncooperative by, for example, cheating, freeriding or stealing, are the most likely to 
be regarded as immoral. And when researchers refer to moral attributes like 
trustworthiness, altruism and generosity, these are also the attributes of a good co-
operator (Curry, 2016). Cooperative reputation and moral reputation, therefore, are 
psychologically very similar, even if they are often studied by different groups of 
researchers. 
Similarly, therefore, people pay close attention to the moral reputation of others 
and use this information to make enduring character evaluations (Brambilla, & Leach, 
2014; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998). Research has shown that negative 
attributions about moral character are made readily and harshly, and are often based 
on minimal information (Martijn, Spears, van der Pligt & Jakobs, 1992; Reeder & 
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Spores, 1983; Skowronski and Carlston, 1992). As with cooperative reputation, 
negative character attributions can be especially harmful because they often spread 
beyond the observer by gossip (Dunbar, 2004; Piazza & Bering, 2008) and as with 
being seen as a poor co-operator, grave consequences can follow from a poor moral 
reputation, including exclusion and social ostracism (Darwin, 1874; Kurzban & 
Leary, 2001). People are not just sensitive to their cooperative reputation, therefore, 
but more generally to their moral reputation (Sperber & Baumard, 2012; Trivers, 
1971).  
Accordingly, people are not only more generous and cooperative in the presence 
of third party observers (Ariely Bracha, & Meier, 2007; Filiz-Ozbay & Ozbay, 2014; 
Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002), but also judge moral transgressions more 
harshly when surveillance cues are present (Bourrat, Baumard, & McKay, 2011; 
Kurzban et al., 2007), presumably in order to demonstrate their moral credentials. A 
considerable literature on self-presentation and impression management, also attests 
to the importance people place on maintaining a good moral reputation (Baumeister, 
1992; Leary & Kowalski, 1990).  
1.6.3 Reputation by association. Reputation can be damDJHGE\DSHUVRQ¶VRZQ
actions, but also by the company they keep because observers make attributions about 
people who associate with stigmatised individuals (Goffman, 1963; Pryor, Reeder & 
Monroe, 2012). For example, Neuberg, Smith, Hoffman, and Russell, (1994) found 
that heterosexual male targets were derogated when they were observed with their 
homosexual friends. Hebl and Mannix (2003) found that a male job applicant was 
rated more negatively if seen sat next to an overweight compared to a normal weight 
female and that just being in the mere proximity of an overweight woman was enough 
to trigger stigmatization of the male applicant, regardless of his relationship to the 
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woman. Research found that teenagers with parents stigmatized by alcohol abuse or 
mental illness were viewed as more socially negative (Burk & Sher, 1990) and 
partners of disabled individuals were less likely to be viewed as intelligent, sociable, 
or athletic (Goldstein & Johnson, 1997).  
Of particular relevance to the prediction that wearing an immoral object like a 
1D]L¶VDUPEDQGZLOOUHVXOWLQLPPRUDOLW\E\DVVRFLDWLRQQegative attributions have 
been found to result from a person being incidentally associated with negatively 
valenced objects or symbols, like a flag or religious icon (Carlston & Mae, 2007). 
Notably, these stigma-by-association effects are analogous to physical contamination 
in the sense that both are transferred easily and by proximity, as emphasised by the 
use of contamination and infectious disease language in the stigma-by-association 
literature (e.g., Corrigan, Watson & Miller, 2006). As Pryor et al. (2012, p1) remark, 
³Like DQLQIHFWLRXVGLVHDVHVRFLDOVWLJPDFDQVSUHDGIURPD³PDUNHG´SHUVRQWR
others who are somehow associated with this person... Why does stigma have this 
SRZHUWRFRQWDPLQDWHRWKHUV"´ However, these authors understand that the similarity 
is by analogy, not homology and they use disease language metaphorically, 
explaining their findings with mechanisms like association and trait inference, rather 
than by invoking an intuitive belief in the transfer of material or spiritual essences 
(Rozin & Nemeroff, 1986).  
As would be expected from a species that is thought to have evolved to manage its 
reputation as a desirable co-operator, people feel uncomfortable and threatened if they 
are observed interacting with stigmatised others, presumably out of concern for their 
reputation (Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, Lickel, & Kowai-Bell, 2001). Given the 
importance of moral information in person evaluations, it is reasonable to suggest that 
people might also feel threatened by contact with immoral people or objects, such as a 
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1D]L¶VDUPband. People might (implicitly) perceive threat to reputation because 
touching or wearing these objects would lead observers to make inferences of 
immorality by association. &KRRVLQJWRZHDUD1D]L¶VDUPEDQGZRXOGEHWKH type of 
association that Goffman (1963) referred to as meaningful association, in which a 
person appears to choose to identify with a certain group, further justifying negative 
character attributions made by observers.  
Thus, a considerable body of research and theory points to the hypothesis that 
people avoid associating with immoral stimuli because they intuit that visible 
association could lead observers to make negative attributions, thus damaging their 
moral reputation. People may act as if a Nazi armband or hat is contagious, but it may 
be reputation threat, not contamination threat, that motivates this behaviour. 
 
1.9 Signaling 
Avoiding association with immorality is oQO\RQHPHDQVWRPDQDJLQJRQH¶V
UHSXWDWLRQ$QRWKHULVWRDGYHUWLVHRQH¶VPRUDODWWLWXGHVDQGEHOLHIVE\
communicating condemnation. As Tennie, Frith and Frith (2010, p3) put it, 
³5HSXWDWLRQFRXQWVIRUOLWWOHLILWLVQRWVLJQDOOHG´ And as Boyer and Baumard (2012 p 
27) point out, managing reputation does not just require implicit attention to cues that 
SHRSOHPD\EHZDWFKLQJEXWPRUHVWUDWHJLFDELOLWLHVVXFKDV³WKHDELOLW\WRDQWLFLSDWH
WKHUHDFWLRQVRIRWKHUVWRRQH¶VRZQDFWLRQVDQGDWWLWXGHVLQFOXGLQg their reactions to 
RXUUHDFWLRQVWRWKHDFWLRQVRIWKLUGSDUWLHV´ Much of moral reasoning and 
argumentation, for example, may be strategically GLUHFWHGDWSURWHFWLQJRQH¶V
reputation by finding and communicating PRUDOMXVWLILFDWLRQVIRURQH¶VDFWLRQV(Haidt, 
2001; Mercier & Sperber, 2011) and the importance of maintaining a good reputation 
may be why the moral beliefs and attitudes that we claim to have often deviate from 
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our actual behaviour ± moral hypocrisy (Kurzban, 2009). People who calculate when 
presented with the opportunity to behave morally are perceived as less prosocial 
(Everett, Pizarro & Crockett, 2016), whereas those who make uncalculating, quick 
and intuitive decisions are perceived as more moral (Critcher, Inbar & Pizarro, 2013; 
Evans & Van de Calseyde, 2016). Accordingly, participants have been found to 
engage in more uncalculating behaviour when their decision process was observable 
to others, showing that people can modify their behaviour to signal that they have 
genuinely prosocial motives as a reputation management strategy (Jordan, Hoffman, 
Nowak & Rand, 2016).   
Emotional reactions are an effective way to VLJQDORQH¶VPRUDOmotives because 
they tend to be uncalculating and impulsive and they can show that we are strongly 
and authentically motivated by moral concerns (Frank, 1988). For example, Barasch, 
Levine, Berman and Small (2014) found that targets who donated to charity because 
WKH\IHOW³YHU\HPRWLRQDO´ZHUHUDWHGDVPRUHJHQXLQHO\FKDULWDEOHWKDQtargets who 
donateGEHFDXVHWKH\³ZDQWHGWRKHOSDVPDQ\SHRSOHDVSRVVLEOH´. Emotions, as 
opposed to cold reasoning, may be perceived by people as reflecting DQDFWRU¶VWUXH
motives and dispositions (Ames and Johar, 2009). However, not all emotions provide 
the same information: Barasch et al. found that only targets with other-regarding 
emotions were rated as more authentically charitable and not those who gave to 
charity in order to feel happy. People may also express emotions to show strong and 
authentic condemnation of oWKHUV¶PRUDOYLRODWLRQV. But again, not all condemning 
emotions will be perceived equally. Anger, for example, might be perceived as more 
selfish, and disgust as more impartial and moral.  
This suggestion aligns with the recognition that emotions do not only regulate 
individual behaviour, but also have a communication function in signalling social 
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motivations to others. This perspective derives both from the behavioural ecology 
view of emotion expressions as signals of intent toward other individuals (Hinde, 
1985; Fridlund, 1994), and from perspectives on the communicative and interpersonal 
functions of emotions (Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Giner-Sorolla, 2012; Hareli & 
Hess, 2012; Parkinson, 2005; Van Kleef, 2009). In contrast to this perspective, other 
researchers suggest that emotional expressions are automatic read-outs of emotional 
experience and that measuring facial expression is sufficient to know what emotion a 
person is experiencing (e.g., Cannon et al., 2011; Chapman et al., 2009). This idea 
largely derives IURP(NPDQ¶s Basic Emotions Theory: internal emotional 
mechanisms are automatically and causally linked to prototypical emotional faces by 
³)DFLDO$IIHFW3URJUDPV´ (Ekman, 1972; Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Izard, 1993).  This 
view leads to the idea that if one records a disgust expression, for example with facial 
behaviour coding or with EMG, then the participant must be experiencing the 
corresponding disgust emotion, including components like nausea (e.g., Cannon et al.; 
Chapman et al.). Even if it is sometimes true that strong emotions are automatically 
linked to particular facial expressions, there are many reasons to doubt that this 
assumption always holds. Facial expressions may not have evolved as adaptations 
³IRUWKHH[SUHVVLRQHPRWLRQ´ (Hinde, 1985).  
1.7.1 Behavioural ecology. Behavioural ecology shows that nonhuman 
animals can produce signals for strategic communicative reasons, even when the 
signals do not reflect their internal state (Krebs & Dawkins, 1984). Signals that do not 
always reflect the internal state of the signaller include alarm calls. For example, the 
fork-tailed drongo follows other species living in the Kalahari, such as meerkats and 
pied babblers. The drongo makes alarm calls when a predator (owl, fox or mongoose) 
approaches, leading signal receivers to run away (Flower, 2011). But the drongo also 
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makes false alarm calls when there are no predators around and then it steals the food 
abandoned by the signal receivers (Flower, Gribble & Ridley, 2014). Here, then, the 
drongo produces a signal as a strategic emission and not as an accurate readout of an 
internal state elicited by a predator. Signalling mechanisms evolve as adaptations 
serving the interests of signallers, and their interests are not always served by 
accurately conveying their internal state (Krebs & Dawkins, 1984). For this reason, 
we should not expect emotion expressions to be automatically and necessarily tied to 
particular internal states (Hinde, 1985).  
As another example, Batesian mimicry, in which a harmless species such as a 
hoverfly has evolved to imitate the warning signals of a harmful species such as a 
wasp, the mimic gains an advantage without having to pay the cost of arming itself 
with toxins (Ruxton, Sherratt & Speed, 2004). These species emit signals (e.g., bright 
coloration) that do not accurately reflect its internal state. The signal receiver 
nevertheless attends to the information because of a rule previously set up in its mind 
of the relationship between the signal and a quality such as distastefulness (Dawkins 
& Guildford, 1991). This is analogous to the signalling function of moral disgust 
proposed here: the meaning of disgust expressed towards physical stimuli like rotten 
meat or faeces is understood early in life to mean strong offense and rejection. This 
association between the disgust expression and its meaning in the minds of receivers 
can subsequently be used by signallers to communicate strong offense towards other 
types of stimuli, such as the signal UHFHLYHU¶VRUDWKLUGSDUW\¶V objectionable 
behaviour. This account suggests that the use of disgust to express moral 
FRQGHPQDWLRQGHYHORSVRYHUWKHFRXUVHRIDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VOLIH due through the flexible 
use of facial behaviour. As such, the account is more parsimonious than accounts 
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claiming that moral disgust is a discrete adaptation with its own evolutionary history 
(e.g., Tybur et al., 2013). 
Of course, the signalling behaviour of primates is much more flexible than the 
colouration of Batesian mimics. Whiten and Byrne (1988) documented many 
examples of primate behaviours used strategically in the absence of the usual 
corresponding internal state. They described, for example, several observations of 
individuals remaining overtly calm while approaching an opponent before launching 
of a sudden and unexpected attack. Taking inspiration from biologists, Fridlund 
(1991; 1994) developed the Behavioral Ecology View (BECV) of human facial 
behaviour as an alternative to Basic Emotion Theory. Like animal signals, he argued, 
human facial displays, communicate the intent of the displayer toward others in a 
social interaction. Anger, for example, might communicate the intent to attack or 
threaten, while a smile might display the intention to be friendly, cooperative or 
appeasing. However, these intentions do not imply any particular internal state, 
EHFDXVHLWPLJKWVHUYHRQH¶VLQWHUHVWWRVLJQDOthe intention to attack using anger, even 
if one internally experiences fear (Fridlund & Russell, 2006); or to communicate the 
intention WRFRRSHUDWHHYHQLIRQH¶VLQWHUQDOH[SHULHQFHLVFRQWHPSW, disgust or pain 
(Kunz, Prkachin, & Lautenbacher, 2013).  
One argument against the idea that expressions are only signals of intent with 
little relation to internal feelings (Fridlund, 1994) is that signalling systems must be 
'honest' in that the signal reliably reflects some underlying quality of the signaller, 
because if a signal is not reliable, the evolutionary consequence would be that the 
signal becomes no longer used by receivers (Zahavi, 1987). This idea also derives 
from behavioural ecology, but it has been extended to human emotions: they must 
contain honest and UHOLDEOHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWDVLJQDOOHU¶VLQWHUQDOVWDWHRWKHUZLVH
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receivers will not know how committed to a particular course of action the signaller is 
(Bryant & Aktipis, 2014; Frank, 1988). However, this argument neglects that the 
costs may not be high to signallers or to receivers and the cost of true assessment will 
often not be justified by what could be gained from uncovering a cheat (Dawkins & 
Guildford, 1991). Costs might be paid by receivers, for example, in terms of time and 
attention paid to signallers to determine the veracity of their signal. In any case, as 
described above, much evidence shows that signals do not have to honestly reflect an 
DQLPDO¶VLQWHUQDOVWDWH 
Nevertheless, it might still be useful to tell involuntary and affectively 
produced expressions from those that are more voluntary because signallers might try 
to show that they intend to be more cooperative than they really are and receivers will 
benefit from adjusting their cooperation accordingly. Owren and Bachorowski (2001) 
suggested that this dynamic could have resulted in an evolutionary arms-race for 
being able to produce effective voluntary smiles versus discriminating between 
voluntary and involuntary smiles. Bryant and Aktipis (2014) found that volitional 
laughs were judged as real on average 37% of the time and suggested that this 
intermediate result might be the consequence of a co-evolutionary arms race shaping 
senders and receivers of volitionally controlled vocal signals, such as laughter and 
smiling. Laughter is also thought to be a signal of cooperative intent (Gervais & 
Wilson, 2005; Mehu & Dunbar, 2008), originally deriving from laboured breathing 
during play, like that seen in apes like chimpanzees. In a large cross-cultural study 
Bryant et al. (2016) found that people were able to distinguish pairs of laughers who 
were friends from pairs who were strangers that had just met. The authors suggested 
that group laughter provides a reliable cue with which an audience, and the laughers 
themselves, can assess the degree of affiliation between laughers. 
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Nevertheless, expressions that do not correspond to internal states may still 
FRQWDLQXVHIXOLQIRUPDWLRQ$³SROLWH´VPLOHRUODXJKPLJKWRIWHQEHa prosocial signal 
despite not being entirely spontaneous (Fridlund, 1991). Similarly, an expression of 
disgust PLJKWEHLQIRUPDWLYHHYHQLIWKHH[SUHVVHULVQ¶WH[SHULHQFLQJDQLQWHUQDOVWDWH
like nausea typically associated with the expression.  
 
1.7.2 Social psychology of emotion expressions. The social psychological 
literature on the communicative and interpersonal functions of emotions has come to 
similar conclusions as the behavioural ecology view of emotion expression (Fischer & 
Manstead, 2008; Frijda, 1986; Giner-Sorolla, 2012; Parkinson, 1996; Van Kleef, 
2009). Research and theory on the social functions of emotion has concluded that 
RWKHUV
HPRWLRQDOH[SUHVVLRQVSURYLGHLQIRUPDWLRQQRWRQO\DERXWH[SUHVVHUV¶SULYDWH
feelings and internal states, but also their attitudes, motives and behavioural intentions 
(Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Parkinson, 2005) and even their character dispositions 
(Hareli & Hess, 2012). Put another way, emotion expressions communicate states of 
µDFWLRQUHDGLQHVV¶DQGWKHVHVWDWHVFDQEHDSSUDLVHGE\REVHUYHUVWRJDLQXVHIXO 
LQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHH[SUHVVHU¶VOLNHO\EHKDYLRXU)ULMGDFrijda, Kuipers & ter 
Shure, 1989). If disgust, even in the absence of internal feelings like nausea and 
contamination, contains information about the attitudes, motives and behavioural 
intentions of an expresser, then it could still contain useful information to a receiver. 
An early study along these lines found that infants were more likely to cross a 
visual cliff when their mother smiled at them than when she looked fearful (Klinnert, 
Campos, Sorce, Emde, & Svejda, 1983). The infant can be thought of as using 
emotional expressions not to decode the internal feeling state of the mother, but to 
provide intentional information about threats in the environment. Clark, Pataki and 
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Carver (1996) found that when adults express sadness, they often do so to solicit help 
and this may not always be in proportion to their internal feelings of sadness. In 
another study participants inferred from negotiation partners who expressed guilt or 
regret that the expresser felt they had asked for too much, and participants responded 
by increasing their own demands (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2006). 
Expressions of emotion, both verbal and non-verbal, can influence perceptions of the 
SHUVRQ¶VFKDUDFWHUDQGKow much the person is liked (Knutson, 1986). For example, 
Clark and Taraban (1991) found that in close relationships and in business 
relationships, expressions of happiness increased liking whereas expressions of 
irritability decreased liking. Hareli and Hess (2010) found that a person who reacted 
with anger when they were blamed for being late was perceived as more aggressive 
and self-confident, but also as less warm and gentle than a person who reacted with 
sadness to the blame. 
1.7.3 Anger and disgust as signals. In summary, evidence from behavioural 
ecology and social psychology indicates that people can express emotions for their 
communicative effects, even in the absence of the internal state that usually 
corresponds with that emotional expression. The reason people express disgust 
towards moral violations even if they do not have any bodily, pathogen or impure 
content, therefore, could be that the disgust expression communicates useful 
information to observers. Furthermore, the disgust expression may communicate 
different information form an anger expression, explaining why people may choose to 
express disgust towards a moral violation, even if the violation seems to be an anger-
eliciting situation. 
The more specific hypothesis is that observers infer more self-interested 
motivation from anger but more impartial, moral, motivation from disgust. Thus, 
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people express anger or disgust depending on whether they seek to communicate 
moral versus self-interested motivation. From this perspective, disgust is not just an 
expression of an inner reaction to impurity, but a signal that advertises a moral 
position. Complementary perspectives on moral disgust have been given by Tybur et 
al. (2013) and Royzman and Kurzban (2011). Tybur et al. suggested that disgust 
functions as a signal to recruit observers to help condemn and punish the violator of a 
rule that the expresser favours. The current research does not test whether disgust 
effectively inspires collaborative behaviour but, based on the assumption that people 
can be motivated to communicate their moral position whether or not they expect to 
LQIOXHQFHREVHUYHUV¶EHKDYLRXUZHWHVWthe compatible hypothesis that the decision to 
express disgust versus anger depends on the motives the expresser seeks to 
communicate. Whereas other authors claim that disgust is felt and then signalled 
(Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Molho, Tybur, Güler, Balliet & Hofmann, 2017), the 
current perspective is more line with behavioural ecology approaches to animal 
signalling, because it argues that disgust does not need to be felt in order to be 
expressed, and it can even be expressed when some other emotion like anger is felt. 
1.7.4 Anger Protects Direct Self-interest. Anger arises when a person 
perceives their interests to be harmed (Frijda, 1994; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Kuppens 
et al., 2003). An expression of anger communicates the intention to approach and 
aggress, and that the recipient of anger should make concessions (Van Kleef, De Dreu 
& Manstead, 2004). For example, one study showed that expressing anger when 
complaining led to greater compensation because it enhanced the credibility of the 
claim and, presumably, the credibility of threat (Hareli et al., 2009). Anger and the 
threats that it communicates can also discouraging future transgressions towards the 
expresser (Sell, Tooby & Cosmides, 2009).  
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Although anger serves the very important function of GHIHQGLQJRQH¶V
interests, a person who expressed anger too readily could suffer social and 
reputational damage. Participants who negotiated with someone who expressed anger 
became angry themselves, disliked the counterpart, and were less willing to meet 
DJDLQFRPSDUHGWRWKRVHZKR¶VQHJRWLDWLRQSDUWQHUH[SUHVVHGKDSSLQHVV9DQ.OHHI
De Dreu & Manstead, 2004). Work teams with an angry leader also became angry 
themselves and developed a negative impression of the leader, in comparison to teams 
with a happy leader (Van Kleef, Homan, Beersma, Van Knippenberg, Van 
Knippenberg & Damen, 2009). Studies have found that compared to the expression of 
emotions like happiness and gratitude, anger can lead to reduced trust in the observer 
(Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). The expression of anger can even lead to the desire to 
take revenge on the expresser (Van Kleef & Cote, 2007) or to exclude the anger 
expresser form a coalition (Van Beest, Van Kleef & Van Dijk, 2008).  
Due to these potential costs, anger should only be deployed when violations 
that have clear, countervailing costs to the individual. Purely moral concerns that 
WUDQVFHQGDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VVHOI-interest would fail this cost-benefit logic of anger. 
Accordingly, although anger can be aroused by moral concerns like injustice, it is 
more consistently aroused by selfish concerns like goal blockage (Hutcherson & 
Gross, 2011; Kuppens, 2003). Assuming that people have some folk-psychological 
understanding of anger and its causes, observers of an anger expression are likely to 
infer that it is motivated by self-interest, especially in socially ambiguous situations; 
hence a different emotional expression might be more useful to signal unselfish moral 
concern. 
1.7.5 Disgust communicates unselfish condemnation. Unlike anger, disgust 
does not prepare aggressive action (Roseman, Wiest & Swartz, 1994), so it may be 
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appraised as less self-serving. Furthermore, because things are usually disgusting by 
consensus, at least within a cultural group (e.g. foods, sexual acts), an observer of a 
disgust expression would appraise, not so much that a selfish goal has been blocked, 
but that a consensually offensive stimulus has been encountered. These features 
underlie the prediction that, in contrast to anger, people will infer disgust expressions 
to be motivated more by moral concern than by self-interest. And if expressers have 
implicit knowledge that observers make motive inferences from expressions, they 
should strategically express anger and disgust to communicate these motives. If the 
expression of disgust does communicate moral motives, then it could serve an 
important role in the management of moral reputation. 
 
1.10 Overview of studies 
Chapter 2 reports the studies investigating the reputation management account 
of apparent moral contagion and Chapter 3 presents tests of the social signaling 
hypothesis of moral disgust. 
Chapter 2 studies. Study 1presented a hypothetical decision to wear a Nazi 
armband visibly or hidden but against the VNLQ3DUWLFLSDQWV¶UHDVRQVIRUWKHLUdecision 
were assessed. Study 2 replicated Study 1 but in a lab environment with a real Nazi 
armband and including audience versus private conditions. Study 3 assessed third 
party judgements of targets who wore the armband in each way. 
Chapter 3 studies. Studies 4 and 5 presented a scenario in which a target 
expressed anger or disgust towards a wrongdoing and SDUWLFLSDQWV¶ inferences about 
the target¶V moral versus self-interested motivation were measured. Studies 6 gave 
participants a scenario in which their aim was either to communicate self-interest or 
moral concern and measured which emotion they chose to express. For a more 
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stringent test, Studies 7 and 8 used a concrete scenario involving harm to the self, to 
see whether the aim of communicating moral motivation would increase disgust 
expression under conditions that would normally predict anger (Hutcherson & Gross, 
2011). All measures, all manipulations, data exclusions, and a priori sample size 




















                                                             
1 Preregistrations and data can be found on the OSF website, https://osf.io/4ac5p/ 
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Chapter 2. Reputation management explains apparent moral contagion 
The studies presented in this chapter investigated whether reputation or 
contamination concerns primarily motivate avoidance of morally disgusting stimuli. 
Following Rozin and colleagues (1999) a Nazi armband was used because, in Western 
populations, Nazis are reliably found to be highly immoral and disgusting (Rozin, Haidt 
& McCauley, 2008). A behavioral choice paradigm was devised that enabled a direct 
competition between contamination and reputation motives by giving participants a 
choice between direct contact with the armband and display of the armband. Study 1 
gave participants a hypothetical behavioral decision and measured what motivated their 
decisions. Study 2 replicated Study 1 using real behavior in a lab environment, and 
introduced audience versus private conditions to test a clear prediction of the reputation 
management account - that preference for avoiding display would be enhanced under 
audience conditions. Study 3 investigated third-party judgements of targets who chose 
to wear the Nazi armband in the ways described in Studies 1 and 2.  
 
2.1 Study 1 
In a hypothetical scenario, participants chose between wearing a Nazi 
armband on top of their t-shirt sleeve, so that it was visible but not directly touching 
their skin, or underneath their t-shirt sleeve so that it directly against their skin but not 
visible. This paradigm facilitated contrasting predictions: The reputation management 
account predicted that participants would choose to put it under the t-shirt to avoid 
displaying it, whereas the contamination avoidance account predicted that participants 
would choose to put it on top of the t-shirt to avoid direct skin contact. After making 
their decision, participants rated items assessing the importance of contamination 





Based on a medium effect size (d = 0.35), a power analysis using GPower 
3.1.9.2., recommended a sample size of 96 at 95% power to test a binomial preference 
in a single sample. This was increased by 10% to allow for incomplete responses and 
exclusions based on the manipulation check question. Amazon Mechanical Turk was 
used to recruit 102 (55 male) participants from the United States (Mage =36.78, SDage 
= 11.08).  
Materials and procedure.  
Participants imagined a scenario in which they had come to a psychology lab 
at a nearby University to take part in a study into attitudes towards wearing historical 
clothing. They were informed that they would be asked to wear a red arm band with a 
Nazi swastika on the front that had belonged to a member of the Nazi party. They 
were told that they could choose how to put the arm band on: over the top of the 
sleeve of their t-shirt with the swastika facing outwards or directly onto their arm 
underneath the sleeve of their t-shirt. 
Scaled decision. $IWHULQGLFDWLQJWKHLUGHFLVLRQSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHG³+RZ
FHUWDLQDUH\RXWKDW\RXZRXOGPDNHWKLVFKRLFH"´DQGLQGLFDWHGWKHLUSUHIHUHQFHIRU
IURP³GHILQLWHO\QRWWKLVZD\´WR³GHILQLWHO\WKLVZD\´7KH\ were then asked 
³+RZPXFKGLGWKHIROORZLQJLWHPVDIIHFW\RXUGHFLVLRQ"´DQGFRPSOHWHGWKH
following dependent measures in a randomised order. All items were items rated on a 
7-SRLQWVFDOHUDQJLQJIURP³QRWDWDOO´WR³DORW´ 
Contagion. To measure the influence of contagion concern, which according 
to Rozin and colleagues can be by either a material or spiritual essence (e.g., Rozin, 
Haidt & McCauley, 2008), participants indicated their level of agreement with the 
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VWDWHPHQWV³I did not wDQWWRJHWFRQWDPLQDWHGE\WRXFKLQJLW´DQG³7KHHYLOHVVHQFH
RIWKHDUPEDQGFRXOGKDYHSDVVHGLQWRPH´7KHUHZDVDKLJKFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQ
these items (r = .75; Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .86), so they were combined into 
a composite Contagion measure. 
Reputation. To measure the influence of reputational concerns, participants 
LQGLFDWHGWKHLUDJUHHPHQWZLWKWKHVWDWHPHQWV³,ZRXOGQRWZDQWWRVHHPOLNH,VXSSRUW
1D]LV´DQG³,ZRXOGQRWZDQWWRVHHPOLNH,DSSURYHRIZKDWWKH1D]LVGLG´7KHUH
was a high correlation between these items (r = .90; Spearman-Brown Coefficient = 
.95), so they were combined into a composite Reputation measure. 
Convention and positive appeal. It was also expected that convention might 
LQIOXHQFHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶GHFLVLRQVVRWKH\were asked to indicate the importance of 
FRQYHQWLRQZLWKWKHVWDWHPHQW³7KLVLVWKHZD\DUPEDQGVDUHVXSSRVHGWREHZRUQ´
To check for the influence of the positive appeal of trying on a Nazi arm band, they 




that participants could in principle believe than an immoral essence had passed onto 
WKHDUPEDQGSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHG³+RZPRUDOO\EDGLVWKHSHUVRQZKRRULJLQDOO\
ZRUHWKHDUPEDQG"´$OWKRXJKWKHVHLWHPVFRUUHODWHGRQO\PRGHUDWHO\r = .30; 
Spearman-Brown Coefficient = .46) they were combined to provide a single 
manipulation check measure. 
Results 
Two participants were excluded from analysis because they did not agree with 
the basic premise that Nazis were immoral; that is, they indicated below the scale 
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midpoint on the rating of Nazi immorality. The mean immorality rating for the 
remaining participants was 5.39 (SD = 0.76) on the zero to six point scale. Where data 
violated sphericity, adjusted values are reported. 
Binary choice. As can be seen from Figure 1, significantly more participants 
(61) chose to wear the arm band underneath their t-shirt sleeve, so that it was against 
their skin but hidden, than chose to wear it on top of their sleeve so that it was visible 
Ȥ2(1, N = 100)  = 4.42, p  &RKHQ¶V w = .21. Thus, as predicted, 
participants had a clear preference for wearing the Nazi arm band so that it was not 
visible, even though it would bring the immoral object into direct contact with their 
skin, suggesting that participants were more strongly motivated by reputational 
concerns than by contamination concerns. 
 
Figure 1. 3DUWLFLSDQWV¶GHFLVLRQVDERXWWRZHDUWKH1D]LDUPEDQG6WXG\ 
Scaled decision. Participants reported that they would prefer to wear the arm 
band underneath their t-shirt sleeve (M = 4.37, SD = 2.18, 95% C.I. = 3.94 to 4.80), 
compared on top of their t-shirt sleeve (M = 1.95, SD = 2.40, 95% C.I. = 1.47 to 2.43). 
A paired samples t-test indicated that this difference was significant, t(99) = 5.50, p < 


















Reasons for choices made. A mixed ANOVA with Reason (4 levels) as a 
within-subjects variable and Choice (2 levels: under vs. over t-shirt sleeve) as a 
between subjects variable, was conducted to assess how important each reason was 
for participants who indicated that they would wear the arm band under their t-shirt, 
compared who to those who chose to wear it on top. There was a significant main 
effect of Reason, F(3, 241.38) = 99.17, p < .001, Șp2 = .51, but not of Choice, F(1, 96) 
= 3.32, p = .07, Șp2 = .03. There was a significant interaction between Choice made 
and Reason given, F(3, 241.38) = 26.49, p < .001, Șp2 = .22. Mean importance ratings 
for each Reason by the Choice made are shown in Figure 2.  
Analysis of simple effects revealed that participants who chose to wear the 
arm band underneath their t-shirt sleeve rated reputation as a more important reason, 
F(1, 96) = 22.21, p < .001, Șp2 = .19, than did participants who chose to wear the arm 
band on top of the sleeve so that it was visible. Notably, those who chose to wear the 
arm band visibly did not rate Contagion as any more important to their choice than 
did participants who wore it hidden, F(1, 96) = 0.03, p = .86, Șp2 = .00. But 
participants who wore it over the t-shirt sleeve rated convention, F(1, 96) = 36.17, p < 
.001, Șp2 = .27, and positive appeal, F(1, 96) = 8.30, p = .005, Șp2 = .08, as more 
important to their decision than did participants who chose to wear the arm band 
under the t-shirt sleeve. 
Overall participants rated contagion close to the bottom of the scale, 
suggesting that it had little influence on their behavior when interacting with the 






Figure 2. Reasons given by participants for their choices in Study 1. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Discussion 
Findings were more consistent with the idea that people recognize that 
displaying their association with an immoral object may be seen as endorsement, 
thereby harming their reputation, so the avoid visible association with it. 
Nevertheless, a substantial minority (39%) chose to wear the armband visibly on top 
of their t-shirt. These participants did not seem to do so because of contamination 
concern, which they rated to be of minimal importance to their decision. Instead, they 
reported being somewhat less concerned about reputation and agreed more that they 
ZHUHIROORZLQJFRQYHQWLRQ³7KLVLVWKHZD\DUPEDQGVDUHVXSSRVHGWREHZRUQ´,W
may be that in the absence of strong reputation concerns, participants habitually 

























is that because it was conducted using a hypothetical scenario, it could be argued that 
moral contagion concerns were not as salient as they would be in a more ecologically 
valid situation, or in real life. Study 2 aimed to address this criticism by replicating 
the experiment in a lab with a real Nazi armband. Another potential criticism is that 
FRQWDJLRQFRQFHUQVFRXOGKDYHEHHQUHYHDOHGLIWKH\KDGQ¶WEeen disguised by 
stronger reputation management concerns due to the presence of an audience (the 
experimenter).  Study 2 addressed this limitation by including private and audience 
conditions. 
 
2.2 Study 2 
To replicate the findings from Study 1 using actual behavior, a lab experiment 
was designed using a real Nazi armband. Participants wore a sleeveless shirt and a 
jacket and chose to put the arm band either over the sleeve of the jacket (low 
contamination potential but visible) or underneath the jacket directly on their arm 
(high contamination potential but hidden). The experiment also included audience and 
private conditions. Based on the reputation management account, we predicted that 
participants would predominantly wear the armband underneath the jacket in the 
audience condition and would report doing so because they were motivated by 
reputational concerns, not by contamination concerns. In the private condition, 
reputation concerns would be less salient, so we predicted that participants would be 
more likely to wear the arm band on top of the jacket, but that they would still not 





Based on small to medium effect size (Șp2 = 0.10), expected for interaction 
effects, a power analysis using GPower 3.1.9.2., recommended a sample size of 84 at 
95% power. This was increased by 10% to allow for incomplete responses and 
exclusions based on the manipulation check question. Ninety (15 male) student 
participants (Mage = 19.61, SD = 3.00) gained course credit for participating in the 
H[SHULPHQWDGYHUWLVHGDV³DVWXG\LQWRDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGVZHDULQJKLVWRULFDOFORWKLQJ´
Before signing up, participants were told that they would need to wear (or bring) a 
sleeveless shirt. Participants were warned that the experiment might include some 
unpleasant (Nazi) material. 
Materials and Procedure.  
A real Nazi armband was obtained from and online war memorabilia store and 
it was placed in a wooden pUHVHQWDWLRQER[7KHRVWHQVLEO\µKLVWRULFDO¶MDFNHWZDVD
brown corduroy second hand item obtained from a charity shop. New plain white 
sleeveless shirts were obtained form an online store for use by any participants who 
forgot to follow the instructions to wear a sleeveless shirt to the experiment. 
 On arriving at the lab, participants were shown to the private experimental 
cubicle and were told to read through the instructions on the computer. The 
experimenter pointed out the two items of historical clothing: one was hanging on the 
door (the jacket) and the other inside a box by the computer (the Nazi armband). To 
emphasize the privacy of the cubicle, the participant was told that they could lock the 
cubicle door (from the inside) during the experiment. The instructions told 
participants that two historical artefacts had been borrowed from the history 
department at the university. To make clear that the arm band could in principle be 
contaminated by an immoral essence, participants were told that it had been worn by a 
member of the S.A. branch of the Nazi party. In the audience condition, participants 
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were informed them that once they had put the items of clothing on, they would be 
OHDYLQJWKHFXELFOHWRZDONWRWKHH[SHULPHQWHU¶VGHVNLQWKHODE 
Participants were informed that they could choose how to put the jacket and 
armband on, since it would not affect the experiment. They could either put the 
armband on their arm and then put the jacket on over the top, or put the jacket on first 
and then put the armband on over the top of the jacket. After making their choice and 
putting the items on, they were given different instructions in the audience and private 
conditions. In the private condition, they were told to click a button to proceed to the 
questions about how they felt wearing the items (described below). In the audience 
condition, they were instructed to exit the cubicle and go to the experimenter to be 
given further instructions. Upon leaving the cubicle, the experimenter directed the 
participant to another cubicle where they answered the questions on a different 
computer. 
Dependent measures. Participants were first asked to indicate how they had 
GHFLGHGWRZHDUWKHDUPEDQGDQGFKRVHIURP³RYHUWKHMDFNHW´RU³XQGHUQHDWKWKH
MDFNHW´1H[WWKey rated the importance of reasons for their decision using the same 
items as in Study 1. In the current study, the Contagion items correlated adequately (r 
= .59 and r = .63, in audience and private conditions, respectively), so they were 
combined into a composite Contagion measure. The reputation items also correlated 
adequately (r = .67 and r = .59, in audience and private conditions, respectively), so 
they were combined into a composite Reputation measure. 
Participants answered the same manipulation check questions as in Study 1 to 
ensure that they perceived the original wearer to be immoral. In addition, to confirm 
that participants found the stimulus to be not only immoral, but morally disgusting, 
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WKH\ZHUHDVNHG³+RZGLVJXVWLQJDUHWKH1D]LV"´DQG³+Rw disgusting is the arm 
EDQGDQGVZDVWLND"´DQGUDWHGWKHLUDJUHHPHQWIURP³QRWDWDOO´WR³H[WUHPHO\´ 
Results 
Four participants were excluded from analysis because they did not score 
above the midpoint on the items assessing immorality and disgust. The mean rating 
across the manipulation check questions for the remaining participants was 5.36 (SD 
= 0.73) on the zero to six point scale, showing that moral disgust was successfully 
elicited. 
Binary choice. A chi squared test of independence revealed a relationship 
between condition (private vs. audience) and choice of how the arm band was worn 
RYHUYVXQGHUWKHMDFNHWȤ2(1, N = 85)  = 11.93, p &RKHQ¶Vw = .37. As 
shown in Figure 3, in the private condition, participants chose to wear the arm band 
RYHUWKHMDFNHWVLJQLILFDQWO\PRUHIUHTXHQWO\WKDQXQGHUȤ2(1, n = 42)  = 13.71, p < 
&RKHQ¶Vw = .57 , but participants in the audience condition chose to wear the 
armband under the more frequently than over the jacket but this difference was not 
significantȤ2(1, n = 43) = 1.13, p  &RKHQ¶Vw = .16.  Thus, as predicted, 
participants in the audience condition were more likely to wear the arm-band under 
their jacket than participants in the private condition. This suggests that concerns 




Figure 3. How participants chose to wear the Nazi arm band, Study 2. 
 
Reasons for choice made. A mixed ANOVA with importance of reason (4 
levels) as a within-subjects variable and condition (audience vs. private) and choice 
(under vs. over jacket) as between subjects variables, revealed significant main effects 
of reason, F(3, 243) = 46.10, p < .001, Șp2 = .36, and choice, F(1, 81) = 30.92, p < 
.001, Șp2 = .28, but no main effect of condition, F(1, 81) = 0.00, p = .97, Șp2 = .00. 
There was no significant interaction effect between condition and choice, F(1, 81) = 
1.09, p = .30, Șp2 = .01, nor between condition and reason, F(3, 243) = 0.96, p = .41, 
Șp2 = .01, nor a significant three way interaction, F(3, 243) = 0.60, p = .62, Șp2 = .01.  
Mean ratings for each reason are shown Figure 4, for participants who chose 
to wear the arm band over the jacket versus under the jacket, collapsed across private 
and audience conditions. Paired t-tests were conducted using a Bonferroni corrected p 
value of .00625 to compare the importance of the four reasons within choice. 
Participants who chose to wear the arm band over the jacket rated contagion as a 


















.001, d = 1.78. Contagion was also less important than reputation, t(50) = 6.30, p < 
.001, d = 1.78, and of similar importance to appeal, t(50) = 1.00, p < .001, d = 0.28. 
Reputation was rated as a more important reason than appeal, t(50) = 6.59, p < .001, d 
= 1.86, and of similar importance to convention, t(50) = 0.09, p = .93, d = 0.01, which 
was also more important than appeal, t(50) = 7.44, p < .001, d = 1.78. 
Participants who chose to wear the arm band underneath the jacket rated 
reputation as a more important reason than contagion, t(33) = 11.86, p < .001, d = 
4.13, appeal, t(33) = 10.72, p < .001, d = 3.73, or convention, t(33) = 9.10, p < .001, d 
= 3.17. Contagion was reported to be of similar importance to appeal, t(33) = 0.99, p 
= .33, d = 0.34, and convention, t(33) = 0.41, p = .68, d = 0.14. Appeal was rated 
similarly to convention, t(33) = 0.84, p = .51, d = 0.29. 
 
Figure 4. Reasons given by participants for their choices in Study 2, collapsed 


























The Nazi armband was rated as highly immoral and disgusting, yet contagion 
was of little importance to participants, even to those who decided against putting the 
armband directly on their skin, and even if they wore the Nazi armband in private. 
Remarkably, contagion concern was of no more importance to participants than the 
positive appeal of feeling like a Nazi. Instead, participants reported that reputation 
concern was most important to the decision to hide the armband, and following 
convention was also important to the decision of those who wore it visibly. 
As predicted by the reputation management account, the presence of an 
audience considerably increased the proportion of participants who chose to wear the 
armband underneath the jacket so that it was not on display. In contrast, most 
participants in the private condition chose to wear the armband on top of the jacket. 
This finding might at first seem like it supports the idea that when in private they do 
not want to make skin contact with the disgusting object, perhaps because they do 
perceive it as contaminating. However the reported reasons dispute this interpretation 
because very little contagion concern was reported. Instead, convention was rated as 
highly important. When in private reputation concerns were probably not sufficient 
for most participants to overcome the convention of wearing the armband in a 
traditional way. In addition a limitation to the design of the study was that it was 
easier to put the jacket on first and then the armband on top, because the jacket then 
held the armband in place, whereas putting the armband on first around the bare arm 
required holding it in place while putting the jacket on. It may simply have been 
harder to put the armband on under the jacket, so the cost was only worth paying 
when there was sufficient reputation concern in the audience condition. 
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Another limitation was that, as in Study 1, a substantial minority of 
participants in the audience condition still chose to wear the armband on top of the 
jacket and the number was not significantly different from the number who wore it 
underneath. This may have been because the presence of the audience did not have a 
VWURQJHQRXJKHIIHFWRQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶UHSXWDWLRQFRncern. In the original study (Rozin 
et al., 1999) participants were also asked to wear the Nazi armband in front of the 
H[SHULPHQWHUEXWWKHUHZDVDOVRD³FRQVSLFXRXVO\SRVLWLRQHG´YLGHRFDPHUDSUHVHQW
in the lab. Had this been included in the current study, fewer participants might have 
worn the armband visibly. Furthermore, the participants were all psychology 
undergraduates who are used to taking part in psychology experiments in the lab, so 
they are likely to be more conformable in those conditions compared to members of 
the general public. If a similar experiment was conducted with participants who were 
not students, audience effects may have been stronger. In addition, participants knew 
that the audience (the experimenter) was aware of the situation and of the requirement 
to wear an armband, so they might reasonably have expected the experimenter not to 
judge them as immoral even if they wore it on display. Had an audience been present 
who were unaware of the experimental conditions, participants might have been more 
concerned about displaying the armband. Another possibility is that there were 
individual differences in dispositional tendencies to worry about reputation, which 
might have influenced the decision about how to wear the armband.  
 
2.3 Study 3 
Study 3 measured third-party judgements of people who had worn the Nazi 
armband under versus over their clothing, to investigate whether the reputation 
concerns revealed in Studies 1 and 2 could serve to prevent harm to moral reputation. 
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If third party observers judged a person who wore the Nazi armband visibly more 
negatively than a person who wore it hidden (but against their skin), this would 
demonstrate that participants were making a decision that functions to preserve moral 
reputation, whereas if third parties judged a person who wore the armband directly 
against their skin as more immoral, this might indicate that immorality is intuitively 
believed to transfer contagiously by contact, as suggested by previous researchers (e.g., 
Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000). Although being seen to abhor physical contact could also be 
a reputation management tactic, it would be different in kind from being seen to care 
about the appearance of supporting Nazism. This study investigated third party 
perceptions of the morality of the two decisions and also third party perceptions of 




Based on a medium effect size (d = 0.50), a power analysis using GPower 
3.1.9.2. recommended a sample size of 315 at 95% power. MTurk was used to recruit 
332 (186 male) participants from the United States (Mage = 36.93, SDage = 11.41).  
Materials and procedure.  
Participants were told that they would be making judgements about a person 
ZKRKDGRVWHQVLEO\WDNHQSDUWLQDQLQYHVWLJDWLRQLQWR³DWWLWXGHVWRZDUGVZHDULQJ
KLVWRULFDOFORWKLQJ´3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHJLYHQVDPHGHWDLOVDVJLYHQLQ6WXG\EXW
from a third-person perspective. In a between-subjects design, participants were told 
that the target had chosen either to wear the Nazi armband on top of his shirt sleeve, 
so that it was not touching his skin but visible, or had worn it underneath his shirt 
sleeve, so that it was touching his skin but not visible. In a third condition, the target 
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chose to put the arm band underneath his shirt sleeve, so that it was not visible, but it 
was not touching his skin because he had a t-shirt on underneath his shirt. This 
condition was included for comparison with the underneath shirt against skin 
condition, so that the influence of contact with the arm band could be tested while 
NHHSLQJWKHWDUJHW¶VGHFLVLRQWRKLGHWKHDUPEDQGFRQVWDQW 
 Dependent measures. First participants were asked to make a binary 
judgement as to whether the target had made the more moral choice, indicating either 
³\HV´RU³QR´1H[WSDUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHGWRUDWHKRZOLNDEOHLPPRUDOGLVJXVWLQJ
and morally contaminated the target was using a 7-SRLQWVFDOHUDQJLQJIURP³QRWDW
DOO´WR³H[WUHPHO\´3DUWLFLSDQWValso indicated how likely the target was to have 
³V\PSDWK\IRUWKH1D]LV´WR³DSSURYHRIWKH1D]LV´WREH³FRQWDPLQDWHGE\WKHHYLO
HVVHQFHRIWKHDUPEDQG´WREH³PRUDOO\FRQWDPLQDWHGE\DVXEVWDQFHIURPWKHDUP
EDQG´DQGWREH³WDLQWHGE\WKHDUPEDQG´.  These items were also rated on a 7-point 
VFDOHUDQJLQJIURP³QRWDWDOO´WR³H[WUHPHO\´3DUWLFLSDQWVDQVZHUHGWKHVDPH
manipulation check questions as in Study 2 relating to immorality of the Nazis. 
Results 
Five participants were excluded from analysis for failing the attention check 
question and seventeen were excluded because they did not score above the midpoint 
on the manipulation check items assessing immorality and disgust towards the Nazis. 
The mean rating across the manipulation check questions for the remaining 
participants was 5.52 (SD = 0.73) on the zero to six point scale. 
Binary moral judgement. A chi squared test of independence revealed a 
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQFRQGLWLRQDQGPRUDOMXGJHPHQWȤ2(1, N = 310)  = 126.02, p < 
&RKHQ¶s w = .64. When the target was described as choosing to wear the arm 
band visibly, participants judged that he had made the less moral choice (71 vs. 34), 
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Ȥ2(1, n = 103)  = 12.34, p &RKHQ¶Vw = .35.  The target who chose to wear the 
arm band hidden was judged to have made the moral choice, whether this led the 
DUPEDQGWRWRXFKKLVVNLQYVȤ2(1, n = 107)  = 79.1, p &RKHQ¶Vw = 
RUQRWYVȤ2(1, n = 98)  = 66.94, p < &RKHQ¶Vw = .83. Judgements in 
WKHVHWZRFRQGLWLRQVZHUHQRWVLJQLILFDQWO\GLIIHUHQWȤ2(1, n = 205)  = 0.20, p = .66, 
&RKHQ¶Vw  LQGLFDWLQJWKDWLQFRQVLVWHQWZLWKD³ODZRIFRQWDJLRQ´DFFRXQW
participants did not perceive direct contact with the Nazi armband to have any bearing 
on immorality when display was held constant. 
Scaled judgements. A MANOVA was conducted to investigate the effect of 
condition (visible vs. hidden touch vs. hidden no touch) on judgements of how 
immoral, disgusting and morally contaminated the target was. There was a significant 
effect of condition on immoral, F(2, 307) = 33.69, p < .001, Șp2 = .25, disgusting, F(2, 
307) = 39.41, p < .001, Șp2 = .20, morally contaminated, F(2, 307) = 24.25, p < .001, 
Șp2 = .14, and likeable, F(2, 307) = 52.05, p < .001, Șp2 = .25.  
Post-hoc Sidak tests revealed no significant difference between the hidden 
touch and hidden no touch conditions, for how likable the target was rated p = .99, d = 
0.05, nor how disgusting, p = .92, d = 0.12, or morally contaminated, p = .91, d = 
0.11. Immoral ratings differed marginally between conditions, p = .08, d = 0.36.  
However, as seen from the descriptive statistics shown in Table 1, when the armband 
was hidden it was the no touch condition in which the target was judged as more 
immoral (and just about as disgusting) than the touch condition, suggesting that 
contact with the morally disgusting armband was not perceived by participants to 
transfer immorality. Another finding was notably inconsistent with the contagion 
account: ratings of the target as morally contaminated were no higher in the touch 
condition than in the no touch conditions. 
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The target was rated as significantly less likable in the visible no touch 
condition compared to the hidden touch p < .001, d = 1.24, and hidden no touch 
conditions, p < .001, d = 1.14. The target was judged more disgusting in the visible no 
touch condition that the hidden touch, p < .001, d = 1.00, or hidden no touch 
conditions, p < .001, d = 0.91. The target was also rated as more immoral in the 
visible no touch condition that the hidden touch, p < .001, d = 1.12, or hidden no 
touch conditions, p < .001, d = 0.69. And perhaps most remarkably, the target was 
rated as more morally contaminated in the visible no touch condition that the hidden 
touch, p < .001, d = 0.83, or hidden no touch conditions, p < .001, d = 0.72. 
Contagion and Affiliation. The essence and substance items measuring how 
contaminated the target was perceived to be correlated well (r = .87) so they were 
combined into a composite Contaminated measure. The sympathy and approval items 
also correlated well (r = .88), so they were combined into a composite Affiliation 
measure. A MANOVA showed that condition (visible vs. hidden touch vs. hidden no 
touch) had a significant effect on how much the target was perceived to affiliate with 
the Nazis, F(2, 307) = 34.79, p < .001, Șp2 = .19, how contaminated by an essence or 
substance the target was perceived to be, F(2, 307) = 10.22, p < .001, Șp2 = .06, and 
how tainted the target was perceived to be, F(2, 307) = 14.58, p < .001, Șp2 = .09. 
Post-hoc Sidak tests revealed that there was no significant difference between how 
much the target was perceived to affiliate with the Nazis in the hidden touch and 
hidden no touch conditions, p = .60, d = 0.23, nor how contaminated, p = .68, d = 
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Post-hoc Sidak tests revealed that there was no significant difference between 
how much the target was perceived to affiliate with the Nazis in the hidden touch and 
hidden no touch conditions, p = .60, d = 0.23, nor how contaminated, p = .68, d = 
0.18, or tainted, p = .58, d = 0.21 the target was perceived to be. However, in the 
visible no touch condition, the target was perceived to affiliate more with the Nazis 
than in the hidden touch, p < .001, d = 0.98, or hidden no touch conditions, p < .001, d 
= 0.79. Remarkably, in the visible no touch condition, the target was perceived to be 
significantly more contaminated than in the hidden touch, p < .001, d = 0.56, or 




regarded the morally disgusting stimulus as contaminating, they may have understood 
FRQWDPLQDWLRQFRQFHSWVPHWDSKRULFDOO\WRPHDQWKDWWKHWDUJHW¶VFKDUDFWHURU
reputation was harmed. For example, the target was also perceived to be significantly 
more tainted in the visible no touch condition than in the hidden touch, p < .001, d = 
0.67, or hidden no touch conditions, p < .001, d = 0.48. And, there were high 
correlations among measures of perceived taint, contamination and affiliation. 
Discussion 
Findings were inconsistent with the idea that people intuitively believe that 
another person who makes contact with an immoral stimulus becomes immoral via 
the transfer of a physical or spiritual essence. Rather, third parties judge that a person 
who chooses to visibly display and immoral object is more of an immoral person than 
a person who chooses to conceal it, even if that leads them to make direct skin contact 
with the immoral object. Furthermore, third parties did not judge the targets who 
chose to wear the armband visibly as more contaminated than those who made skin 
contact with it. This strongly suggests that people do not think that immorality can be 
transferred by contact, or than people can become immoral by touching something 
immoral. Rather, third parties think that a person who chose to display an immoral 
object is more contaminated, suggesting that, to the limited extent that they endorsed 
WKLVWHUPDWDOOWKH\XQGHUVWRRGWKHFRQFHSWWRPHDQWKDWWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VPRUDO
character or reputation is questionable due to their behaviour. The finding that targets 
ZKRGLVSOD\HGWKHDUPEDQGZHUHDOVRMXGJHGDVPRUH³WDLQWHG´WKDQWKRVHZKR
touched it, is also consistent with this interpretation.  
One interesting finding from this study was that ratings were quite low. Even 
for the targets who wore the armband on display, third parties did not judge them 
above the midpoint on any of the negative dependent measures, despite the Nazi 
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armband being rated at close to the scale maximum on ratings of disgust and 
immorality. In itself, this suggests that little of the disgust and immorality was 
transferred. Even targets who chose to display the armband seem to have been judged 
charitably and presumably were not thought to be strongly identifying with Nazis. 
This may in part have been because third parties knew that the targets were wearing 
the armband for the purposes of an experiment. This contrasts with findings from the 
first two studies, especially Study 1 which used participants individuals from a similar 
sample (MTurk), in which participants rated reputation concerns well above the 
PLGSRLQW³,ZRXOGQRWZDQWWRVHHPOLNH,VXSSRUW1D]LV´7KLVPLJKWLQGLFDWHWKDW
people are overcautious when thinking about reputational consequences of their 
actions, relative to the inferences that observers actually make. This is what one 
would expect from an error management point of view, in which threat detection 
mechanisms should be designed to be hypervigilant to avoid the high cost of failing to 
detect a threat, even at the expense of making (less costly) false alarms (Haselton & 
Nettle, 2006; Nesse, 2002; Neuberg, Kenrick & Schaller, 2011). In other words, 
UHSXWDWLRQPDQDJHPHQWPHFKDQLVPVPD\RSHUDWHRQDµEHWWHUVDIHWKDQVRUU\¶ 
principle, because the consequeQFHVRIORVLQJRQH¶VUHSXWDWLRQcan be high, including 
potential exclusion form cooperative activities (Kurzban & Leary, 2001).  
 
2.4 General Discussion 
Results were inconsistent with the idea that people intuitively believe that 
immoral stimuli are contagious, whether by a physical or spiritual essence (e.g., 
1HPHURII	5R]LQ7KLVZDVVKRZQE\SDUWLFLSDQWV¶FKRLFHVbecause overall, 
they preferred to wear the armband hidden, even though this brought it into contact 
with their skin. In addition, there was very low self-reported importance of contagion 
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to decisions in all studies. Furthermore, third parties judged that concealed, immoral 
objects that touched the skin were, if anything, less contaminating, and disgusting 
than concealed immoral objects that did not touch the skin (Study 3). Behavior and 
reported motives were much more consistent with our alternative account that people 
are motivated to avoid immoral stimuli because they are concerned about being seen 
to associate with them. 
2.4.1 Implications for moral contagion. If people do not intuit that essences 
are transferred from immoral objects to other surfaces, then why do people refer to 
immorality as contagious or contaminating? Despite having disparate motivational 
origins, reputational concerns are superficially like contamination concerns in some 
ways. Both motivate avoidance of certain objects and people ± immoral stimuli are 
treated as if they are contagious. Like physical contamination, reputation management 
intuitions are sensitively tuned to manage the risk of seeming immoral ± like a clean 
surface, RQH¶V UHSXWDWLRQFDQEHHDVLO\µWDUQLVKHG¶µWDLQWHG¶RUµFRQWDPLQDWHG¶'XHWR
these analogies, concreate concepts of pathogen avoidance are well suited to elaborate 
on intuitions about reputation management.  
This account of the folk use of disease concepts like contamination and 
contagion is consistent with Baumard and Boyer¶Vdual process account of 
religious beliefs. They argue that a variety of evolved domain-specific systems 
provide stable intuitions, whereas other systems produce explicit, often deliberate, 
elaborations on those intuitions. For example, they suggest that all people have 
pathogen-avoidance psychological mechanisms that provide the intuition that people 
can make you ill by contact, but this mechanism does not provide detailed 
information about vectors or modes of transmission. This means that reflective 
representations are developed to elaborate on the transmission of disease, and because 
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the vectors of disease are invisible, cultures develop a variety of beliefs to elaborate 
on contagion intuitions, such as bad air, evil spirits, germ theory, or witchcraft (Boyer 
& Lienard, 2006; Legare & Gelman, 2008).  
Even in ZHVWHUQSRSXODWLRQVFKLOGUHQ¶V intuition that people can transfer 
sickness is reflectively elaborated in various ways prior to learning about germ theory 
in school. Children intuit that contact with unpleasant objects like insects and dog 
saliva could cause sickness due to the transfer of something invisible but when they 
are asked to explain how, they refer to a variety of transfer mechanisms, including 
poisons, colRXUV³GRJJ\VOLPH´GLUWDQGOLWWOHDQLPDOV/HJDUH:HOOPDQ	*HOPDQ
2009). The widespread FKLOGUHQ¶VJDPHRI³FRRWLHV´may be also an example of a 
simple reflective elaboration on the intuition that people can make you sick by contact 
(Morin, 2008; Samuelson, 1980). Explicit reflective elaboration can also lead people 
to extend their intuitions of contagion from physically disgusting objects to other 
domains (Boyer, 2001). For example, people in many cultures want to touch sacred 
items, such as statue of a saint, and avoid contact with evil items (Shweder, et al., 
1997). The intuition that sickness can be transferred between people may expand into 
a variety of beliefs about contact, such as the totemic belief that the characteristics of 
animals are transferred when they are eaten, or that immorality or evilness can be 
transferred by contact with immoral people or objects (Boyer, 2001). However, 
contrary to claims that this is a universal intuition (e.g., Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000) 
they depend on reflective elaborations which are culturally and individually variable. 
The argument presented in this thesis is that intuitions of reputation threat are 
universal and that they motivate aversion and avoidance behaviour that can appear 
similar to a pathogen avoidance response. Reflective elaborations on aversion towards 
immoral stimuli (e.g., a Nazi armband) may or may not come to the conclusion that 
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feelings are due a concern for reputation. In the current experiments, when 
participants were asked to reflect on their reasons for deciding to wear the armband in 
DSDUWLFXODUZD\WKH\PRVWVWURQJO\HQGRUVHGLWHPVOLNH³,ZRXOGQRWZDQWWRVHHP
OLNH,VXSSRUW1D]LV´VXJJHVWLQJWKDWWKH\GRKDYHLQVLJKWLQWRWKHLUUHSXWDWLRQ
management intuitions. It is possible, however, that in other circumstances, 
individuals or cultures would elaborate on intuitive feelings of aversion towards 
immoral people and objects by describing them as contaminating or contagious. But 
this would not necessarily mean that they would behave exactly as if they are 
contagious: they might avoid proximity or contact with the immoral stimulus but if 
they did contact it (or saw someone else contact it, as in Study 3), they might not 
conclude that they (or a third party) were now contaminated by immorality, in the 
sense of an immoral substance being on the skin which needs to be removed before 
the person is infected with immorality. But this is what is claimed by the moral 
cleansing literature (e.g., Zhong & Liljenquist 2006). Problems with this literature are 
discussed in the general discussion of Chapter 4.  
Furthermore, if people do reflectively elaborate on reputation management 
intuitions with pathogen avoidance language like contamination, they may be using 
the term metaphorically, rather than using it to accurately convey their beliefs. This 
interpretation is supported by Study 3 which found that participants rated targets who 
displayed the armband as more contaminated than targets who made skin contact with 
WKHDUPEDQG6LPLODUUHVXOWVZHUHIRXQGIRUUDWLQJVRIKRZ³WDLQWHG´WDUJHWVZHUH
suggesting that any label that denotes a person to have a morally suspect character can 
be used, even if it has no relevance to disease avoidance. 
This account suggests an avenue for future research into forms of obsessive-
compulsive disorder characterized by obsessions about being sinful, immoral, or the 
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target of punishment (Greenberg & Huppert, 2010). Although often described as 
involving feelings of mental contamination or pollution (Rachman, 1994), these 
concrete terms might in some cases reflect concerns about moral reputation. 
Importantly, the costs of potential reputation loss will not be the same for everyone. 
For example, some people may already be vulnerable to social exclusion due to other 
stigmatizing features, or may be weaker and more socially dependent than others. An 
interesting direction for future research would be to measure individual differences in 
reputation concerns and see how they impact behaviour. Particularly strong concerns 
about certain threats are often associated with anxiety disorders, for example, people 
who feel very vulnerable to disease may develop contamination OCD (Stein & Nesse, 
2011). People who have particularly strong concerns about reputation loss might 
develop a disordered level of anxiety, which could manifest as obsessive thoughts 
about the immorality of their behaviour, or excessive vigilance about the possibility 
that other people are judging them. Although some forms of scrupulosity disorder 
(Miller & Hedges, 2010) and OCD with mental contamination (Herba & Rachman, 
2007) have been argued to relate to excessive disgust sensitivity and contamination 
concerns (e.g., Berle & Philps, 2006), the current perspective suggests that these links 
might instead be explained by the presence of excessive reputational concerns. 
2.4.2 Implications for moral disgust. ,QDGGLWLRQWRFKDOOHQJLQJ³ODZRI
FRQWDJLRQ´LGHDVDERXWLQWXLWLYHEHOLHILQWKHWUDQVIHURIHVVHQFHVILQGLQgs challenge 
the predominant view of moral disgust as originating in the appraisal of a stimulus as 
contaminating (Chapman & Anderson, 2013; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; 
Horberg, et al., 2009; Rozin et al., 2008). Across three studies participants reported 
strong disgust towards Nazis, yet there was little or no evidence that they appraised 
them as contaminating. In previous findings that have been taken to show that 
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immoral objects are perceived as contaminating (e.g., Rozin et al., 1999), participants 
may instead have been motivated by reputational concerns. 
Other evidence supports this deflationary view of moral disgust. Royzman, et 
al. (2008) found that participants reported high levels of disgust towards Hitler, yet 
this was unrelated to prototypical disgust feelings like nausea, gagging or diminished 
appetite, measured using their Oral Inhibition index. Similarly Royzman, et al., 
(2014) found that people did not report experiencing nausea, gagging or diminished 
appetite towards moral violation scenarios, if those scenarios did not contain cues to 
pathogens. Nabi (2002) found that although participants frequently report disgust 
towards moral violations, they will usually stop short of agreeing that they are 
³JURVVHGRXW´DWHUPWKH\UHVHUYHIRUSK\VLFDOO\GLVJXVWLQJH[SHULHQFHV.  
If moral disgust lacks key components of disgust like contamination appraisals 
and feelings of nausea, then it is questionable whether endorsement of the word 
³GLVJXVW´ or even display the facial expression of disgust, towards moral violations 
can be taken as evidence that people experience the emotion disgust. Emotions can be 
distinguished by the presence or absence of a number of different components, 
including characteristic physiological responses, action tendencies and subjective 
feeling states (Roseman, Wiest & Swartz, 1994; Scherer, 2009), so if moral disgust 
lacks the key components of disgust, it should not be assumed to be the same 
emotion, even if it bares the same name. Folk emotion terms were not designed to 
provide emotion scientists with categories that accurately assign experiences to 
discrete natural kinds, so it should not be surprising if some folk emotion terms 
conflate distinct affective experiences (Scarantino & Griffiths, 2011). 
Instead, we should take seriously more conservative views, like the idea that 
moral disgust is merely be reported as a metaphor for anger (Nabi, 2002; Royzman & 
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Kurzban, 2011), or as argued here in the introduction and tested in the next chapter, 
that it communicates a more impartial, moral form of condemnation. Others argue 
that evidence showing that the facial expression of disgust is produced in response to 
moral violations tells us that disgust really is felt and it is not just a synonym for anger 
(Cannon et al., 2011; Chapman et al., 2009). However, as discussed in the 
introduction, this argument depends on the assumption that facial expressions are 
automatically and necessarily tied to emotional experiences (e.g., Ekman, Sorenson & 
Friesen, 1969). However, facial expressions do not always index emotions: like 
words, expressions can be deployed for communicative reasons, even when the 
underlying emotion is not experienced (Fridlund, 1994; Royzman & Kurzban, 2011b). 
This perspective argues for consideration of impression management and 
communicative motives behind expressions of emotion, before taking them as 
reflections of internal feelings states. 
2.4.3 Limitations. One limitation is that only one immoral stimulus was used 
(a Nazi armband). Although this was used because Nazis are known to elicit strong 
moral disgust in Western populations (Rozin et al. 2008), we cannot be certain that 
findings generalize to other stimuli, or to other populations. The findings would not 
be expected to replicate exactly with populations who do not recognize the Nazi 
swastika symbol, or who do not associate the Nazis so strongly with immorality. For 
instance, "We're Aryans too," and "I like Nazi" are said to be common greetings to 
German tourists in India and Pakistan (Kazim, 2010). Other stimuli that have been 
used in moral contagion H[SHULPHQWVLQFOXGHD1D]LRIILFHU¶VKDW5R]LQ, et al. 1999), 
a PXUGHUHU¶s sweater, bed, and car (Rozin et al., 1994), DOLDU¶VKDQGDQGDWKLHI¶V
chair (Eskine et al., 2013).  These stimuli do not all lend themselves to precisely the 
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same methodology used here, nor is association likely to produce equal reputation 
threat.  
A PXUGHUHU¶VVZHDWHU, for example, does not present any observable symbol 
that would identify it as immoral, so any discomfort over wearing it would be less 
attributable to concerns about been seen to endorse murder, but participants reported 
almost as much reluctance to wear a sweater previously worn by a murderer as by a 
person with AIDS or tuberculosis (Rozin et al., 1994). However, this does not 
necessarily show that morality is contagious. Although these participants were filling 
out an anonymous questionnaire, they knew that they would return the questionnaire 
to the experimenter, so the presence of cues to an imagined audience (Hoffman, 
McCabe and Smith, 1996) or implicit audience (Fridlund, 1994) cannot be ruled out. 
Even if contagion concerns motivated reluctance to wear the jumper, it would not 
necessarily be moral contagion because the design does not rule out physical 
contagion. Source effects have shown that outgroup members, foreigners or strangers 
are perceived to be more potent sources of germs, and elicit stronger disgust and 
avoidance (Peng, Chang & Zhou, 2013; Stevenson & Repacholi, 2005; Reicher, 
Templeton, Neville, Ferrari & Drury, 2016). 7RGLVWLQJXLVKWKHVHHIIHFWVSDUWLFLSDQWV¶
contagion and reputation concerns would have to be measured and whether they felt 
more immoral after wearing the jumper (to see if morality is contagious), or merely 
dirtier and contaminated by germs.  
Another limitation is that the decision not to visibly associate with an immoral 
object like the Nazi armband could be motivated by concern about supporting or 
normalizing it. This could be the case, for example, if a person was worried that other 
people could see the Nazi symbol on display and then think that Nazism is acceptable. 
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Thus, the desire to maintain moral norms among others could be an alternative, or 
additional, motive to reputation concerns. 
Many researchers argue that morality and punishment function to maintain 
group-beneficial cooperative norms within large-scale groups (e.g., Graham et al., 
2009; Haidt, 2012) and these researchers might be more likely to argue that 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶UHOXFWDQFHWRZHDUWKH1D]LDUPEDQd was motivated by a desire to avoid 
normalizism Nazism which might be perceived as harmful to society, especially to 
certain members of society. This interpretation is not ruled out by the evidence, due to 
the items used to measure reputation concern, ³,ZRXOGQRWZDQWWRVHHPOLNH,
VXSSRUW1D]LV´ and ³,ZRXOGQRWZDQWWRVHHPOLNH,DSSURYHRIZKDWWKH1D]LVGLG´ 
$OWKRXJK³VHHPOLNH´LPSOLHVDQLPSression management concern, appearing to 
condone or support Nazis would also be objectionable to a participant who is 
motivated by concern about normalizing Nazism. One way to distinguish between 
these motives would be to include adGLWLRQDOLWHPVVXFKDV³,GLG not want to make 
RWKHUSHRSOHWRWKLQNWKDWZKDWWKH1D]LVGLGZDVRN´RU³,GLGQRWZDQWWROHDGRWKHU




between normalization and reputation concerns, respectively.  
Another way to distinguish between these accounts would be to vary the 
composition of the audience. If participants are led to believe that audience members 
are already somewhat sympathetic to Nazis, then the reputation explanation would 
predict lower aversion to being seen associating with the armband and a greater 
tendency to display the armband. But the moral norm endorsement explanation would 
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predict that if the audience members are somewhat sympathetic to Nazis, participants 
would have more concern about display because there is more risk that Nazism could 
become normalized. The audience could also be identified as different groups of 
people. If participants were told that the people who were likely to see them were 
children, then participants might have more concern about normalizing Nazism, 
assuming that people believe that children are more impressionable than adults, but 
also have less power to harm reputation. If, on the other hand, the audience was a 
group of Jews, then participants would be unlikely to be concerned about normalizing 
Nazism, which is unlikely to occur among Jews, but more concerned about the 
DXGLHQFH¶V impression of them. The reputation management account predicts that 
participants in the Jew condition, participants would be less likely to visibly display 
the armband and would report more discomfort about doing so, whereas the 
normalization account predicts that participants in the child condition would be more 
reluctant to visibly display the armband.  
Although the normalization and reputation explanations are both plausible, 
findings from Study 3 are arguably less consistent with the normalization account 
than the reputation management account. Third parties judged people who visibly 
displayed the Nazi armband to be only slightly immoral and disgusting, despite first 
parties (in Studies 1 and 2) reporting strong concern about visibly displaying the 
armband. If display of the Nazi armband was perceived to be wrong because it risks 
promoting an immoral norm, then third-party observers might have been expected to 
more strongly condemn those who displayed the armband for promoting Nazism. But 
if the person who visibly displayed the Nazi armband was only seen as harming 
themselves by damaging their reputation, and not negatively influencing those around 
them, then their action would not have been judged as immoral. Again, this 
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interpretation could be confirmed empirically by asking third-parties additional 





 Although additional evidence would be required to settle the issue with 
certainty, there are theoretical reasons to favour the reputation explanation over the 
norm-support explanation. As explained in detail in the introduction, during human 
evolution maintaining a good reputation is thought to have been extremely important 
because of its influence on securing future cooperative partners and avoiding 
ostracism (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Kurzban & Leary, 2001). For this reason, the 
desire to maintain a good reputation is a strong motive, and reputational consequences 
of actions are often highly salient to people (Hoffman, McCabe & Smith, 1996; 
.XU]EDQ'H6FLROL	2¶%ULDQ).  
In contrast, it is less clear, from an evolutionary perspective, why people 
would be motivated to adjust their self-presentation behaviour based on concerns 
about the effects of their actions on the moral beliefs of third-parties. Some 
perspectives argue that people are motivated to uphold social norms because people 
are concerned about the functioning of their social group and do not want to support 
norm-violations that could damage the group (e.g., Feldman, 1984). Other 
perspectives argue that moral psychology is based on a form of intuitive deontology, 
ZKHUHE\SHRSOHKDYHPRUDOSULQFLSOHVHJ³KDUPLQJRWKHUVLVZURQJ´³1D]LVPLV
KDUPIXODQGZURQJ´DQGRbject when people violate these principles (e.g., Cushman, 
Greene & Young, 2009). Others argue that psychological mechanisms for benefitting 
94 
 
the group could have evolved by group-level selection. For example, intuitive 
aversion to harm or unfairness within a group may have been selected because groups 
ZLWKLQGLYLGXDOVZKRGLGQ¶WFKHDWRUKDUPHDFKRWKHUZRXOGKDYHRXWFRPSHWHGJURXSV
who did, and these groups would have left more descendants (Haidt, 2012; Boyd & 
Richerson, 2002). However, group selection is a weak force and it is not capable of 
constructing complex adaptations (Williams, 1966). Therefore, the psychological 
mechanisms upon which morality is based are unlikely to be designed to benefit the 
group. Evolution builds mechanisms that benefit individual fitness, not group fitness 
(Pinker, 2012).  
However, motives for supporting norms do not have to be a product of group-
level selection, because some norms can enhance individual fitness. Even when a 
YLRODWLRQGRHVQRWDIIHFWDQLQGLYLGXDOGLUHFWO\WKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VILWQHVVFRXOGEH
adversely affected if the cooperative or moral norm were to be come acceptable and 
widespread, so there can selection for motives to punish, gossip and generally uphold 
preferred rules of conduct (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013; Tooby & Cosmides, 2010; 
Tybur et al., 2013). However, this would lead to the evolution of mechanisms that 
identify norms that benefit the individual (which would vary between individuals), 
rather than blind support for norms that benefit everybody. For example, for a weak, 
isolated, or minority group member, it might be especially beneficial to support norms 
DJDLQVWSK\VLFDOYLROHQFHQRWIRUWKHJURXS¶VZHOIDUHEXWbecause RQH¶VVHOIRUNLQ
could later be the target of violence aggressive behaviour was normalized. This 
individual would be particularly motivated to condemn harm violations and might be 
particularly supportive of norms favouring redistribution or supporting the weak and 
vulnerable. In contrast, a person who perceives themselves as strong and dominant 
might favour norms supporting free competition. The functional flexibility of norm-
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endorsement has been supported by recent studies. For example, participants who 
fasted were subsequently more likely to support redistribution norms than those who 
were satiated, possibly because they perceived themselves as needy (Petersen et al., 
2011). As another example, individuals who have mating opportunities (because they 
are attractive or single) are less likely to support norms that favour monogamy (Price 
et al., 2014). This leads to the question: who would benefit from norms supporting 
versus proscribing Nazism? Even if the Nazi ideology could be perceived as 
beneficial to some individuals, such as white heterosexual men, it seems unlikely that 
anyone in a University of Kent psychology lab would think that normalizing Nazism 
was possible or desirable, given the widespread moral condemnation of Nazis (as 
shown by the mean score of over 5 on the 6-point scale of Nazi immorality in Studies 
1, 2 and 3). This could be tested empirically by asking participants, not just about 
WKHLURZQPRUDOYLHZVRQ1D]LVPEXWWKHLUSHUFHSWLRQRIRWKHUV¶YLHZVRI1D]LVP
DQGKRZVXVFHSWLEOHRWKHUV¶YLHZVZHUHWREHLQJFKDQJHGRULQIOXHQFHGE\VHHLQJD
participant condoning the wearing of Nazi insignia. If no-one thinks that Nazism 
should be normalized, or can be normalized, then concern about normalization seems 
unlikely to be a salient motive. 
2.4.4 Conclusion. At a minimum, these findings cast doubt on the claim that 
moral disgust arises from appraisals of contamination. If disgust reported towards 
immoral stimuli is not accompanied by perceptions of contamination, then this raises 
the possibility that moral disgust may not be the same emotion as disgust elicited by 
towards physical, pathogenic, stimuli, especially if, as many have argued, the 
perception of the potential to contaminate is required for the elicitation of disgust 
(e.g., Horberg et al., 2009). If moral disgust is not really the same mental state as 
prototypical disgust, then it is necessary to explain why people frequently use disgust-
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related terminology, and facial expressions of disgust, when responding to moral 
violations that have no pathogenic content (e.g., Chapman et al., 2009). The next 
Chapter contains five studies investigating the social signaling account of moral 
disgust.  
 
Chapter 3. Disgust communicates moral motives 
One way to enhance moral reputation is to publicly condemn the immoral 
DFWLRQVRIRWKHUSHRSOHWKHUHE\VLJQDOOLQJRQH¶VRZQYLUWXH$OWKRXJKERWKDQJHUDQG
disgust are emotions of condemnation, anger is typically deployed in defence of self-
interest, so observers are likely to infer from anger that the expresser is motivated by 
self-interest. Disgust may also communicate strong offense but without prompting 
inferences of self-interested motivation. Disgust may be expressed towards 
immorality not because a wrongdoing is appraised as contaminating, or because the 
expresser feels nausea, but because the expresser seeks to communicate morally 
motivated condemnation.  
This chapter contains five studies testing these hypotheses. Studies 4 and 5 
presented a scenario in which a target expressed anger or disgust toward a 
ZURQJGRLQJDQGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶LQIHUHQFHVDERXWWKHWDUJHW¶VPRUDOYHUVXVVHOI-
interested motivation were measured. Study 6 gave participants a scenario in which 
their aim was to communicate either self-interest or moral concern and measured 
which emotion they chose to express. For a more stringent test, Studies 7 and 8 used a 
concrete scenario involving harm to the self, to see whether the aim of 
communicating moral motivation would increase disgust expression under conditions 
that would normally predict anger (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). All measures, all 
manipulations, data exclusions, and a priori sample size rationale are reported. Studies 
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5, 6, and 7 were preregistered, including all of the hypotheses. Preregistrations and 
data can be found on the Open Science Framework website, https://osf.io/4ac5p/. 
 
 
3.1 Study 4 
Participants were presented with a scenario in which they imagined two people 
having a conversation in which one of the people is describing a wrongdoing and 
condemns the wrongdoing by expressing either disgust or anger. The details of the 
wrongdoing were deliberately kept vague, so that participants had to make inferences 
based on the expression and not on other contextual clues. Ambiguous social situations 
have also been used in other research to investigate inferences based only on expressed 
emotion, while excluding situational clues (Van Doorn, Van Kleef & Van der Pligt, 
2015). Participants were then asked to infer the likely motives of the person who 
condemned the wrongdoing. Predictions were that the disgust expresser would be 
perceived as motivated more by moral concerns, or concerns for what had happened to 
someone other than themselves, whereas the anger expresser would be perceived as 
being motivated more by self-interest. Participants were also asked to infer who was 
likely to be the victim of the wrongdoing. Given the hypothesis that anger 
communicates self-interest and disgust communicates more moral and impartial 
motives, the victim in the anger condition should be inferred to be expresser herself, 
whereas in the disgust condition, the victim would be inferred to be WKHWDUJHW¶VIULHQG





Participants. Based on an effect size (d = .91) in similar research on emotion 
communication (Hareli & Hess, 2010), a power analysis using GPower 3.1.9.2., 
recommended a sample size of 66 at 95% power. This was increased by 25% to allow 
for incomplete responses and exclusions based on an attention check question. 
Amazon MTurk was used to recruit 84 (34 female) participants from the United States 
(Mage =36.18, SD = 11.11). Allocation to anger and disgust conditions was unevenly 
balanced, resulting in 34 participants in the anger condition and 50 in the disgust 
condition. 
Materials and procedure.  
Scenario. The participant imagined seeing a colleague expressing either 
disgust or anger in response to a violation. Minimal information about the violation 
was given, to ensure that participants made inferences based on the emotion expressed 
and not on other clues about the situation. The scenario consisted of the following text 
(word changes for the disgust condition in brackets): 
³<RXDUHDWZRUNLQDMREWKDW\RXKDYHRQO\MXVWVWDUWHGDQG
you are sitting in the breakroom during your break. Two of your 
colleagues come into the room and sit at the table at the other end of the 
room. After a few minutes you overhear one of your colleagues talking 
and, although you do not know her well, you recognize the voice as 
belonging to your colleague Mary. 
You can't hear all of the conversation from where you are but 
from what you hear, you can tell that they are talking about someone 
else who has done something wrong. <RXFDQWHOOIURP0DU\¶VYRLFH
that she sounds angry (disgusted). A minute later, you over-hear the 
words "I am angry (disgusted)". You decide to glance up at her and 
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when you see her face, you can tell from her expression of anger 
GLVJXVWWKDWKHUIHHOLQJVDUHVWURQJ´ 
Participants were then asked to complete several dependent measures.  
Perceived victim. Participants were asked to infer who was likely to be the 
YLFWLPRIWKHZURQJGRLQJIURPWKHIROORZLQJRSWLRQVµ0DU\¶µ0DU\¶VIULHQG¶RU
µVRPHRQHHOVH0DU\GRHVQ¶WNQRZYHU\ZHOO¶ 
Perceived Motives. Participants were DVNHG³Based on what you saw and 
heard, why do you think Mary feels this way about whatever has happened? How 
OLNHO\DUHWKHIROORZLQJWREHWUXH"´Nine items were rated on a scale from 0, µnot at 
all likely¶, to 6, µYHU\OLNHO\¶ assessing how selfish, other-caring and moral the 
WDUJHW¶VPRWLYHV were SHUFHLYHGWREH7KHVHOILVKLWHPVZHUHµVKHLVPDLQO\
FRQFHUQHGDERXWKHUVHOI¶µVKHLVFRQFHUQHGDERXWKRZVRPHWKLQJKDVDIIHFWHGKHUVHOI¶






(Į = .25). Since the second item was the only one that was unambiguously about the 
WDUJHW¶VPRral concern, the other two items were dropped. 
Results 
Four participants were excluded based on the attention check question. Where 
data violated sphericity, adjusted values are reported. 
Perceived victim. Figure 5 shows the perceived victim when the target 
expressed anger versus disgust. There was a significant association between the 
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WDUJHW¶VHPRWLRQH[SUHVVLRQDQGWKHSHUFHLYHGYLFWLPȤ2 (2, N = 80) = 14.39, p < .001, 
&UDPpU¶VV = .42. The target herself was perceived to be the victim more frequently 
ZKHQH[SUHVVLQJDQJHUWKDQGLVJXVWȤ2(1, n = 50) = 5.33, p  &RKHQ¶V w = .33. 
7KHWDUJHW¶VIULHQGZDVSHUFHLYHGWREHWKHWDUJHWPRUHIUHTXHQWO\ZKHQWKHWDUJHW
H[SUHVVHGGLVJXVWFRPSDUHGWRDQJHUȤ2(1, n = 19) = 6.88, p &RKHQ¶V w = .60. 
A stranger was perceived to be the target more frequently when the target expressed 
GLVJXVWFRPSDUHGWRDQJHUEXWWKLVGLIIHUHQFHZDVQRWVLJQLILFDQWȤ2(1, n = 12)  2.18,  
p  &RKHQ¶V w = .45. 
 
 
Figure 5. Frequency of inferences made by participants about whether the 
YLFWLPRIWKHYLRODWLRQZDVWKHWDUJHWKHUVHOIWKHWDUJHW¶VIULHQGRUDVWUDQJHUZKHQ
the target expressed anger versus disgust, Study 4. 
 
Perceived Motives.  A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
with emotion as a between subjects factor and perceived motive as a within subjects 
factor revealed a main effect of motive, F(1.33, 103.80) = 17.21, p < .001, Șp2 = .18, 
























interaction was revealed, F(1.33, 103.80) = 12.90, p < .001, Șp2 = .14. As can be seen 
in Figure 6, an expression of anger led participants to infer more self-interested 
motivation than disgust, F(1, 78) = 13.77, p < .001, Șp2 = 7KHWDUJHW¶VPRWLYHV
were rated as more other-caring when disgust was expressed, F(1, 78) = 8.65, p = 
.004, Șp2 = .10, and as marginally more moral with disgust, F(1,78) = 3.56, p = .063, 
Șp2 = .044. 
 
Figure 6. Motives inferred by participants when the target expressed anger versus 
disgust, Study 4. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
3.1.3 Discussion 
Findings supported the prediction that more moral concern and other concern 
would be inferred from an expression of disgust compared to anger and more self-
concern would be inferred form an expression of anger. In addition, many more 
participants thought the victim of the wrongdoing was likely to be the expresser 



























hypothesis that disgust is less likely to be inferred as self-serving. One limitation was 
that the difference between inferences of moral concern was only marginal and this 
may have been related to the sample size being fairly small. The aim of Study 5 was 
to replicate these findings with a larger sample size and including additional 
measures. 
 
3.2 Study 5 
Additional items were included for the measurement of moral concern, and the 
gender of the target was varied because some research has shown that women can be 
more harshly viewed for expressing anger (Brescoll and Uhlmann, 2008). We also 
investigated whether inferences about the WDUJHW¶VPRWLYHVZHUHH[WHQGHGWR
judgements about their character, given findings that expressed emotions are 
sometimes seen as diagnostic of personality characteristics (e.g. Hareli & Hess, 2010).  
 Method 
Participants. Amazon MTurk was used to recruit 200 (72 female) participants 
(Mage = 32.49, SD = 11.01). Expecting similar effect sizes to Study 4 (~d = .70), a 
power analysis (with desired power at .90) recommended a sample size of 176. We 
aimed to collect 200 participants to allow for exclusions based on an attention check 
question.  
Materials and Procedure.  
Scenario. The scenario was the same as in Study 4, except that the gender of 
the target was varied. The names Robert and Mary were used because in research by 
Cotton, 2¶1HLOO	*ULIILQ (2008), they were rated equally American, Caucasian and 
likeable. Participants then completed the following dependent measures.  
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Perceived victim. Participants were asked to infer who was likely to be the 
YLFWLPRIWKHZURQJGRLQJIURPWKHIROORZLQJRSWLRQVµ0DU\¶µ0DU\¶VIULHQG¶RU
µVRPHRQHHOVH0DU\GRHVQ¶WNQRZYHU\ZHOO¶ 
Perceived Motives. PDUWLFLSDQWVDUHDVNHG³Based on what you saw and heard, 
why do you think Mary (Robert) feels this way about whatever has happened? How 
likely are the following to be trXH"´DQGUDWHGLWHPV from 0, µnot at all likely¶, to 6, 
µvery likely¶. Items measuring self-concern (Į = .74) and other concern (Į = .78) were 
the same as in Study 4. Items assessing moral motivation were divided into 3 moral 
concern items and 3 principled LWHPV7KHPRUDOFRQFHUQLWHPVZHUHµVKHKHWKLQNV
VRPHRQHKDVEHKDYHGXQHWKLFDOO\¶µVKHKHIHHOVWKLVZD\EHFDXVHVRPHRQH¶V
EHKDYLRXUYLRODWHGDPRUDOSULQFLSOH¶DQGµVKHKHIHHOVWKLVZD\EHFDXVHVKHKH
thinks important moral rules have been brRNHQ¶Į = .79). The principled items were: 
µVKHKHZRXOGIHHOWKLVZD\DERXWZKDWKDSSHQHGQRPDWWHUZKRZDVLQYROYHG¶µVKH
KHWKLQNVWKDWSHRSOHVKRXOGQ¶WHYHUEHKDYHOLNHWKDW¶DQGµVKHKHZRXOGIHHOWKLV
way about what happened whoever the victiPZDV¶7KHUHOLDELOLW\RIWKH principled 
items was unacceptable (Į = .56), so the second item was dropped and the remaining 
two items correlated well (r = .59). 
Trait inferences. 3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHG³Based on what you saw and heard, 
to what extent do you think that Mary (Robert) is likely to have the following 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFV"´,WHPVIRUWKUHHRIWKHWUDLWVZHUHIURP/HDFKEllemers & Barreto 
(2007). Perceived competence was assessed with 3 items: Competent, intelligent and 
skilled (Į = .82). Warmth was assessed with 3 items: Likeable, warm and friendly (Į 
= .90). Morality was assessed with 3 items: Honest, sincere and trustworthy (Į = .83). 
The dominance items: Dominant, assertive and forceful (Į = .83) were from Anderson 




aggressive and out of control (Į = .81). All items were UDWHGIURPµQRWDWDOO¶WR
µDORWOLNHWKLV¶ 
Results 
Sixteen participants were excluded for failing the attention check question. 
Perceived victim. Figure 7 shows the perceived victim when the target 
expressed anger versus disgust. There was a significant association between the type 
RIH[SUHVVLRQDQGWKHSHUFHLYHGYLFWLPRIWKHZURQJGRLQJȤ2 (2, N =184) = 7.99, p = 
&UDPpU¶VV = .21. A stranger was perceived to be the victim more frequently 
ZKHQGLVJXVWZDVH[SUHVVHGFRPSDUHGWRDQJHUȤ2(1, n = 39) = 4.33, p  &RKHQ¶V 
w  7KHWDUJHW¶VIULHQGZDVPRUHIUHTXHQWO\SHUFHLYHGWREHWKHYLFWLPZKHQWKH
target expressed disgust compared to anger but this difference was not significant, 
Ȥ2(1, n = 29) = 0.86, p  &RKHQ¶V w  7KHWDUJHW¶VVHOIZDVSHUFHLYHGWREH
the victim more frequently when expressing anger compared to disgust, but this 



























Figure 7. Frequency of inferences made by participants about victim of the 
violation when the target expressed anger versus disgust, Study 5. 
 
The pattern of results was similar irrespective of the gender of the target but effects 
were stronger for the male target, despite clear results for the female target in Study 5. 
Separate analyses for male and female target are described below. 
Separate analyses for male and female targets. When the male target is 
considered separately, there was a significant association between the type of 
H[SUHVVLRQDQGWKHSHUFHLYHGYLFWLPRIWKHZURQJGRLQJȤ2 (2, n = 93) = 16.96, p < 
&UDPpU¶VV = .43. The target himself was perceived to be the victim more 
frequently when he expressed anger (36 observed vs. 26.3 expected) compared to 
GLVJXVWREVHUYHGYVH[SHFWHGȤ2 (1, n = 52) = 7.24, p = .007, CohHQ¶V w = 
%XWWKHWDUJHW¶VIULHQGZDVSHUFHLYHGWREHWKHYLFWLPPRUHIUHTXHQWO\ZKHQWKH
target expressed disgust (15 observed vs. 9.4 expected) compared to anger (4 
REVHUYHGYVH[SHFWHGȤ2 (1, n = 19) = 6.60, p  &RKHQ¶V w = .59, and a 
stranger was perceived to be the victim more frequently when the target expressed 
disgust (15 observed vs. 10.9 expected) compared to anger (7 observed vs. 11.1 
H[SHFWHGWKRXJKWKLVGLIIHUHQFHGLGQRWUHDFKVLJQLILFDQFHȤ2 (1, n= 22) = 3.06, p = 
.08, CohHQ¶V w = .37.  
When the female target is considered separately, the perceived victim only 
PDUJLQDOO\GLIIHUHGEHWZHHQDQJHUDQGGLVJXVWH[SUHVVLRQVȤ2 (2, n= 91) = 5.12, p = 
&UDPpU¶VV = .24. The number of times the target herself was inferred to be the 
victim did not differ significantly between anger (31 observed vs. 31.6 expected) and 
GLVJXVWH[SUHVVLRQVREVHUYHGYVH[SHFWHGȤ2 (1, n = 64) = 0.02, p = .88, 
&RKHQ¶V w  7KHQXPEHURIWLPHVWKHWDUJHW¶VIULHQGZDVLQIHUUHGWREHWKHYLFWLP
106 
 
was greater when anger was expressed (8 observed vs. 4.9 expected) compared to 
GLVJXVWREVHUYHGYVH[SHFWHGȤ2 (1, n = 10) = 3.85, p  &RKHQ¶V w = .62. 
The number of times a stranger was inferred to be the victim did not differ 
significantly between anger (6 observed vs. 8.4 expected) and disgust (11 observed 
YVH[SHFWHGH[SUHVVLRQVȤ2 (1, n = 17) = 1.36, p  &RKHQ¶V w = .28. 
Perceived motives. An ANOVA with emotion expressed and gender of target 
as between subjects factors and perceived motives as a within subjects factor revealed 
a main effect of motive, F(2.55, 458.67) = 120.64, p < .001, Șp2 = .40, but no main 
effect of emotion expressed, F(1, 180) = 1.83, p = .18, Șp2 = .01, or gender of target, 
F(1, 180) = 0.12, p = .73, Șp2 = .00.  There was a significant 3 way interaction, F(2.55, 
458.67) = 3.89, p = .009, Șp2 = .021. Figure 8 shows mean ratings for each motive. 
Participants inferred more selfish motivation from anger, F(1, 180) = 32.26, p < .001, 
Șp2 = .15, but more other-caring motivation from disgust, F(1, 180) = 3.97, p = .48, 
Șp2 = .02, as well as more moral, F(1, 180) = 7.49, p = .007, Șp2 = .04, and more 
principled, F(1, 180) = 22.89, p < .001, Șp2 = .11, motivation from disgust than from 
anger.  
The direction of results was similar for male and female target but effects were 
stronger for the male target. For the male target is considered separately, participants 
inferred significantly more self-interest when the expression was anger compared to 
disgust, F(1, 180) = 28.91, p < .001, Șp2 = .14. His motives were rated as more other-
caring when the expression was disgust compared to anger, F(1, 180) = 7.812, p = 
.006, Șp2 = .042, as well as more moral when the expression was disgust in 
comparison to anger, F(1, 180) = 4.78, p = .030, Șp2 = .026, and also more 
disinterested when the expression was disgust in comparison to anger,  F(1, 180) = 
11.67, p < .001, Șp2 = .061.  
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Figure 8. Motives inferred by participants when the target expressed anger 
versus disgust, Study 5. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
7KHIHPDOHWDUJHW¶VDQJHUHPRWLRQDOH[SUHVVLRQOHGSDUWLFLSDQWVWRLQIHU
significantly more self-interested motivation compared to disgust, F(1, 180) = 7.13, p 
= .008, Șp2 = .038. Participants inferred more disinterested motives when she 
expressed disgust, compared to anger, F(1, 180) = 11.22, p < .001, Șp2 = .059. 
However, the other-caring motive, F(1, 180) = .001,  p = .97, Șp2 = .00 and the moral 
concern motive, F(1, 180) = 2.85,  p = .093, Șp2 = .016, did not significantly differ 
between disgust and anger  expressions. In general, the female target showed the same 
overall pattern as the male but less strongly and consistently. 
Trait inferences 
 
An ANOVA with emotion and gender of target as between subjects factors and trait 
inferences as a within subjects factor revealed a main effect of trait, F(1.76, 317.03) = 
14.28, p < .001, Șp2 = .073, but main effects of emotion expressed, F(1, 180) = .79, p 
= .38, Șp2 = .004, and gender of expresser F(1,180) = .82, p = .37, Șp2 = .005, were not 

























significantly differed between emotion conditions, and only for the male target: It was 
higher when anger was expressed (M = 4.35, 95% CIs [3.99, 4.71]) compared to 
disgust (M = 3.81, 95% CIs [3.45, 4.18]), F(1, 180) = 4.26, p = .04. Mean ratings for 
all inferred traits and correlations between inferred traits and inferred motives are 
shown in Tables 2 and 3. 
 
Table 2. Mean trait inferences made by participants when the target expressed anger 
versus disgust. 
 
    Emotion expressed     
 Target Trait Anger  Disgust 
Mean 
difference p 
      
Mary Morality 4.52 4.35 0.17 .45 
  Warmth 3.93 3.85 0.08 .72 
  Competence  4.41 4.49 -0.08 .66 
  Dominance 4.25 4.30 -0.05 .86 
  Negative aggression 3.86 3.56 0.30 .25 
Robert Morality 4.33 4.33 0.00 .98 
  Warmth 3.70 3.97 -0.27 .24 
  Competence  4.26 4.42 -0.16 .42 
  Dominance 4.75 4.44 0.31 .22 









      
Table 3. Correlations between inferred traits and inferred motives 
 
Motive/trait                 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.Self-interested  
motive - 
       
2.Other caring 
motive -.02 - 
      
3.Moral concern 
motive .19* .31** - 
     
4.Disinterested 
motive -.08 .50** .46** - 
    
5.Trait morality .17* .15* .18* .20** - 
   
6.Trait Warmth .24** .26** .26** .26** .71** - 
  
7.Trait 
competence .13 .10 .21** .20** .71** .68** - 
 
8.Trait negative 
aggression .14 -.11 -.20** -.28** -.34** -.40** -.21** - 
9.Dominance .10 -.10 -.09 -.23** -.07 -.14 .13 .63** 




Study 5 replicated the findings from Study 4: when the target expressed anger, 
he or she was more likely to be perceived as motivated by self-interest and the victim 
was thought to most likely be the expresser herself. When the target expressed 
disgust, though, she was perceived as more motivated by moral concerns, other 
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concerns, and principled concerns and the likelihood of the victim being the expresser 
herself decreased. 
The findings did not extend to character inferences, despite previous research 
VKRZLQJWKDWHPRWLRQH[SUHVVLRQVFDQEHWDNHQDVFXHVWRDSHUVRQ¶VGLVSRVLWLRQ
(Hareli & Hess, 2010; Knutson, 1996). One reason for this might be that participants 
did not feel that there was enough evidence in the abstract scenario to make 
MXGJPHQWVDERXWWKHWDUJHW¶VFKDUDFWHUSHUKDSVLIWKH\KDGNQRZQZK\5REHUWZDV
expressing anger, then they would have been more willing and able to make trait 
inferences. Expressing anger in itself might not be perceived as making a person less 
moral, even if it is less likely to be morally motivated, unless the anger is seen as 
unreasonable or unjustified. If he had been expressing anger towards a minor insult or 
goal blockage, for example, then he may have been seen as less moral and warm. 
Future research could investigate trait inferences further by including more 
information about the scenario, such as the nature of the transgression and the target 
of the expression. 
 
3.3 Study 6 
Study 6 investigated whether people strategically deploy anger and disgust 
depending on the motives they aim to communicate. The prediction was that 
participants would choose to express more disgust than anger to show moral concern, 
but more anger than disgust to show self-concern. Whether the emotion was 
expressed towards a second party (the moral violator), or towards a third party 
(someone hearing about the violation) was also varied. This was included to explore 
the possibility that, in communicating with a second party, the value of anger in moral 
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communication might increase, because of the possibility of changing behaviour 
directly. 
Method 
Participants. Amazon MTurk was used to recruit 204 participants (82 female) 
(Mage = 35.75, SD = 12.36). Although Study 6 investigated participants¶ own 
expression choices rather than inferHQFHVDERXWRWKHUV¶expressions, similar effect 
sizes were expected (~d = .70). A power analysis with desired power at .90 
recommended a sample size of 176. We aimed to collect 220 participants to allow for 
incomplete responses and exclusions based on an attention check question.  
Materials & Procedure.  
Scenario. Minimal information about the violation was given to ensure that 
participants chose an expression based on their communicative aim and not on other 
situational information. The scenario consisted of the following text (word changes 
for the harm-to-self condition in brackets): 
 ³<RXDUHDWZRUNDQG\RXDUHVLWWLQJLQWKHEUHDNURRPGXULQJ\RXU
lunch break talking to your colleague, Mary. You are talking about another 
colleague you know called Robert, who has done something bad which you 
feel strongly about because it was immoral (harmed you). 
You are trying to get Mary to understand that you feel strongly about 
what Robert did because he broke an important moral principle (it harmed 
\RXSHUVRQDOO\´ 
In the second party condition, participants imagined talking directly with the 
person who committed the violation: 
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You are at work in the break room during your lunch break and you 
are talking to your colleague, Robert. Robert has done something bad which 
you feel strongly about because it was immoral (harmed you personally). 
You want to make sure that Robert understands that you feel strongly 
about what he did because he broke an important moral principle (it harmed 
you personally). 





fear, disgust and joy facial expressions. Images were obtained from the Radboud 
faces database (Langner et al., 2010). The expressions were portrait views from the 
first model in the database, a Caucasian adult female. 
Emotion label scale. 3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHGµ+RZPXFKRIHDFKHPRWLRQGR
\RXWKLQN\RXZRXOGH[SUHVVLQWKLVVLWXDWLRQ"¶DQGrated the four emotion labels from 
0, µnone¶ to 6, µa lot¶. 
Results 
Sixteen participants were excluded due to incomplete responses and seven 
because they failed the attention check question. Analyses are conducted only for the 
emotions of interest, anger and disgust. 
Emotion label. There was a significant association between communicative 
aim and emotion expression chosen, Ȥ2(1, N = 190)  = 43.44, p &UDPpU¶VV = 
.48. As shown in Figure 9, when participants¶DLPZDVWRVKRZPRUDOFRQFHUQWKH\ 
chose to express disgust more frequently than anger, Ȥ2(1, n = 96)  = 21.58, p < .001, 
113 
 
&RKHQ¶V w = .47 EXWZKHQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶ aim was to show concern about harm to 
themselves, anger was chosen more frequently, Ȥ2(1, n = 94) = 22.03, p < .001, 
&RKHQ¶V w = .48. This pattern of results held across audience conditions: There was 
no significant difference between how often anger and disgust were chosen when 
communicating with a third party or a second partyȤ2(1, N = 190) = 2.87, p = .09, 
&UDPpU¶V9  
 
Figure 9. Categorical anger/disgust expression choices by communicative goal, Study 
6. 
Emotion facial expression. There was a significant association between 
FRPPXQLFDWLYHDLPDQGFKRLFHRIIDFLDOH[SUHVVLRQȤ2 (1, N = 186) = 47.99, p < .001, 
&UDPpU¶V9 ,I SDUWLFLSDQWV¶DLPZDVWRVKRZPRUDOFRQFHUQWKH\ chose disgust 
more frequently than angerȤ2 (1, n = 95) = 23.55, p < .001, &RKHQ¶V w = .50, but if 
their aim was to show concern about harm to themselves, they chose anger more 
frequentlyȤ2 (1, n = 91) = 24.58, p < .001&RKHQ¶V w = .52. There was no significant 
difference between how often anger and disgust facial expressions were chosen in the 
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Emotion scale.  An ANOVA with communication aim and audience as 
between-subjects factors and emotion as a within-subjects variable revealed no main 
effects of emotion, F(1, 186) = 1.07, p = .30, Șp2 = .00, audience, F(1, 186) = 0.97, p 
= .33, Șp2 = .00, or communicative aim, F(1, 186) = 0.52, p = .47, Șp2 = .00. The two-
way interaction between emotion and audience was not significant, F(1, 186) = 0.66, 
p = .42, Șp2 = .00, nor was the three-way interaction, F(1, 186) = 0.39, p = .53, Șp2 = 
.00. However, there was a significant interaction between the emotion chosen and the 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶FRPPXQLFDWLYHDLPF(1, 186) = 45.78, p < .001, Șp2 = .20. As can be 
seen in Figure 10, when SDUWLFLSDQWV¶DLPZDVWRFRPPXQLFDWHPRUDOFRQFHrn, 
significantly more disgust than anger was chosen, F(1, 186) = 16.64, p < .001, Șp2 = 
.08, but when their aim was to communicate self-concern, more anger was chosen, 
F(1, 186) = 30.06, p < .001, Șp2 = .14. 
 
Figure 10. Scaled anger/disgust expression choices by communicative goal, 
Study 6. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Discussion 
Findings gave clear support to predictions: participants deliberately chose to 























disgust when their aim was to communicate moral concern about a wrongdoing. This 
is consistent with the hypothesis that disgust is expressed towards moral violations 
because it is more effective than anger at communicating morally motivated 
condemnation and not necessarily because participants subjectively feel disgusted.  
One limitation is that because we did not give any specific information about 
the content of the wrongdoing in the scenario, it is possible that participants inferred 
that a purity, or bodily moral, violation had occurred and that is why they chose 
disgust. In the harm-to-self condition, participants could have inferred that the 
wrongdoing contained no impure content, so they chose anger, as would be predicted 
by theories that posit specific links between moral content and emotions (e.g., 
Graham et al., 2009; Rozin et al., 1999). In addition, Hutcherson & Gross (Study 2, 
2011) found that feelings of disgust are higher when the victim of a transgression is a 
stranger, whereas feelings of anger are higher when the victim is the self, and 
intermediate for a friend. Our scenario did not specify whether the victim was the self 
RUDVWUDQJHUEXWRQO\YDULHGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶FRPPXQLFDWLYHDLPVRLWLVSRVVLEOHWKDW
participants inferred that they themselves were the victim in the harm condition, but 
someone else was the victim in the moral concern condition, leading participants to 
feel the corresponding emotions. Study 7 aimed to eliminate these alternative 
explanations for the decision to express disgust versus anger. 
 
3.4 Study 7 
As a more stringent test of whether the goal of communicating moral motives 
increases the likelihood of expressing disgust, Study 7 explicitly identified the self as 
the victim of a harm transgression, favouring feelings of anger (Hutcherson & Gross, 
2011; Rozin et al., 1999).  However, we predicted that despite feeling anger, the 
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number of participants choosing to express disgust would increase if their 
communicative aim was to show morally motivated condemnation. When their 
communicative aim was to protest harm-to-self, they would express anger.  
Method 
Participants: Although Study7 was similar in design to Study 6, we 
conservatively expected smalOWRPHGLXPHIIHFWVL]HVa&UDPpU¶V9 GXHWR
differences in design. A power analysis with desired power at .90 recommended a 
sample size of 263. We aimed to collect 20% extra participants to allow for 
incomplete responses and exclusions based on an attention check question. From 
Amazon MTurk, 296 participants (156 female; Mage = 37.48, SD = 11.51) completed 
the study.  
 Materials and Procedure 
Scenario 
The first part of the scenario was the same for the two communicative aim 
conditions and the felt emotion comparison condition:  
 ³$W\RXUSODFHRIZRUN\RXDQG\RXUFROOHDJXH5REHUWKDYHUHFHQWO\
completed a project that you have both been working on for the past few 
weeks. You were equal partners on the project. If anything, you feel that you 
worked a bit harder than Robert but you are pleased that the project was a 
success and you are happy to give him equal credit. 
However, you have just been told by another colleague that Robert 
presented the results of the project to the managers of the company. He made 
it sound as if he had done the majority of the work himself.  Since he was 
given almost all of the credit for the work, he was awarded a significant 
amount of money as a bonus. 
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If your colleague had not told you about this, you might not even have 
found out. When you saw Robert recently, he did not mention anything about 
LW´ 
In the comparison condition, to show that anger was the predominant felt 
emotion, the scenario ended here and participants reported how they would feel. 
In the other conditions, the following text manipulated communicative aim 
(word changes for the harm-to-self condition in brackets): 
³$VKRUWZKLOHDIWHU\RXILQGRXWDERXWZKDWKDGKDSSHQHG\RXDUHLQ
the break room during your lunch break with your colleague Mary. 
You still feel strongly about what happened and you are trying to 
make it clear to Mary that you feel this way about what Robert did because 
he broke an important moral principle (harmed you personally). 
Which emotion would you be most likely to express to show that you 
feel strongly about what Robert did because it was immoral (harmed you 
SHUVRQDOO\"´ 
Participants completed the following dependent measures: 
Emotion label. Participants were asked: µ:KLFKHPRWLRQZRXOG\RXbe most 
likely to express to show that you feel strongly about what Robert did because it was 
LPPRUDOKDUPHG\RXSHUVRQDOO\"´2ULQWKHIHOWHPRWLRQFRQGLWLRQµ:KLFKHPRWLRQ
would best describe how you would feel when you found out about what Robert did"¶
7KH\FKRVHIURPµDQJU\¶µGLVJXVWHG¶µDIUDLG¶DQGµMR\IXO¶ 
Emotion label scale. Participants were asked µ+RZOLNHO\ZRXOG\RXEHWR
H[SUHVVHDFKHPRWLRQLQWKLVVLWXDWLRQ"¶RUµ+RZOLNHO\ZRXOG\RXEHWRIHHOHDFK




Emotion facial expression. In the expressed emotion conditions, participants 
were DVNHGµ:KLFKRIWKHIDFLDOH[SUHVVLRQVVKRZQEHORZZRXOG\RXEHPRVWOLNHO\
WRVKRZ"¶DQGFKRRVHIURPDQJHr, fear, disgust and joy expressions. 
Results 
Ten participants were excluded for failing the attention check question. Only 
the emotions of interest, anger and disgust, were analysed. 
Felt emotion. As expected, participants chose the label angry more frequently 
than disgusted WRGHVFULEHKRZWKH\ZRXOGIHHOȤ2(1, n = 94)  = 24.51, p < .001, 
&RKHQ¶V w  = .51. Using the scaled responses, participants also reported that they 
would feel anger more than disgust, t(94) = 4.59, p < .001, d = 0.95. Figures 11 and 
12 display these results in comparison to the communicative goal conditions. 
Expressed emotion label. There was a significant association between 
communicative aim and emotion expressionȤ2(1, N = 191)  = 8.37, p = .004, 
&UDPpU¶V9 = .21. When participants were given the aim to communicate concern 
about harm-to self, they chose angry more frequently than disgusted, Ȥ2(1, n = 93)  = 
20.82, p < .001, &RKHQ¶Vw = .47. When they aimed to communicate moral concern, 
there was no significant difference in how often they chose disgusted and angryȤ2(1, 
n = 98)  = 0.5, p = .48&RKHQ¶Vw = .07.    
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Figure 11. Categorical anger/disgust expression choices by communicative goal or 
felt emotion condition, Study 7. 
Expressed emotion face. Similarly, there was a significant association 
between communicative aim and facial H[SUHVVLRQFKRVHQȤ2(1, N = 188)  = 12.15, p 
< .001&UDPpU¶V9 = .25. When participants had the aim to communicate concern 
about harm-WRVHOIWKH\FKRVHDQJHUPRUHIUHTXHQWO\WKDQGLVJXVWȤ2(1, n = 92)  = 
28.28, p < .001&RKHQ¶Vw = .55. When they aimed to communicate moral concern, 
there was no significant difference between anger and disgustȤ2(1, n = 96)  = 0.52, p 
= .47&RKHQ¶Vw = .07.  Expressed emotion scale. There was no interaction between 
gender of participant, communicative aim and emotion expressed, F(1, 189) = 0.22, p 
= .64, Șp2 = .00. 
Expressed emotion scale. An ANOVA with communicative aim as a 
between-subjects factor and emotion as within-subjects revealed a main effect of 
emotion expressed, F(1, 189) = 18.24, p < .001, Șp2 = .09, but the main effect of 
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way interaction between emotion expressed and communicative aim was significant, 
F(1, 189) = 18.24, p < .001, Șp2 = .09. 
As can be seen from Figure 12, ZKHQWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DLPZDVWR
communicate self-concern, more anger than disgust was chosen, F(1, 197) = 35.55, p 
< .001, Șp2 = .16, but when the aim was to communicate moral concern, disgust was 
equal to the anger expressed, F(1, 197) = .000, p = 1.00, Șp2 = .00. 
Figure 12. Scaled anger/disgust expression choices by communicative goal or 
felt emotion condition, Study7. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Analysis by gender of participant 
Felt emotion. Male participants chose the label angry (n = 31) more 
frequently than disgusted (10) to describe how they would feel and female 
participants also chose the label angry (n = 40) more frequently than disgusted (n = 
13) to describe how they would feel. These proportions were not significantly 
differentȤ2(1, n = 94)  = 0.00, p = .99. Using the scaled responses, there was no 






















Expressed emotion label. When male participants were given the aim to 
communicate concern about harm-to self, they chose angry (n = 35) more frequently 
than disgusted (n = 11) and when female participants were given the aim to 
communicate concern about harm-to self, they also chose angry (n = 34) more 
frequently than disgusted (n = 13). These proportions were not significantly different, 
Ȥ2(1, n = 93)  = 0.17, p = .68. When male participants aimed to communicate moral 
concern, they chose disgusted (n = 24) and angry (n = 23) with similar frequency but 
female participants chose disgusted (n = 30) more frequently than angry (n = 21). 
However, these proportions did not significantly differ, Ȥ2(1, n = 98)  = 0.6, p = .44. 
Expressed emotion face. When male participants had the aim to 
communicate concern about harm-to self, they chose anger (35) more frequently than 
disgust (11) and females also chose anger (37) more frequently than disgust (9). 
These proportions did not significantly differȤ2(1, n = 92)  = 0.26, p = .61. When 
males aimed to communicate moral concern, they chose anger (23) and disgust (22) 
about as often, but females chose anger (29) more frequently than disgust (22). 
However, the proportions did not significantly differ between gendersȤ2(1, n = 96)  = 
0.32, p = .57.   
In summary, gender of participant did not alter the findings, suggesting that 




In confirmation of previous findings, when participants aimed to communicate 
that their condemnation was morally motivated, the relative likelihood of expressing 
disgust increased to the extent that they were just as likely to express disgust as anger. 
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This was found despite the scenario strongly favouring anger because the violation 
had clear direct effects on the participant themselves and had unambiguously harmful 
content. The comparison condition confirmed that the wrongdoing elicited feelings of 
anger much more than disgust. Intentions to express disgust do not just depend on 
what one feels, but also on what one aims to communicate, even if the violation has 
no impure content. 
 
3.5 Study 8  
Study 8 had a similar aim to Study 72 but had a different design. Participants 
were given a similar scenario but were asked how they would feel after the first part 
of the scenario and were then also asked which emotion they would express if they 
had a particular communicative aim. The prediction was again that participants should 
predominately report feeling anger because in the scenario they are the victim of the 
violation (Hutcheson & Gross, 2011). However, despite reporting feeling anger, 
participants would predominantly choose to express disgust when their 
communicative aim was to show morally motivated condemnation. When their 
communicative aim was to protest harm-to-self, then they were expected to express, 
as well as feel, anger. It was not expected that all (or even most) participants would 
switch to disgust, since many would presumably answer with a mind to being 
consistent with the feeling they had reported.  Nevertheless, if a significant number of 
participants switch to disgust in the communicating moral motives condition, then the 
social signalling hypothesis would pass a stringent test. 
Method 
                                                             
2
 Study 8 was conducted prior to Study 7 but is included afterwards here, because it did not 
appear in the main text of Kupfer and Giner-Sorolla (2016) but only in the supplemental online 
materials due to the findings being less clear-cut than those of Study 7. 
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 Participants: ([SHFWLQJVPDOOWRPHGLXPHIIHFWVL]HVa&UDPpU¶V9 
.25), a power analysis using GPower 3.1.9.2., with the alpha level at .05 and desired 
power at .90 was conducted. It recommended a sample size of 264. We aimed to 
collect 317 participants to allow for incomplete responses and exclusions based on an 
attention check question. Of the 305 participants (133 female; Mage = 37.22, SD = 
11.33) who completed the study on Amazon MTurk, 12 were excluded for failing the 
attention check question, leaving 290 participants for analysis. 
Materials and Procedure 
Scenario part 1. The first part of the scenario was common to both conditions. 
It described the violation with the following text and then the participant was asked 
how they would feel and the second part described an audience to whom the 
participant was trying to express. The scenario consisted of the following text (word 
changes for the harm-to-self condition are given in brackets): 
 ³$W\RXUSODFHRIZRUN\RXDQG\RXUFROOHDJXH5REHUWKDYHUHFHQWO\
completed a project that you have both been working on for the past few 
weeks. You were equal partners on the project. If anything, you feel that you 
worked a bit harder than Robert but you are pleased that the project was a 
success and you are happy to give him equal credit. 
However, you have just been told by another colleague that Robert 
presented the results of the project to the managers of the company. He made 
is sound as if he had done the majority of the work himself.  Since he was 
given almost all of the credit for the work, he has been awarded a significant 
amount of money as a bonus. If your colleague had not told you about this, 








emotion do you think you would express in tKLVVLWXDWLRQ"¶DQGUDWHGWKHIRXUHPRWLRQ
labels from 0, none to 6, a lot. 
Scenario part 27KHVHFRQGSDUWRIWKHVFHQDULRYDULHGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶
communicative aim using the following text (word changes for the harm-to-self 
condition are given in brackets): 
³$VKRUWZKLOHDIWHU\RXILQGRXWDERXWZKDWKDGKDSSHQHG\RXDUHLQ
the break room during your lunch break with a few of your colleagues. You 
decide that you want to talk to them about what Robert did. You still feel 
strongly about what happened but you want to make it clear to your 
colleagues that you feel this way about what Robert did because he broke an 
important moral principle (it harmed you personally). 
Which emotion would you express to show that you feel strongly 
about what Robert did because iWZDVLPPRUDOKDUPHG\RXSHUVRQDOO\"´ 
Next, participants completed the following dependent measures: 
Emotion label3DUWLFLSDQWVFKRVHIURPµDQJU\¶µGLVJXVWHG¶µDIUDLG¶DQG
µMR\IXO¶ 
Emotion facial expression. 3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHGµ:KLFKRIWKHIDFLDO
H[SUHVVLRQVVKRZQEHORZZRXOG\RXEHPRVWOLNHO\WRVKRZ"¶DQGFKRVHIURPDQJHU




you think you ZRXOGH[SUHVVLQWKLVVLWXDWLRQ"¶DQGUDWHGWKHIRXUHPRWLRQODEHOVIURP
0, none to 6, a lot. 
Results 
Felt emotion. Participants who chose afraid (n = 0) or joyful (n = 3) were 
excluded, so that the emotions of interest, angry (n = 222) and disgusted (n = 65), 
could be compared directly. As expected participants chose the label angry (222) 
more frequently than the label disgusted (65) WRGHVFULEHKRZWKH\ZRXOGIHHOȤ2(1, N 
= 287)  = 84.89, p &RKHQ¶V w  = .54. Using the scaled responses, participants 
also reported that they would feel more anger (M = 6.27, SD = 1.05) than disgust (M = 
5.62, SD = 1.45), t(289) = 7.12, p < .001, d = 0.84.   
Expressed emotion label. Participants who chose afraid (n = 2) or joyful (n = 
0) were excluded, so that the emotions of interest, angry and disgusted, could be 
compared directly. There was a significant association between communicative aim 
DQGHPRWLRQH[SUHVVLRQFKRVHQȤ2(1, N = 288)  = 3.98, p  &UDPpU¶V9 
When participants were given the aim to communicate concern about harm-to self, 
they chose angry (n = 77) more frequently than disgusted (n = 64), although this 
GLIIHUHQFHGLGQRWUHDFKVLJQLILFDQFHȤ2(1, n = 141)  = 1.20, p  &RKHQ¶Vw = .09. 
When they aimed to communicate moral concern, they chose disgusted (n = 84) more 
frequently than angry (n  7KLVGLIIHUHQFHDSSURDFKHGVLJQLILFDQFHȤ2(1, n = 
147)  = 3.00, p  &RKHQ¶Vw = .14.   
Expressed emotion facial expression. Participants who chose afraid (n = 2) 
or joyful (n = 0) were excluded, so that the emotions of interest, angry and disgusted, 
could be compared directly. There was a significant association between 
FRPPXQLFDWLYHDLPDQGHPRWLRQH[SUHVVLRQFKRVHQȤ2(1, N = 279)  = 5.27, p = .022, 
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&UDPpU¶V9 :KHQSDrticipants were given the aim to communicate concern 
about harm-to self, they chose the anger facial expression (n = 92) significantly more 
frequently than disgust (n  Ȥ2(1, n = 138)  = 15.33, p &RKHQ¶Vw = .33. 
When they aimed to communicate moral concern, there was no significant difference 
between anger (n = 75) and disgust (n  Ȥ2(1, n = 141)  = 0.57, p  &RKHQ¶V
w = .06.   
Thus with both emotion word labels and facial expression choices, having the 
aim of communicating moral motivation for condemnation increased the proportion 
of disgust choices relative to anger choices. These findings are consistent with those 
of Study 7.  
Expressed emotion scale. An ANOVA with communication aim as a 
between-subjects factor and amount of emotion expressed as a within-subjects 
variable revealed no main effect of emotion expressed, F(1, 288) = 2.62, p = .11, Șp2 
= .01, but there was a significant main effect of communicative aim, F(1, 189) = 7.02, 
p = .008, Șp2 = .02. The two-way interaction between emotion expressed and 
communicative aim was not significant, F(1, 288) = 0.77, p = .38, Șp2 = .00. When the 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶DLPZDVWRFRPPXQLFDWHVHOI-concern, more anger (M = 5.59, SD = 1.40) 
and disgust (M = 5.67, SD = 1.45) was chosen, than anger (M = 5.11, SD = 1.49) and 
disgust (M = 5.38, SD  ZKHQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DLPZDVWRFRPPXQLFDWHPRUDO
concern. 
Results by gender of participant.  
Felt emotion. Male participants chose the label angry (118) more frequently 
than the label disgusted (39) to describe how they would feel and female participants 
also chose the label angry (104) more frequently than the label disgusted (26). These 
SURSRUWLRQVGLGQRWVLJQLILFDQWO\GLIIHUȤ2(1, N = 287)  = 0.95, p = .33.  
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Expressed emotion label. When male participants were given the aim to 
communicate concern about harm-to self, they chose angry (n = 45) more frequently 
than disgusted (n = 40) and females also chose angry (n = 32) more frequently than 
disgusted (n = 24). These proportions did not differ, Ȥ2(1, n = 141)  = 0.24, p = .62. 
When males aimed to communicate moral concern, they chose disgusted (n = 41) 
more frequently than angry (n = 32) and females also chose disgusted (n = 43) more 
frequently than angry (n = 31). These proportions did not differȤ2(1, n = 147)  = 
0.06, p = .81. 
 Expressed emotion facial expression. When male participants were given 
the aim to communicate concern about harm-to self, they chose the anger facial 
expression (n = 56) significantly more frequently than disgust (n = 27) and females 
also chose the anger facial expression (n = 36) significantly more frequently than 
disgust (n = 19). These proportions did not significantly differȤ2(1, n = 138)  = 0.06, 
p = .81. When males aimed to communicate moral concern, they chose anger (n = 36) 
and disgust (n = 33) about equally and women also chose anger (n = 39) and disgust 
(n = 33) about equally. These proportions did not significantly differ, Ȥ2(1, n = 141)  = 
0.56, p = .81.  
Expressed emotion scale. Looking at the scaled responses, gender of 
participant did not interact with the emotion expressed, F(1, 288) = 0.87, p = .35, Șp2 
= .00. 
In summary, consistent with Study 7, findings did not differ depending on the 
gender of participants, suggesting that males and females make use of anger and 






The results from emotion label choices and facial expression choices were 
consistent with predictions, in that despite the scenario predominantly eliciting 
feelings of anger, a goal of communicating morally motivated condemnation pushed 
the expression decision in the direction of disgust. However, this did not occur for the 
emotion scale ratings. One possible reasons is that since the scale rating came after 
the word and face ratings, it may be that the relatively subtle effect of the 
communicative aim manipulation had attenuated. This may have been exacerbated 
because participants were not reminded of the communicative aim, so they may 
simply have reported their felt emotion. The design for Study 7 (described previously 
but conducted after Study 8) was adjusted to take into account these possible 
weaknesses; this was mainly achieved by making the felt condition a third, 
comparison, condition, rather than asking felt emotion prior to asking the same 
participant their expressed emotion. In addition, participants were reminded of their 
communicative aim in the scenario before completing the scaled emotion responses. 
These changes may have reduced any consistency or attenuation effects, enabling the 
effect of interest to be revealed more clearly. 
One limitation is that Study 8 (as well as Study 7, above) did not investigate 
whether having a particular communicative goal influenced the emotion felt. In both 
studies, the felt emotion was measured before the communicative goal was given and 
then participants were asked which emotion they would express. However, it could 
have been that having a goal of communicating moral motives increased the 
likelihood of expressing disgust but also increased the likelihood of feeling disgust, 
or, more strongly, that the increased likelihood of feeling disgust led to increased 
likelihood of expressing disgust. There are reasons to doubt the latter stronger claim, 
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however, because there is no obvious reason why a desire to express moral concern 
should directly make a person feel the emotion disgust. However, a more plausible 
indirect account could be that a person expresses disgust because they have implicit 
knowledge that disgust effectively communicates moral motives for condemning a 
wrongdoer (as argued in this thesis), but then the act of expressing disgust leads to 
feelings of disgust.  
This possibility is supported by some evidence relating to the effect of 
expressions on feelings. AFFRUGLQJWRWKHIDFLDOIHHGEDFNK\SRWKHVLVSHRSOH¶V
affective experience can be influenced by their emotion expression, even if that 
expression did not arise from a corresponding emotion (Strack, Martin, and Stepper, 
1988). However, if it exists, the facial feedback effect may be weak: a recent 
registered replication involving 17 independent studies in which the funniness of a 
cartoon was rated with a pen held between the teeth or lips (to produce a smile or 
pout), found an effect size of zero (Wagenmakers, et al., 2016). Another possibility is 
that feelings of disgust follow expressions of disgust due to cognitive, rather than 
physiological mechanisms. Evidence has shown that the act of publically 
communicating attitudes can have an influence on DSHUVRQ¶VDFWXDODWWLWXGHV, even if 
they did not hold these attitudes previously (Higgins & Rholes, 1978); and when 
people deliberately present themselves to an audience in a particular way, they can 
come to believe that what they have presented reflects how they really are (Kelly & 
Rodriguez, 2006; Schlenker & Trudeau, 1990). Perhaps an analogous process could 
lead self-presentations of moral concern via disgust to lead to actual feelings of 
disgust. 
Regardless, the possibility that expressing disgust leads to feelings of disgust 
(or any other feeling), does not contradict the central claims of this thesis, which are 
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that the initial motive for expressing disgust is to communicate particular social-
motives (Studies 4-8), and that moral disgust is not initiated by contamination 
appraisals (Studies 1-3). By themselves, these findings suggest that moral disgust is 
unlike prototypical disgust, and if it were true that expressing moral disgust 
subsequently led to some degree of prototypical disgust feeling, this would not be 
contradictory. 
To test the possibility that reporting disgust, or having a communicative aim, 
leads to feelings of disgust, additional conditions could be added in which participants 
are given a communicative aim and are then  asked which emotion they would feel, 
after (or instead of) asking which emotion they would express. A caveat to any 
findings deriving from an experiment like this would be that participants will often 
report feeling disgust, even when the emotional experience is in fact unlike 
prototypical disgust (Kupfer, 2018; Kupfer & Fessler, 2018). To find out whether 
participants truly feel disgust, rather than report feeling it because they the term 
imprecisely, the emotion should be measured at a more granular level by asking 
participants whether they feel the key components of disgust, including nausea, the 
urge to vomit, the urge to withdraw, and feelings of contamination. Indeed, Studies 1-
3 of the present thesis showed that participants do not appraise or feel contamination, 
even when they report being strongly disgusted by an immoral stimulus (a Nazi 
armband), suggesting that people may report moral disgust without experiencing the 
emotion (assuming that emotions are defined by their physiological and subjective 
properties, rather than simply by use of a word). Future studies could also investigate 
whether people who report moral disgust feel nausea, the urge to vomit, or suppressed 
appetite; the lack of which is already indicated by some evidence (Royzman et al., 
2014). If people do not experience these components either, then it would be difficult 
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to argue that moral disgust is the same emotion that is experienced in response to 
physical elicitors such as faeces or rotten meat, given that the responses would have 
little left in common beyond a vague feeling of dislike or displeasure and a similar 
facial display.  
Importantly, this would not mean that reporting or expressing disgust towards 
immorality is dishonest or deceptive. Moral disgust would only be deceptive if 
observers were led to mistakenly infer that the expresser was experiencing sensations 
of nausea and contamination. This, too, is an empirical question: a study could ask 
participants to rate how disgusted an expresser is towards a moral violation, and then 
to rate how much nausea and contamination they think the target feels. Participants 
could also be asked how much indignation or moral outrage the target feels. 
According to the account outlined here, ratings of nausea and contamination would be 
much lower than indignation and outrage. Moreover, perceived indignation and 
outrage would predict the level of disgust inferred more strongly than perceived 
nausea and contamination. It might still be argued that expressing disgust towards 
immorality is an attempt to deceive observers, even if the outcome of this proposed 
study showed that the attempt to deceive is unsuccessful. Again, this could be tested: 
a participant could be asked which expression they would show towards a moral 
violation and, for those who chose disgust, asked to predict what an observer (who is 
aware that the expression was shown towards a moral violation) would infer 
UHJDUGLQJWKHSDUWLFLSDQW¶V feelings. The prediction would be that the participant 
would not expect an observer to infer nausea or contamination, but would infer moral 
motives, which might be labelled indignation or outrage. Notably, a person may 
genuinely feel outrage and indignation while expressing disgust, but their sincerity is 
likely judged by many factors, such as the strength of their display, their history of 
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sincerity (if known), and whether they are perceived to have selfish interests at stake. 
Together these two studies would show that expressing moral disgust in the absence 
of prototypical disgust feelings is not deceptive, and nor is it an attempt to deceive. 
Rather, as highly sophisticated social communicators and perceivers, humans have 
flexibly redeployed an existing facial display to serve the uniquely human need 
advertise and perceive socio-moral standards. 
 
3.6 General Discussion 
Overall, results show that an expression of disgust conveys more moral 
concern than an expression of anger (Studies 4 and 5), and that people deliberately 
choose to express disgust to communicate that they are motivated by moral concern, 
and anger to communicate that they are motivated by self-concern (Studies 6, 7 and 
8). These findings support the social signalling hypothesis of disgust.  
This perspective may explain why people often report feeling disgust towards 
wrongdoings such as cheating or stealing, which have no cues of contamination: 
disgust is being used to communicate morally motivated condemnation. Even with 
wrongdoings that do involve any purity content, a question for future research is 
whether people respond with disgust predominantly because of an appraisal of 
contamination or impurity, as previous researchers have argued (e.g., Graham et al., 
2009; Horberg et al., 2009; Inbar & Pizarro, 2014), or because they aim to 
communicate morally motivated condemnation. It could also be that the disgust 
expression is motivated by a combination of concerns; one might have an automatic 
disgust reaction towards a sexually deviant act but exaggerate the expression of 
GLVJXVWWRPDNHFOHDURQH¶VPRUDOEDVLVIRUREMHFWLRQPrevious findings have shown 
that even distaste or disgust expressions towards unpleasant chemicals are produced 
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in private but exaggerated when in front of an audience (Brightman, Segal, Werther & 
Steiner, 1977; Gilbert, Fridlund & Sabini, 1987; Jancke & Kaufmann, 1994). As 
noted by Hinde (1985), the motives behind an emotion expression may lie somewhere 
on a continuum from purely expression of internal feeling, to purely strategic 
signalling.   
Findings from the current chapter reinforce the argument made in Chapter 2 
that if people report disgust or even produce an expression of disgust, it may not mean 
that they experience the subjective feeling of disgust or its associated nausea, 
contamination and withdrawal components. Rather, they may express disgust to 
FRQYH\LQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHLUPRWLYHV7KLVLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWK)ULGOXQG¶V
view of the function of emotion expressions: they have adaptive value because they 
convey information about the behavioural intentions and social motives of the 
H[SUHVVHUQRWLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHH[SUHVVHU¶VLQWHUQDOIHHOLQJVWDWH,QWKHFDVHRI
disgust towards wrongdoings, it seems clear that communicating information about 
RQH¶V basis for disapproval of the behaviour has greater adaptive value than 
FRPPXQLFDWLQJRQH¶VIHHOLQJRIOLWHUDORUILJXUDWLYHFRQWDPLQDWLRQHaving an 
alternative expression to anger, with its selfish connotations, affords opportunities to 
condemn behaviour without appearing to be motivated by self-interest. This might be 
especially useful in ambiguous situations in which one could plausibly be motivated 
HLWKHUE\FRQFHUQIRURQH¶VVHOIRUE\FRQFHUQIRUWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIDPRUDOQRUP
Anger may prompt obseUYHUV¶WRFRQVLGHUZK\WKHH[SUHVVHUKHUVHOIKDVEHHQKDUPHG
whereas GLVJXVWFRXOGSURPSWREVHUYHUV¶WRFRQVLGHUWKHLPPRUDOQDWXUHRIWKH
ZURQJGRLQJGUDZLQJDWWHQWLRQDZD\IURPWKHH[SUHVVHU¶VSHUVRQDOLQWHUHVWV 
By framing condemnation as moral, rather than selfish, disgust may be a more 




failure to care about a moral norm. In this way, disgust could be used not only to 
VKRZRQH¶VPRUDOFUHGHQWLDOVEXWWRUHinforce moral norms that benefit the expresser. 
This argument accords with other accounts also suggesting GLVJXVW¶VLQYROYHPHQWLQ
morality is due to its signalling value, but that its main function is to recruit 
condemnation from third party observers to support norms that serve the fitness 
interests of the expresser (Tybur et al., 2013).  In contrast to anger which threatens 
direct aggression, they argue that disgust functions like gossip as an indirect form of 
punishment (Molho, Tybur, Güler, Balliet, & Hofmann, 2017).  
Although largely compatible, the present account differs in two main respects 
from that of Tybur and colleagues. First, they argue that disgust was exapted during 
evolution to serve the specific new function of norm endorsement and condemnation 
coordination (Tybur et al., 2009; Tybur et al., 2013). Many other researchers also 
argue that moral disgust arose through exaptation, an evolutionary process in which a 
pre-existing trait adopts a new function (Gould & Vrba, 1982), sometimes referred to 
as co-option, or preadaptation (Borg et al., 2008; Chapman & Anderson, 2013; 
Chapman et al., 2009; Kelly, 2014; Rozin & Haidt, 2013; Rozin, Haidt & McCauley, 
2008). In contrast, the current perspective argues that there is no discrete emotion of 
moral disgust, as a few other researchers have also suggested (Nabi, 2002; Royzman 
et al., 2014). When the emotion of disgust is elicited by a moral violation, it is in 
response to pathogen or bodily content of the violation and the emotion is, therefore, 
pathogen disgust, not moral disgust (Royzman et al., 2014). Or if disgust is reported 
towards pathogen-free violations, it merely involves the expressive components of 
disgust, not the physiological, action tendency, or subjective feeling components that 
define emotion episodes (Studies 1-3; Nabi, 2002; Royzman et al., 2014).  In 
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accordance with the behavioural ecology view of animal signals and human facial 
expressions (Dawkins & Krebs, 1984; Hinde, 1985; Fridlund, 1994), the expressive 
components of disgust can be used flexibly and strategically to communicate 
intentions and motives, irrespective of the internal state of the expresser. This account 
is more parsimonious than the exaptation account of moral disgust because it does not 
require a discrete adaptive event to explain the available evidence (Williams, 1966), 
only moralized pathogen disgust and flexible use of expressive components. 
A second related difference is that Tybur and colleagues assume that reports 
and expressions of moral disgust reflect feelings and internal states of disgust (Molho 
et al., 2017), citing evidence that facial expressions of disgust are produced in 
response to pathogen free violations like cheating (Chapman et al., 2009) and that 
anterior insula activity increases in response morally disgusting stimuli. As detailed in 
Chapter 1, studies like these do not provide strong evidence that disgust is 
experienced. If reports and expressions of moral disgust do not include components of 
disgust like subjective feelings, physiology and action tendencies, then this renders 
exaptationist accounts even less parsimonious because it would need to make a post-
hoc account of how these components were lost following its evolutionary origin as a 
novel assignment of the pathogen disgust system.  
One counterpoint to the argument that disgust towards pathogen-free 
violations only involves expressive components is that facial actions should evolve to 
be honest signals; otherwise signal receivers will stop attending to them because they 
provide misleading information (Gintis, Smith & Bowles, 2001; Frank, 1988; Zahavi, 
1977). Honesty in this context means that the expression is reliable and accurate in 
representing the internal emotion experience of the signal emitter. This argument may 
well be true for some expressions such as anger (Reed, DeScioli & Pinker, 2014), or 
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smiling (Brown & Moore, 2002; Mehu, Little & Dunbar, 2007), which could be 
misused by an expresser to send false signals of cooperative intent and then to cheat 
or free-ride on the gullible receiver. This may be why people are able to distinguish 
betweeQµKRQHVW¶RU'XFKHQQHVPLOHV that are hard to fake because they are 
automatically linked to particular emotional experiences (Ekman, Davidson & 
)ULHVHQDQGµIDOsH¶VPLOHV(NPDQ	)ULHVHQ, which do not involve 
contraction of the muscle surrounding the eye. However, if receivers are able to 
distinguish between honest and false smiles, then false smiles are not really false in 
the sense of being misleading, rather they contain different information. For example, 
Reed, Zeglen and Schmidt (2012) found that both Duchenne and non-Duchenne 
smiles expressed by the sender during an acquaintance period were predictive of 
sender cooperation in a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma game. Smiles that are not 
automatically linked to a particular internal state still communicate cooperative intent, 
just not as strongly as automatic smiles; receivers who are sophisticated enough to tell 
the difference between these signals can glean useful information from both signals 
DQGQHHGQRWLJQRUHWKHµGLVKRQHVW¶VLJQDO$VLPLODUDUJXPHQWFDQEHPDGHIRU
disgust: receivers are not misled by expressions of disgust towards immorality; they 
just receive different information from an expression of disgust automatically tied to a 
particular internal state: they learn about the moral position of the expresser, not about 
her internal feelings of nausea or contamination. 
Arguably, it is more useful for an observer to acquire information about 
ZKHWKHUWKHH[SUHVVHU¶VPRWLYHVDUHPRUDOYHUVXVVHOI-interested than it is to learn 
about their internal feelings of contamination. It is, after all, information about the 
social motives, disposition and behavioural intentions of the expresser that will enable 
the observer to adjust their own social behaviour accordingly: Through trust and 
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cooperation given the disinterested, moral inclination of the disgust expresser, or 
through appeasement or retaliation given the personal stakes suggested by anger. 
Future research may investigate whether observers do behave differently (more 
cooperatively) towards a person who has expressed disgust versus anger towards the 
same wrong-doing. Research could also investigate whether receivers can tell the 
difference between expressions of disgust linked to internal feelings of nausea from a 





















Chapter 4. General Discussion 
Chapter 2 demonstrated that the apparent contagiousness of immoral objects 
may in fact be due to concerns about being seen to associate with immorality. This 
finding provides further reason to doubt that disgust reported towards pathogen-free 
immorality really reflects activation of the emotion disgust (Royzman et al., 2014). 
Chapter 3 showed that disgust may be expressed towards moral violations because it 
is more effective than anger at communicating unselfish and morally motivated 
condemnation.  This explanation removes the need for exotic explanations for 
GLVJXVW¶VHOLFLWDWLRQE\SDWKRJHQ-free immorality, such as the perception and 
HPERGLPHQWRI³VRFLDOFRQWDPLQDQWV´, discussed below (Chapman et al., 2009; Zhong 
& Liljenquist, 2006), or the exaptation of pathogen disgust to motivate avoidance of 
poor cooperative partners (Tybur et al., 2009). Together, these findings provide an 
alternative account for why pathogen-free moral violations are reported to be 
disgusting and contaminating. The chapters are linked in that they both explain 
phenomena in terms of the fundamentally important social goal of maintaining a good 
moral reputation: apparent contagion concern functions to avoid immorality by 
association and the expression of disgust functions to communicate morally motivated 
condemnation. Maintaining a good moral reputation was probably vital during human 
evolutionary history, to secure the benefits of cooperation (Barclay & Willer, 2007) 
and to avoid the costs social exclusion (Kurzban & Leary, 2001), so it should not be 
surprising if reactions to immorality are shaped by reputation management motives, 
rather than by metaphorical pathogen avoidance motives.  
Previous chapters discussed limitations, future research directions and links to 
existing literature. This chapter will discuss implications relating to moral cleansing 
effects and will use current and existing findings to consider metaphorical nature of 
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disgust and contamination. In addition, some broader suggestions for future research 
will be considered. 
4.1. Metaphors and moral cleansing  
The claim made in this thesis is that the language of disgust and contamination 
is used for communicative reasons but is underpinned by psychology unrelated to 
disease avoidance. However, the literature on moral cleansing claims to show that 
SK\VLFDOFOHDQLQJUHGXFHVSHRSOH¶VIHHOLQJVRIPRUDOGLVJXVWDQGFRQWDPLQDWLRQ (e.g., 
Zhong and Liljenquist, 2006). If physical cleaning does indeed have this effect, it 
would count as evidence against the claim that people do intuit that moral disgust is 
physically contaminating. 
In one of the most prominent set of studies, Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) had 
participants recall either moral or immoral past behaviour. Participants who had 
recalled an immoral act were more likely to complete word fragments (e.g., S _ _ P) 
with cleansing-related words (SOAP). In another study, Zhong and Liljenquist found 
that participants who recalled an immoral behaviour were more likely to choose an 
antiseptic wipe over a pencil as a free gift, apparently showing that immoral thoughts 
not only activated cleaning concepts but also motivated the desire to cleanse. Schnall, 
Haidt, Clore, and Jordan (2008) found that participants exposed to an untidy room, a 
bad smell, or a video showing a dirty toilet, expressed stronger moral condemnation 
than participants who sat in a clean room. Zhong et al. (2010) found that if 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHLUSK\VLFDOcleanliness were increased using a writing 
task, then subsequent ratings of their own moral character also increased. Lobel et al. 
(2014) found that participants donated less money to charity after they had bathed for 
religious purification and participants cheated more if they had taken a shower after 
visiting the gym. Based on the idea that clean is often represented by white and dirty 
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by black, Sherman and Clore (2009) used a moral Stroop task and found that 
participants judged the colour of a word more quickly when moral words were shown 
in white and immoral words in black. The more strongly people showed this effect, 
the more they rated soap and toothpaste as desirable. 
Inspired by every-day sayiQJVVXFKDV³dirty mouth´DQG³GLUW\KDQGV´Lee 
and Schwarz (2010) suggested that the above cleaning effects should be specific to 
corresponding body parts, in the same way that a person wants to clean their foot, not 
their mouth, when they step in dog faeces. Participants took part in a role-playing task 
in which they lied by voice mail (mouth) or by e-mail (hands). Participants who had 
lied with their mouth subsequently preferred mouthwash over hand sanitizer, whereas 
those who had used their hands preferred hand sanitizer over mouthwash. Participants 
were also willing to pay more for the product that cleansed their respective body part. 
The evaluation of mouth-cleaning versus hand-washing products was later shown to 
be associated with higher activities in the respective sensorimotor neural regions 
(Denke, Rotte, Heinze, & Schaefer, 2014; Schaefer, Rotte, Heinze, & Denke, 2015). 
In a successful replication of the Macbeth effect (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006), Kaspar, 
Krapp and König (2015) found that cleansing reduced moral condemnation and this 
was linked to reduced pupil dilation. These findings have been taken to support the 
claim that understanding of abstract moral ideas is enabled by grounding in concrete 
sensorimotor experiences of cleanliness and contamination (Lee & Schwarz, 2016; 
Zhong & House, 2014). 
&OHDQLQJKDVDOVREHHQVKRZQWRUHGXFHWKHPRWLYHWRPDNHDPHQGVIRURQH¶V
past immoral behaviour. Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) found that if participants did 
not wipe their hands they felt guilty about their past transgressions and were more 
likely to volunteer for another project. In contrast, those who wiped their hands felt 
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less guilty and were less likely to volunteer, suggesting that physical cleansing 
alleviates the need to make amends. Similarly, Schnall, Benton, and Harvey (2008) 
found that participants who had watched a disgusting movie judged transgressions 
more harshly but not if they had washed their hands after watching the film. This 
study was interpreted as showing that by reducing disgust, cleaning attenuated the 
motive to condemn.  Gollwitzer and Melzer (2012) demonstrated that participants 
who played violent video games reported preferring hygiene related products over 
non-hygiene-related products in a product selection task.  
From a functional perspective it is not obvious why immoral behaviour would 
lead to the desire to physically cleanse. Physical contaminants would be removed by 
cleaning, thus reducing the chance of infection, but past immoral behaviour cannot be 
removed in this way. Nor can these effects be explained as performative attempts to 
signal regret, since many were conducted without an audience. Lee and Schwarz 
SVXJJHVWWKDW³WKHUHJXODWLRQRIPRUDOEHKDYLRXULVEXLOWXSRQHDUOLHU
mechanisms that evolved to KDQGOHSK\VLFDOFRQWDPLQDWLRQ´. This argument is an 
extension of the idea that moral disgust was co-opted from its original pathogen 
avoidance function to regulate avoidance of immorality (Rozin et al., 2008; Tybur et 
al., 2009). Here they suggest that an important action tendency associated with 
physical disgust ± cleaning and hygienic behaviour ± was also co-opted to deal with 
moral contamination. However, given that cleaning does not actually rectify immoral 
deeds or improve relations with the transgressed person, it is not clear how cleaning 
would enhance fitness or why it would have been co-opted by an evolutionary 
process.  
These effects are part of a wider literature on embodied cognition that has 
been demonstrated in domains other than physical cleanliness. For example, 
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participants who held a cup of hot coffee made more favourable judgements about a 
target that those who held a cup of iced coffee (Williams & Bargh 2008). The authors 
claimed that this showed that concrete experiences facilitate abstract social cognition 
like interpersonal judgement ± an idea known as conceptual metaphor theory, or 
embodied cognition. They claimed that the effect was not just driven by 
misattribution of positive affect (due to having hot coffee) because only attributes 
related to warmth (prosocial, generous, helpful) were rated higher. Experiences of 
physical warmth have also been found to increase the likelihood of warm behaviour 
towards a target (IJzerman & Semin 2009). Other demonstrations of conceptual 
metaphor theory include the finding that abstract ideas of importance are influenced 
E\FRQFUHWHSHUFHSWLRQVRIZHLJKWDVLQ³DZHLJKW\LGHD´3DUWLFLSDQWVZKRKHOGD
heavy compared to a light clipboard judged a variety of issues to be more important 
(Ackerman, Nocera, & Bargh, 2010; Jostmann, Lakens, & Schubert, 2009). Inspired 
E\VD\LQJVOLNH³WKHKHDY\EXUGHQRIJXLOW´.RXFKDNL*LQRDQG-DPLIRXQG
that carrying a heavy backpack induced feelings of guilt and made individuals less 
willing to cheat.  
The inspiration behind these effects derives largely from the conceptual 
metaphor theory of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), which argues that cognition is 
grounded in concrete metaphors, and from embodied cognition theories (e.g., 
Barsalou, 2008) which also argue that cognition is grounded, but that it is primarily 
grounded in action simulations (e.g., a simulation of weight or of cleaning), rather 
than in concrete metaphors.  Many scholars have noted the remarkably frequent use of 
metaphors in languages (Asch, 1958) but Asch made the more specific observation 
that many metaphors used to describe social relations derive from our understanding 
of the physical world: a person can be warm or cold hearted, bright or dull, high or 
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low in status, and social interactions are often described in terms of physical force: 
³VKHIRUFHGKLPWRJRZLWKKHU´RU³WKH\were SXVKHGWRWKHOLPLW´ (Pinker, 2010).  
Lakoff and Johnson suggested that the significance of these metaphors had 
been underappreciated by previous scholars and argued that people represent abstract 
concepts in terms of concepts that are more concrete and easier to understand. 
&RQFHSWXDOPHWDSKRUVFRQVLVWRIV\VWHPVRI³HQWDLOPHQWV´RUPHQWDODVVRFLDWLRQV, 
between elements of the concrete and abstract concepts. This enables people to use 
knowledge of a concrete concept to understand and think about the abstract concept. 
)RUH[DPSOHSHRSOH¶VFRQFUHWHHDUO\GHYHORSLQJFRQFHSWLons of physical cleanliness, 
disgust and contamination form the cognitive basis for conceptions of the otherwise 
abstract concept of moral purity. In this view, disgust and contamination are not 
merely linguistic expressions, but concrete concepts necessary for thinking about 
morality, which would be too abstract to understand, were it not for activation of 
these concrete concepts (Landau, Meier & Keefer, 2010; Schnal et al., 2008). 
Barge and associates (Bargh & Morsella 2008; Williams, Huang & Bargh, 
2009) describe a similar view of metaphor, referred to as scaffolding : later forming 
and more abstract concepts are grounded on earlier forming and more concrete 
H[SHULHQFHVOLNHDFKLOG¶VH[SHULHQFHVZLWKKHDWSK\Vical space, or unpleasant foods. 
As the abstract concepts develop from concrete concepts, associative connections are 
made which enable priming effects because activating the concrete sensation now also 
activates the associated abstract concept. Others have suggested that these effects 
could have come about not only during development but over evolutionary time (e.g., 
Barsalou, 2016)/HH	6FKZDU]DUJXHWKDW$QGHUVRQ¶VSULQFLSOHRI
neural reuse - that existing neural mechanisms acquire new functions over 
evolutionary time - can in part explain why moral disgust shares the concrete 
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properties of physical disgust like contamination and cleansing motives. In summary, 
in contradiction to the argument presented in this thesis, a considerable literature 
based on conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) suggests that people 
do intuit that immorality is physically contaminating, and that they can even remove 
this contamination by physically washing. However there are empirical and 
theoretical reasons to doubt the credibility of this literature.  
Perhaps the most important limitation of conceptual metaphor effects is that 
they are unreliable. For example, Rabelo, Keller, Pilati and Wicherts (2015) failed to 
replicate the highly cited effect linking ideas of importance to the perception of 
physical weight (Jostmann, Lakens, & Schubert, 2009).The authors found that 
carrying a heavy clipboard compared to a light one did not have any effect on the 
perceived importance of helping, prosocial responses, or the severity of moral 
judgments. Furthermore, like many of the conceptual metaphor studies, the original 
weight studies were methodologically weak. For example, the paper by Ackerman et 
al. (2010) had 54participants in their first study and, although not reported, this gave 
an effect size of d = 0.54, with confidence intervals close to zero, 95% CI [0.002, 
1.09]. Their second study had a similar effect size d = 0.54 and had confidence 
intervals overlapping zero, 95% CI [-0.04, 1.17] (Lakens, 2014).  
Francis, Tanzman, and Matthews (2014) applied the Test for Excess 
Significance (TES) to a set of articles published in Science and found that Ackerman 
et al. (2010) was among the five articles with the most excessive successful results 
based on the sampling and analysis they used. Rabelo et al. (2015) ran the p-uniform 
method (van Assen, van Aert & Wicherts, 2015) on 25 previously published studies 
purporting to show that perception of weight influences judgements. A meta-analysis 
showed an effect size of d = 0.57, but the p-uniform test revealed strong evidence of 
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publication bias. Correcting for this bias yielded a negative effect size. Such bias 
typically results from dubious practices such as choosing which dependent measures 
to report or using sequential testing with selective reporting of studies (Bakker, van 
Dijk & Wicherts, 2012). The authors of one of the most widely cited weight-
importance articles (Jostmann et al., 2009), confirmed that they had indeed chosen to 
include measures from exploratory and not just confirmatory variables and had also 
withheld one study from the paper. Admirably, however, the authors updated their 
FODLPV³:HKDYHKDGWRFRQFOXGHWKDW there is actually no reliable evidence for the 
HIIHFW´-RVWPDQQHWDO2016, p1). 
These problems are not restricted to social embodiment findings on the 
weight-importance link but have also been shown to apply to other effects, as 
illustrated by numerous, often highly powered, failed replication attempts (e.g., 
Brandt, IJzerman & Blanken, 2014; LeBel & Wilbur, 2014; Lynott, Corker,  
:RUWPDQ&RQQHOO'RQQHOODQ/XFDV	2¶%ULHQ3DVKOHU&REXUQ	+DUULV
2012; Pecher, van Mierlo, Cañal-Bruland & Zeelenberg, 2015; Wortman, Donnellan 
& Lucas, 2014). The majority of original demonstrations in the field have been 
underpowered, and according to a p-curve analyses by Lakens (2014), show evidence 
of selective reporting and publication bias. Although it could still be true that concrete 
environmental cues influence social cognition and judgement, the evidence does not 
currently provide strong support for this idea (Lakens, 2014). Importantly, this also 
applies to evidence purporting to show that concrete experiences of physical disgust, 
contamination and cleansing influence moral cognition. Several studies have failed to 
UHSOLFDWH=KRQJDQG/LOMHQTXLVW¶VSURPLQHQWILQGLQJVWKDWSULPLQJXQHWKLFDO
versus ethical behaviours led participants to prefer cleaning products over non-
cleaning products (Earp, Everett, Madva & Hamlin, 2014) and that participants who 
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physically washed their hands after recalling an unethical deed, were subsequently 
less likely to volunteer to help (Fayard, Bassi, Bernstein & Roberts, 2009; Gámez, 
Diaz & Marrero, 2011). Johnson, Cheung and Donnellan (2014) sought to replicate 
6FKQDOO%HQWRQDQG+DUYH\¶VILQGLQJVWKDWSDUWLFLSDQWVPDGHOHVVVHYHUH
judgments when they were primed with the concept of cleanliness and when they 
washed their hands after experiencing disgust. Neither effect was found, despite the 
direct replication attempts using much larger sample sizes. 
In summary, the evidence supporting conceptual metaphor theory in general, 
and moral cleansing effects more specifically, is weak and cannot be taken to show 
that people intuitively believe that immorality is physically contaminating. In 
addition, conceptual metaphor theory has been criticised on theoretical grounds for 
the claim that people are unable to think abstractly without grounding abstract 
concepts in concrete physical experiences (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008; McGlone, 
2011). Others contest that people can think about social relations using by mentally 
manipulating symbolic concepts (Dove, 2009; Goldinger, Papesh, Barnhart, Hansen 
& Hout, 2016; Lakens, 2012). Another theoretical weakness is that it is unclear why 
links between abstract concepts and physical concepts would also activate motives 
(Chatterjee, 2010; Molden, 2014). For example, even if immorality is linked by 
associations to physical concepts of disgust and contamination, this does necessarily 
mean that the entire emotion, including motives like the urge to clean, would also be 
activated. 
Furthermore, despite the major influence of Lakoff & Johnson¶V
conceptual metaphor theory on social psychology, there are credible alternative 
theories of metaphor that do not share the embodiment assumption (e.g., Hofstadter, 
2001; Pinker, 2010). For example, Searle (1979) argues that people first derive the 
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meaning of a metaphor by mentally converting it into a comparison statement, so a 
VWDWHPHQWOLNH³WKHfeeling I have about touching the 1D]LDUPEDQGLVFRQWDPLQDWLRQ´
EHFRPHV³WKHfeeling I have about touching the Nazi armband is like FRQWDPLQDWLRQ´
From a ³weak embodiment´SHUVSHFWLYH abstract concepts may initially be understood 
through simulation and embodiment but once conventionalises they gain independent 
representation and do not need to be represented in terms of concrete domains; 
³NQRZOHGJHGrawn from concrete bases is used to build up the representation of an 
abstract concept that can then be used without drawing on the concrete domains that 
LQIRUPHGLW´Jamrozik, McQuire, Cardillo & Chatterjee, 2016, p. 4). Similarly, the 
career-of-metaphor account, a metaphor may initially by understood by its concrete 
sensorimotor associations but when repeated frequently enough, a person no longer 
needs these associations to comprehend the salient features of the metaphor (Bowdle 
& Gentner, 2005). These familiar metaphors become polysemous ± capable of being 
understood to have both its original literal meaning and its new abstract meaning 
(Lehrer, 1990). This is why the abstract meanings arise later both in history and in an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VGHYHORSPHQW=KDULkov & Gentner, 2002), as is the case for moral 
GLVJXVW¶VGHYHORSPHQW'DQRYLFK	%ORRPAccording to these accounts, 
disgust reported or expressed towards immorality would not require sensorimotor 
simulation unless a person had not encountered the metaphor before. If disgust is not 
simulated but only processed abstractly, then it is unlikely that its physiological 
components like nausea and contamination would be activated. 
Others argue that people directly understand that metaphors are used to make 
assertions about attributes. For example if a boy is said to fly home on a bike, flight 
prototypically denotes fast travel, so people directly perceive the metaphor attributes 
speed to the boy (Glucksberg, 1998; Ortony, 1979). Similarly if disgust is the 
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prototypical experience of offense and rejection, then it is easy to see why it would 
come to be used in a variety of contexts to denote the attribute of causing offense. 
Metaphors are often used when ideas would otherwise be difficult to express using 
literal language, at least in a concise way (Fainsliber & Ortony, 1987). Furthermore, 
Ortony (1975) suggested that metaphors are often used because they help to 
communicate the vividness of an experience by prompting the receiver to conjure 
perceptual and sensory images, which is why people often use metaphors for 
HPRWLRQDOH[SHULHQFHVOLNH³,ZDVEXUQLQJLQVLGH´ 
These features seem to apply well to disgust when it reported towards 
immorality: it expresses disapproval in a way that is vivid and evocative of strong 
feelings of rejection and offense that might be difficult to communicate using literal 
language. One interpretation of the finding WKDWLIDFULPHZDVGHVFULEHGDV³DYLUXV
LQIHFWLQJ´DWRZQSHRSOHZHUHPRUHOLNHO\WRVXSSRUWLQYHVWLJDWLQJDQGWDFkling the 
criminals (Thibodeau and Boroditsky, 2011) is that the metaphor effectively evoked 
attributes of spreading harm but without necessarily being embodied.  In addition, the 
disgust expression is concise and rapidly recognised and decoded by people (Ekman 
& Friesen, 1971; Sauter & Eimer, 2010; Sauter et al., 2010). Although anger might 
also be vivid and concise, as the current thesis shows, it does not communicate 
impartial, moral offense as effectively as disgust. These points might also apply to the 
language of contamination and contagion: it might be vivid and concise way to bring 
to mind the idea of strong discomfort with contact or proximity. When accompanied 
by facial expressions, metaphors of disgust and contamination might even more 





4.2 Other signalling functions of disgust.  
If it is true, as suggested here, that the expressive components of disgust can 
be flexibly used irrespective of the internal state of the expresser, then there is nothing 
that ties it exclusively to the function of signalling moral condemnation. The disgust 
expression likely communicates a more general meaning of offense, dislike and the 
intention to avoid. It also invites agreement because disgusting objects, like faeces, 
mould, or unpleasant tastes and odours, tend to be disgusting to everyone, not just to 
one particular individual. The disgust expression, then, could be used as a more 
general social tool. It might be used, for example, to show dislike of certain 
outgroups, or even ingroup rivals, in the absence of any specific harmful act that 
would warrant anger. Females, especially, might use disgust as a tool of relational 
aggression to signal to peers that a rival is undesirable and to encourage them to 
exclude her (Underwood, 2004). This signal might communicate morally motivated 
tones if the target was a mating rival being denigrated as promiscuous, for example, 
or it might be a more general purpose tool. There are other tools of relational 
aggression, such as looks of contempt and back turning (Bjorkqvist, Osterrnan & 
Lagerspetz, 1994; Hines & Fry, 1994) but it would be interesting to know whether 
disgust is used in particular circumstances and whether it is more effective at 
recruiting condemnation and promoting social exclusion than other signals. 
Similarly, treating an object as if it is contaminating is unlikely to apply only 
to immoral stimuli if the function of this behaviour is to avoid reputation harm by 
association. Stigma-by-association effects are widespread and have been documented 
to occur for many devalued individuals. Proximity or association with disabled 
people, homosexuals, or obese people lead to negative inferences about a target, 
leading to reputation damage (Neuberg et al., 1994; Pryor et al., 2012). If a person 
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perceives that visible association with these groups, or objects associated with them, 
would lead to reputation harm, then they will also appear to be treated as if they are 
contaminating. This reputation damage need not be moral reputation, since people 
seek to manage their reputations in other domains too, such as competence, 
formidability or popularity (Macfarlan & Lyle, 2015). Jones (1990), for example, 
distinguished five common self-presentational domains relating to being likeable, 
competent and powerful, as well as virtuous or moral.  
Equally, reputation could be harmed by visibly associating with outgroups 
because apparent affiliation might be taken to show disloyalty ± a concern which 
might have motivated Liverpool FC SOD\HU-DPLH&DUUDJKHU¶VUHOXFWDQFHWRZHDUD
Manchester United Shirt after losing a bet, despite a /LYHUSRROIDQV¶DGYLFHRIWHQ
EHLQJIUDPHGLQWHUPVRIGLVHDVHDYRLGDQFH³'RQ
WHYHQGDUHSXWWKDWVKVWDLQHG
rag on Carra... you'll catch DOOPDQQHURIGLVHDVHV´*DGG2015). Similarly, findings 
that people are more reluctant to wear shirts belonging to outgroup members (Reicher, 
et al., 2016) could partly be motivated by reputational concerns about loyalty, rather 
than disease avoidance. One prediction is that these effects should be stronger in 
audience conditions, especially if the audience consists of ingroup members. 
However, even without an audience, reputational concerns might not be eliminated 
because there could be an imagined or implicit audience (Fridlund, 1994), or 
reputational concerns might be activated by association. For example, if a certain 
EHKDYLRXUHJZHDULQJDULYDO¶VVKLUWLVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKGLVOR\DOW\WKHQHYHQ
contemplating the action in private might be enough to bring implicit reputation 
concerns to mind. 




behaviour can be motivated by genuinely unselfish moral sentiments that transcend 
considerations of fitness. However, as several authors have noted being motivated by 
apparently selfish reputational concerns does not exclude the possibility that people 
can also be motivated by genuinely moral or prosocial concerns (e.g., Boyer & 
Baumard, 2012; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013). Indeed, the best way to appear moral may 
be to be genuinely morally motivated, so evolution may have favoured genuine moral 
sentiment precisely because it is the best way to make people seem moral and 
therefore good co-operators (Dennett, 2004; Trivers, 1971). In other words, one 
function of genuine moral motivation is reputation management. Nevertheless, even 
people who feel genuinely moral proximate motives might behave more scrupulously 
when they perceive that there could be reputational consequences. People should not 
necessarily be aware that their moral motives derive from reputational concerns, since 
reputation management itself would favour belief that one acts out of genuine moral 
concern, so as to more easily convince others that this is true (Trivers, 1991). 
Evolution would favour self-deception in this regard because it is easier to hold one 
inaccurate but functional belief that one has genuinely moral motives, than to 
VLPXOWDQHRXVO\KROGDQDFFXUDWHEHOLHIDERXWRQH¶VVHOfishness and overt beliefs that 
one has  genuinely moral motives with which to convince others (Kurzban & Aktipis, 
2007; Smith, Trivers, & von Hippel, 2017).  
Costs and benefits of reputation. Enhancing reputation is beneficial for 
RQH¶Vstatus as a good and moral co-operator, but it is also be costly in terms of time 
and resources GHYRWHGWRPRQLWRULQJRQH¶VEHKDYLRXU, including cognitive resources 
like attention and memory. In addition, monitoring the reputational effects of actions 
requires vigilance of other people and their attitudes and inferences. This state of 
vigilance can lead to stress and anxiety, to the extent that excessive reputational 
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concern may be associated with some anxiety disorders (Miller & Hedges, 2008). 
Reputational management also involves opportunity costs because a person might 
refrain from taking certain actions that might risk reputational damage. 
Due to these costs, investment in reputation management should vary 
depending on an LQGLYLGXDO¶Vsituational and dispositional need for a good cooperative 
(moral) reputation. There may be predictable consistencies in investment based on 
these considerations. For example, people with more power, status or competence 
may be less dependent on having a cooperative reputation (e.g., for not cheating, or 
not being seen to contribute equally to a group endeavour) than a person who cannot 
confer such benefits. A person in this situation does not have to pay the costs of 
reputation management. 
A person who has high prestige or perceived abilities (e.g., a prestigious 
professor) may not even be judged as non-cooperative for the same behaviour that 
would stigmatise or ostracise a person with lower perceived ability. A person who 
communicates warmth through non-verbal behaviour might counteract reputation 
history or negative reported reputation by signalling cooperative disposition through 
warmth of character. People should be slower to punish highly valuable collaborators 
and when choosing a partner, they may trade off cooperative and moral reputation for 
other assets, like competence or status. A racist and sexist politician or a celebrity sex 
offender might get away with behaviour that would otherwise stigmatise because they 
afford people other benefits. People who are not under the patronage of these figures 
may not be in a position to benefit from the celebrity or politician and will be 
incredulous as to how he is allowed to get away with it. In summary, these affordance 
trade-RIIVVKRXOGSUHGLFWKRZPXFKDSHUVRQ¶VUHSXWDWLRQZLOOEHKDUPHGIRULPPoral 
acts, as well as how much an individual worries about their own reputation. Future 
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research could examine how these variables influence decisions to express emotions 
including disgust and anger. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Evolutionary adaptation is a special and onerous concept that should not be 
XVHGXQQHFHVVDULO\« adaptation should be attributed to no higher a level of 
organization than is demanded by the evidence. (Williams, 1966, p v) 
 
In no case is an animal activity to be interpreted in terms of higher 
psychological processes if it can be fairly interpreted in terms of processes 
which stand lower in the scale of psychological evolution and 
development. (Morgan, 1984, p 53) 
 
The evidence reviewed in chapter 1 of this thesis gave only weak evidence in 
support the claim that the emotion disgust is elicited by pathogen-free moral 
violations. By showing that morally disgusting objects are not perceived or treated as 
contaminating, the evidence described in chapter 2 raises further doubts about 
whether reports and expressions disgust towards pathogen-free immorality reflect an 
internal state of disgust. The evidence described in chapter 3 supports an alternative 
account of why disgust is reported towards immorality: it is more effective than anger 
at communicating unselfish and morally motivated condemnation. 
Given the constraints on evolution and the improbability of complex adaptation 
(Blomberg & Garland, 2002; Brakefield, 2006) and the improbability of complex 
DGDSWDWLRQDOOXGHGWRLQ0RUJDQ¶V&DQRQDQG:LOOLDPV¶³JURXQGUXOH´RI
evolutionary thinking, the hypothesis that an emotion called moral disgust evolved as 
a discrete adaptation should be treated with scepticism, especially in the absence of 
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convincing arguments that it conferred a significant individual-level fitness benefit on 
ancestral humans. Furthermore, if existing psychological mechanisms can account for 
the evidence that moral disgust is sometimes preferentially reported and expressed 
towards moral violations, then according to the principle of parsimony (Epstein, 1984, 
Morgan, 1894), the hypothesis that moral disgust is a discrete adaptation should be 
rejected. Here it is argued that reports and expressions of disgust (and contamination) 
towards immorality can be explained by existing signalling and reputation 
management psychological mechanisms.  
Disgust reported or expressed towards bodily RULPSXULW\YLRODWLRQVFDQEH³IXOO
GLVJXVW´ but the disgust is elicited by the pathogen content of the violation, so the 
emotion is pathogen disgust, not a separate emotion of moral disgust.  Disgust toward 
pathogen-free moral violations is metaphorical: a vivid, concise and unique metaphor 
expressed with words and facial behaviour, but not necessarily an embodied or 
evolutionarily co-opted full emotion. From this perspective understanding the role of 
disgust in morality reduces to two research directions: why disgust is an effective 
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